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Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the
Managerial Critique of Individual
Rights
David A. Super
This Article contends that enforceable individual rights can improve
the efficiency of government operations. The last decade has seen enforceable individual rights eliminated in a wide range of areas, from welfare to
the treatment of immigrants and prisoners in U.S. jails to, most recently,
the treatment of prisoners in Abu Ghraib and elsewhere overseas. In most
instances, opponents of enforceable individual rights have quarreled little
with the substantive norms underlying these rights. Instead, they have argued that enforceable legal rights would unduly burden government administration. Supporters of individual rights have tended to concede that
they are inefficient, arguing instead that other values justify the imposition.
In fact, enforceable individual rights operate very much like privatized audits of program operations. Most government programs have multiple, partially inconsistent goals. Agency leaders typically communicate the
importance of their goals by auditing the performance of line workers. A
single audit, however, has difficulty enforcing multiple, partially conflicting goals simultaneously. Requiring line staff to respond both to pressure
from auditors enforcing one set of norms and to individual rights vindicating competing norms is likely to produce the best balance between the two.
This Article analyzes the jurisprudential foundations of the adversary
system of justice to find support for the proposition that competing pressures on behalf of contrasting positions tend to produce an optimal balance. The Article then illustrates how the adversary system has worked
successfully in public-benefit programs and highlights the difficulties of
achieving similar results through the command-and-control mechanisms
that typically replace individual-rights regimes.
Introduction
Skepticism about government officials’ reliability in applying social
norms absent pressure from those most affected is at the foundation of the
adversary system in Anglo-American law. We do not trust an investigating
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magistrate to look out for our rights as scrupulously as we would ourselves
before a neutral judge or jury.
This same skepticism gave rise to the individual-rights revolution in
administrative law in the late 1960s and early 1970s.1 If we do not trust
investigating magistrates to enforce norms designed to secure our wellbeing, surely we do not trust government bureaucrats to do so. The rights
revolution manifested itself in two primary ways: by giving individuals the
right to sue to enforce statutory requirements on agencies2 and by giving
individuals administrative procedures to challenge agencies’ actions
against them.3
From the beginning, the individual-rights revolution had its critics.4
The thrust of this criticism was twofold. First, critics disputed the premise
that the government cannot be expected to honor behavioral norms without
being subject to an adversarial process.5 Second, critics asserted that enforcing norms through individual rights has heavy costs in the form of lost
managerial efficiency of government programs.6 Doctrinally, these critiques provided the basis of two of the three prongs of the central dueprocess calculus in Mathews v. Eldridge.7 These criticisms also have
1. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Welfare Reform and Local Administration of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children in Virginia, 57 Va. L. Rev. 818 (1971); Joel Handler, Controlling Official
Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 479 (1966).
2. See, e.g., Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969) (allowing publichousing tenants to sue to enforce federal program requirements); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968)
(same for public-assistance claimants); J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (same for stockholders
asserting rights under federal securities laws).
3. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas, & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (requiring a
municipal utility to allow its customers hearings in which they could challenge terminations of service);
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (same for public-school students facing suspensions); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (same for public employees challenging terminations); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (same for convicts challenging parole revocations); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970) (same for welfare recipients).
4. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 272 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (predicting
grave administrative burdens from giving welfare recipients pre-termination hearings); Wheeler v.
Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (finding administrative hearings
unnecessarily costly).
5. See, e.g., Thomas Sowell, The Vision of the Anointed: Self-Congratulation as a
Basis for Social Policy 206 (1995) (arguing that the imposition of “due process” requirements by
courts on institutions such as schools arbitrarily assumes that what is beneficial in one kind of
institution is beneficial in a very different one); see also Frank Easterbrook, Substance and Due
Process, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 85, 112 (arguing that the government’s failure to provide reliable
procedures to enforce a norm should be taken as a substantive decision about the value of that norm).
6. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2682 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that judicial second guessing of a detention while hostilities continue would defeat the “unity, secrecy,
and dispatch” important to warmaking); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 25.3,
662-64 (6th ed. 2003) (suggesting that the cost of procedural rights could be quantified and offered as a
premium to persons willing to interact with the government without those rights); Sowell, supra note
5, at 105, 224-25 (criticizing views of procedural costs as “incidental” and the pursuit of “perfect
justice” without regard to its costs).
7. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (explaining that when courts evaluate “the risk of an erroneous
deprivation . . . through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
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figured prominently in the Court’s decisions declining to imply private
rights of action to enforce statutes and regulations.8 In Congress, these
criticisms have fueled a movement over the past decade to eliminate the
enforceable rights of several politically weak groups, including immigrants,9 prisoners,10 welfare recipients,11 parents in troubled families,12 and
persons suspected of a connection to terrorism.13
Responses to these attacks on the individual-rights revolution have, in
turn, taken two primary forms. First, champions of individual rights have
emphasized the importance of those rights, sometimes finding substantive
value in the procedures of individual adjudication.14 Second, they have
procedural safeguards,” they are essentially comparing the reliability of the more adversarial procedure
a litigant is proposing with that of the bureaucracy’s self-regulation—and noting that when courts
explore “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail,” they are evaluating the
greater managerial cost of enforcing the norm as an individual right). The third factor, the individual
interest at stake, is essentially a measure of how important it is to force the government to accept
whatever loss of efficiency is involved.
8. E.g., Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) (finding no private right of action under a
statute requiring states to provide child support enforcement services); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347
(1992) (finding requirements in child-welfare statute unenforceable by families); Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (requiring clear evidence of congressional intent before
finding enforceable rights in statute setting out program’s goals).
9. Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1210
[hereinafter “AEDPA”]; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 [hereinafter “IIRIRA”] (codified at scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.). For example, AEDPA prohibits the courts from considering pleas for political or religious
asylum from those that entered the United States “without inspection”—i.e., those that entered the
country without passing through an official port of entry. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (2000). IIRIRA denies
immigrants the benefit of state and local confidentiality rules (e.g., those implemented in connection
with public-health programs) that limit the reporting of confidential information to federal immigration
authorities. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2000).
10. AEDPA, supra note 9; Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. VIII, 110 Stat.
1321-66 to 1321-77 [hereinafter “PLRA”]. The AEDPA generally forbids a prisoner from filing a
second petition for habeas corpus even if his or her first petition was denied on arcane procedural
grounds the prisoner lacked the sophistication to anticipate. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2000). The PRLA
denies prisoners consideration on the merits of suits seeking to enforce the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments without payment of unaffordable filing fees if the prisoner has had three prior suits
dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2000).
11. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 7, 8, and 42 of the U.S.
Code) [hereinafter “PRWORA”]. PRWORA explicitly forbids interpreting any of its provisions to
confer any rights to individuals or families. 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (2000).
12. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter “ASFA”]. For example, AFSA requires states to act to
terminate the parental rights of any parent whose child has been in foster care for fifteen months, thus
eliminating any right to an individualized determination of whether the parent is making progress
toward being able to regain custody of the child. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2000).
13. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of
18 and 28 U.S.C.).
14. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory,
61 B.U. L. Rev. 885, 888-91 (1981) (arguing that due-process law ought to vindicate the individual’s
right to participate in decisions affecting her in important ways without regard to the presence of a
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sought to rebut assertions that government agencies can be counted upon to
conform to legal norms without giving individuals the ability to enforce
those norms.15 These arguments, too, correspond broadly to two of the
Mathews v. Eldridge factors: the individual interest and the risk of erroneous deprivation. For the most part, however, champions of individual rights
have implicitly conceded their opponents’ contention that interposing individual rights has a cost in terms of the efficiency of the underlying government activity.16
This Article argues that both critics and defenders of individual rights
have seriously underestimated the contributions a rights-based system can
make to the efficiency and effectiveness of governmental activities.17
Specifically, it argues that most significant government activities have
positive entitlement); Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process,
in Due Process: Nomos XVIII 126 (J.R. Pennock & J. Chapman eds., 1977) (arguing that legal
processes implement “process values” such as participatory governance, procedural rationality, and
humanness); Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 111 (1978)
(same); Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes—A Plea for “Process
Values,” 60 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 4 (1974) (same); William W. Van Alstyne, Cracks in the “New
Property”: Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 445, 484 (1977)
(asserting a general right to be free of arbitrary governmental behavior without regard to whether the
interests affected can be characterized as entitlements).
15. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and
Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1121, 1202-12 (2000) (arguing the collapse of norms
of professionalism within public-benefit agencies creates grave risks for relying upon administrative
discretion to produce fair decisions); Joel F. Handler, Comment, Discretion in Social Welfare: The
Uneasy Position in the Rule of Law, 92 Yale L.J. 1270, 1271-76 (1983) (listing factors likely to distort
decision making in public-benefits offices); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due
Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and
Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 772 (1974) (same).
16. Paradoxically, the role of private enforcement of government-set norms has gained more
acceptance in areas where private individuals’ own interests are not at stake. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy,
Growing Pains: Using the False Claims Act to Combat Health Care Fraud, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 57 (1999)
(extolling the virtues of statutes allowing unaffected individuals to sue for wrongs committed against
government programs); Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the
Future of Public Law Litigation, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 315 (2001) (discussing qui tam and similar
remedies allowing private parties to assert claims on behalf of the government against third parties);
Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Government, 50 Am.
U. L. Rev. 627 (2001) (same).
17. This article focuses on individual rights’ impact upon the implementation of public policies
once these policies are set. A separate reason to grant individuals enforceable rights is to induce them to
participate in the framing of those policies. Without the prospect of such rights, individuals may
conclude the potential value of any policies they could influence through participation—once
discounted by the likelihood of underenforcement—is outweighed by the costs of that participation. As
a result, a narrow minority with concentrated individual interests might dominate policymaking and
frustrate the popular will. See, e.g., Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 265-74
(1957) (explaining why the majority may rationally abstain from voting despite having opinions on
pending issues, leaving control to a narrow economic minority); Mancur Olson, The Logic of
Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 60-65 (1971) (describing the
dominance of small groups in a range of policy areas). These effects are distinct, however, from those
that form the primary focus of this article: the implementation of whatever norms the government has
selected for its programs.
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multiple purposes. Accordingly, efficiency depends not on maximizing
adherence to any single goal but on balancing several competing objectives.18 An efficiently managed program gives sway to each objective in
proportion to its importance and weighs the advancement of one goal
against the impairment of another. A program may forego a slight advancement of its primary purpose to prevent a major loss in achieving one
of its secondary goals. Thus, even a business whose primary strategy focuses on pleasing its customers will not give away unlimited amounts of its
product or require its employees to tolerate customers’ physical assaults: cost containment and employee morale may be subordinate goals,
but they are not irrelevant to profitability.19 Similarly, even if leaders, to
advance the prime objective of security, are prepared to countenance the
abusive interrogation of a terrorist who knows the location of a “ticking
bomb,” the competing objectives of community relations and military discipline clearly dictated a different treatment for the accused petty criminals
that comprised much of Abu Ghraib’s population.
Maintaining the optimal balance among competing goals requires a
steady flow of information between senior managers and line employees.
Senior managers must indicate their preferences in ways that line employees can understand. Senior managers also must learn how line employees
are resolving problems, both to ensure that employees are adhering to policy and to allow managers to identify any unintended consequences of policy so that they may timely readjust the definition and priority of the
program’s goals. Although the chain of command presumably provides the
primary conduit for this flow of information, fear of admitting errors, confused incentives, limited competence, and garbled transmission all can interfere with middle managers’ reliability as sources of information for

18. See Steven Brint, In an Age of Experts: The Changing Role of Professionals in
Politics and Public Life 84-85 (1994) (arguing that modern professionals have imbued society with
a strong preference for synthesizing and balancing competing ideas rather than committing absolutely
to any one concept); see also Edward V. Sparer, The Role of the Welfare Client’s Lawyer, 12 UCLA L.
Rev. 361, 375 (1965) (arguing that, without pressure from claimants’ advocates, program
administrators experience strong incentives to reduce costs that are rarely balanced by pressures to
achieve the substantive purposes of those programs).
19. Although it is customary to assume that commitment to a primary goal must permeate all
actions of an enterprise’s managers and staff, success actually rests primarily upon a relative handful of
decisions. See Marshall Sashkin & Kenneth J. Kiser, Total Quality Management 52 (1991).
For example, removing any problematic employee may enhance productivity, but most problems
typically can be traced to a small number of disruptive workers. Once those malefactors are removed,
the marginal value of firing other ineffectual staff may be relatively slight and may be outweighed by
the damage to morale and the costs of hiring replacements. Similarly, while all customers may be
welcome, a business’s success is likely to turn on securing a relative handful of large contracts.
Managers may exhort their employees to increase sales ever further, but in fact may be unwilling to
expend many advertising resources to pursue more small customers.
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either senior managers or line workers.20 As a result, large programs with
important objectives often supplement this information with some form of
audit. Most commonly, each major objective is backed with some form of
an auditing system.21 This Article argues that the administration of major
government benefit programs can be understood as the interaction of complex schemes of auditing systems each supporting one of the program’s
various objectives.
Just as individual rights against excessively mean administration of a
program are termed “entitlements,”22 auditing systems that seek to restrain
excessively generous administration of a program conduct can be termed
“counter-entitlements.”23 A counter-entitlement, for example, seeks to deter
a government worker from giving benefits to an ineligible claimant out of
sympathy. Inducing the line employees that distribute government benefits
(“eligibility workers”) to balance a program’s multiple objectives appropriately requires striking the proper balance between the pressures they feel
from each of these audit systems, between entitlements and counterentitlements.
A regime of individual legal rights provides the functional equivalent
of an audit of line employees’ compliance with a particular set of objectives. Instead of criticism in a report (“audit exceptions”), which line employees may contest, this system produces claims of rights violations,
which line employees also may contest. Individual rights may offer more
reliability and lower cost than a traditional audit system, with “auditors”
highly motivated to provide information on the program’s shortcomings.
Although claimants pressing these rights do not typically intend to provide
management information, that often is their function.

20. Cf. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (1532), reprinted in The Portable Machiavelli
77, 155-57 (Peter Bondanella & Mark Musa trans., 1979) (warning princes to aggressively seek out
information to avoid being misled by flatterers in their employ).
21. A single common auditing system may be appropriate for measuring achievement of several
relatively similar objectives—e.g., near-term considerations such as the rate and direct costs of
production. When asked to measure several disparate aspects of work, such as the rate of production
and the long-term cost of customer annoyance due to shipping errors, auditors may have difficulty
determining which goals to emphasize.
22. The term “entitlement” has psychological, economic, procedural, and political meanings in
addition to the legal and managerial ones examined here. See David A. Super, The Political Economy
of Entitlement, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 633, 640-58 (2004) [hereinafter Super, Political Economy].
23. A counter-entitlement is a device for giving incentives to program administrators and
individual eligibility workers to deny benefits to claimants where doing so will serve other important
public policies. Typically, counter-entitlements resemble specialized forms of audits. Where a claimant
does not have any of the characteristics (such as income or resources exceeding the program’s limits or
a refusal to comply with a work requirement) to which the counter-entitlement is sensitive, only the
entitlement will act on eligibility workers and the claim will be honored. Where, however, the
individual is ineligible, the counter-entitlement will defeat the entitlement and result in the denial of
benefits. In close cases, eligibility workers and local administrators will have to weigh the claimant’s
arguments against their desire to avoid the consequences of running afoul of the counter-entitlement.
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If policymakers believe a program’s operations are tilting too strongly
in favor of the norms that the individual rights enforce, eliminating the enforceability of those rights is rarely the most efficient response—just as a
business that feels it has been overemphasizing cost at the expense of quality will not cease its financial audits. Instead, the most reliable ways of
achieving the new, preferred balance among objectives are to trim back the
substance of the norms that individuals may enforce or to strengthen the
audit systems enforcing the competing programmatic objectives that policymakers believe are being undervalued.
This is not to deny, of course, that some rights-based regimes do undermine efficiency. Any system can be designed badly. But in an era of
increasingly complex governmental functions, rights-based systems can be
an effective component of the communications between managers and line
staff. Conversely, the current tendency toward eliminating enforceable
rights poses the grave danger that public administration will drift far from
the goals of policymakers and the electorate .
This Article shows that, in addition to the important roles assigned to
them in constitutional theory,24 enforceable individual rights can meaningfully enhance the efficiency of governmental operations in achieving the
optimal balance among their competing values. Part I places this discussion
into broader theoretical perspective, drawing on the principal jurisprudential arguments underlying American law’s reliance on the adversarial
model. A vision of entitlement structures as adversarial processes may be
counterintuitive because we are accustomed to thinking of legal entitlements as imposing one-sided pressures on decision makers, without
counterweights.25 Upon showing that such counterweights do in fact exist
for most major entitlements, this Article argues that “[i]f, as our adversary
system presupposes, accurate and just results are most likely to be obtained

24. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court
Jurisdiction, 83 Yale L.J. 498 (1974) (inferring a requirement of a national forum for vindicating
rights from the structure of the Constitution); Richard H. Fallon Jr., Reflections on the Hart and
Wechsler Paradigm, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 953, 979-84 (1994) (finding the availability of federal judicial
fora constitutionally necessary to vindicate the substantive rights recognized in the Reconstruction
Amendments); Henry M. Hart Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1953) (finding some minimum level of
access to judicial fora for enforcing rights essential to give the structure of law meaning); Laurence H.
Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 129, 142-44 (1981) (finding that limits on the enforceability of rights implicitly
burden the underlying substantive rights themselves).
25. Thus, for example, discussions of the “entitlement” to cash assistance that existed before
1996 assume that administrators were helpless, compelled to provide aid even to the most unworthy
claimants. See, e.g., Nancy L. Johnson, Bill Archer, E. Clay Shaw, Jr., & J. Dennis Hastert,
Welfare Reform Has Already Achieved Major Successes: A House Republican Assessment
of the Effects of Welfare Reform 8-9 (1999) [hereinafter House Republicans].
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through the equal contest of opposed interests,”26 we should exercise great
caution in discarding entitlement structures when we seek to make complex
adjustments among competing policies in public law.27 Thus, this Article
argues that augmenting, rather than abandoning, the adversary system that
entitlements represent in the welfare system would more faithfully accommodate the increased emphasis on encouraging recipients to work with the
continuing concern for low-income people. This Article is concerned solely
with the relative efficiency of entitlement and non-entitlement structures in
accommodating the competing programmatic objectives that policymakers
have chosen.28 It thus considers neither the substantive merits of those objectives nor the important dignitary goals that some procedural structures
may serve.29
Granting individuals enforceable rights against government agencies
also places the evaluation of those agencies’ performance partly in the
hands of independent, self-interested actors in much the same way that
markets rely upon self-interested consumer choices, rather than the puffery
of enterprise managers, to evaluate the output of producers. Indeed, a
rights-based regime represents a form of privatized performance evaluation. Accordingly, Part I also explores the commonalities between systems
of individual rights and the principles that have led this country to prefer
market mechanisms to command-and-control systems.
To make this discussion more concrete, Part II applies these principles
to one of the earliest and best-known products of the current movement to
abolish individual rights: the 1996 welfare law, the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA).30 Part II
examines whether eliminating the entitlement was the only or best way to
accommodate the public’s competing substantive objectives of stronger

26. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981). This does not suggest, of course, that
adversarial tensions will uniformly lead to optimal results, but rather that their results are likely,
overall, to reflect consideration of the widest possible array of significant factors. Thus, “[t]hat
Marbury, Mapp, and countless other decisions retain their vitality despite their obvious flaws is a
necessary byproduct of the adversary system, in which both judges and the general public rely upon
litigants to present ‘all the relevant considerations.’” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 718
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In the case of entitlements, the desired end may not be justice in the
sense Lassiter meant it—an accurate application of an array of legal principles to the facts of particular
cases—but it is likely to reflect the accommodation of competing policies, in view of the facts of
particular claimants.
27. Thus, although a public benefit program could be structured in non-adversarial ways, doing
so increases the risk that the administering agencies will neglect one or more of the goals it seeks to
achieve.
28. Promoting recipients’ sense of dignity or security may be an important substantive priority of
some programs. See Super, Political Economy, supra note 22, at 640-44. If so, this may be an
additional reason to incorporate individual rights into their structures. See supra note 17.
29. Other writers have developed extensive dignitary theories to support the extension of due
process rights. See supra note 14.
30. See PRWORA, supra note 11.
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incentives to work and the protection of low-income families.31 Because
these objectives are likely to conflict when applied to many individual
families, the management system should allow policymakers to express
their preference for how the two ought to be reconciled, to monitor implementation, and to adjust the balance between them in light of experience.32
Part III considers alternatives to entitlements for ensuring that a program’s implementation accommodates its priorities in the manner senior
policymakers prefer. It finds serious shortcomings in each of these alternatives. Part IV distills some basic principles to guide the choice between
entitlement and non-entitlement structures. Finally, Part V briefly applies
these lessons to the organization of other governmental activities, including
health-care subsidies, immigration, and prisons. It also considers the possibility that, in some cases, eliminating the individual enforceability of substantive norms reflects a covert attempt to abandon norms that retain public
support. This introduces a different kind of inefficiency in the political
process.
I
Individual Rights in the Adversarial, Economic, and
Bureaucratic Contexts
All too often, discussions about whether to grant individuals the right
to enforce norms that benefit them take place in a theoretical vacuum.
Debates revolve around the substantive importance of the norms in question and policymakers’ level of sympathy for the groups involved. Implicit
in this is the assumption that enforceable rights serve only the interests of
the prospective holders of those entitlements. Typically missing is an appreciation of the implications of individual rights on the substantive policies of government programs. Much of the analytical problem here stems
31. The House Republicans that led the fight to eliminate the entitlement to cash assistance cited
their belief that an entitlement was incompatible with work requirements as their primary reason for
eliminating it. See House Republicans, supra note 25, at 8-9. A leading private-sector advocate of the
1996 welfare law, on the other hand, called the entitlement “objectionable” but denied that its
elimination was central to the goals of reform, which he characterized as promoting work. Robert
Rector, Heritage Found., Backgrounder No. 1075, Yet Another Sham Welfare Reform: Examining the
NGA Plan 7 (Mar. 18, 1996), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/welfare/bg1075.cfm. No
doubt others had other philosophical or practical reasons for opposing the entitlement to cash
assistance. Nonetheless, its supposed inconsistency with promoting work was the central complaint of
those most responsible for the legislation eliminating it.
32. If the consequences for local agency staff of denying benefits to claimants for not complying
with work requirements are too great—if the entitlement is too strong—the work requirement will have
little meaning. If, on the other hand, the consequences of providing benefits without requiring work are
too great—if the counter-entitlement is too strong—the program will cease to provide a reliable safety
net for those that are willing to work but unable to find employment. Indeed, a hyperactive counterentitlement could undermine the very policy it seeks to implement: local offices not wanting to risk
improper awards of benefits will deny many eligible, compliant claimants, making claimants skeptical
about the value of complying with the work requirements.
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from a failure to recognize that even when a program grants enforceable
rights, these rights do not stand alone. Far less visible but crucial to programs’ operations are audit systems enforcing other programmatic priorities that may conflict with those that individual rights may enforce. These
audit systems may be termed “counter-entitlements.” In a public-benefits
program, a quality control (QC) system guards against inappropriate
awards of benefits just as a legal entitlement—if conferred—may guard
against inappropriate denials of benefits. In a police station, for example,
political pressure to solve crimes guards against too lax an interrogation
regime just as suspects’ procedural rights guard against thuggish treatment.
In prisons, state auditors may guard against spending money on unnecessarily generous treatment of prisoners just as the Eighth Amendment seeks
to check brutality. In each case, the administration of the program will depend on the balance of pressures that frontline agency staff—such as welfare-eligibility workers, police officers, and prison guards—feel from the
individual entitlements and these countervailing forces. When we abolish
individual entitlements, the counter-entitlements typically remain in place.
Thus, the result is that frontline staff face accountability for achieving
some—but not all—of their programs’ competing objectives.33
The choice, then, is between a system that juxtaposes individual rights
to enforce some norms with counter-entitlements to enforce others, on the
one hand, and a program without enforceable rights that relies upon internal bureaucratic controls to guide frontline agency employees’ exercise of
discretion, on the other. This choice, as it happens, closely resembles other,
better-understood choices in law, for it raises essentially the same issues as
the choice between an adversarial decision-making system and a bureaucratic or directive one.
In addressing this choice, the Anglo-American legal system has
shown a strong preference for adversarial processes. Even in disputes involving children, incompetents, and others incapable of representing themselves, the courts frequently appoint someone to represent their interests so
that the disputes may be resolved adversarially. Similarly, a court allows
persons contesting its jurisdiction to appear without waiving their objections so that it may have the benefit of adversarial debate in determining
whether it may hear the case.
This Part places the disentitlement movement in broader theoretical
context. Part I.A demonstrates parallels between the values underlying the
adversary system of adjudication and those favoring individual rights.
Correspondingly, it shows how debates over the continued vitality of the
33. In the long term, one may imagine that each of the program’s policies will receive some
vindication. Media exposés, special investigative commissions, and the like all are potential threats to
officials that wholly neglect some programmatic policies. Whether the possibility for this sort of
haphazard accountability suffices to counterbalance ongoing pressure is another matter.
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adversary system provide important insights into the utility of affording
individuals enforceable rights generally. Part I.B looks to the business
world for further parallels. It finds that individuals asserting rights in public programs provide administrators with the same kinds of signals that
consumers choosing where to spend their money send merchants and producers. Finally, Part I.C brings this discussion home to public-benefits law,
a prominent area where many significant individual rights recently have
been eliminated. It seeks to separate the core of the critique of entitlements
from the overheated and analytically bankrupt rhetoric that the disentitlement movement has generated.
A.

Individual Rights and the Theory of the Adversary System

The assault on legal entitlements, in public benefit programs and
elsewhere, bears a close intellectual kinship to assaults on the adversary
system. Accordingly, this Section considers the applicability of some of the
major premises of the adversary system to the administration of government programs. Part I.A.1 reviews some of the principal arguments advanced in support of the adversary system and their analogues in the
administration of government programs such as public benefits, immigration, domestic prisons, and the detention of other persons around the world.
Part I.A.2 then considers whether some important critiques of the adversary
system also caution against giving individuals the legal means to enforce
the government’s compliance with substantive norms.
The mere fact that our legal system typically opts for adversarial determinations of parties’ rights, of course, does not mean that these customs
must be followed slavishly in designing government programs. Our affinity
for an adversarial process in our courts, of course, springs in part from a
tradition both longer and stronger than that underlying the more bureaucratic methods in administrative law. The adversary system, however, has
important advantages that deserve consideration before dismissing the entitlement/counter-entitlement model. Similarly, although our preference for
relying on private, independent evaluations of governmental programs
rather than agencies’ self-appraisals is not dispositive, it does suggest that
the burden of persuasion should fall on those urging passive faith that
frontline government offices will correctly interpret and balance competing
policy objectives.
1. Advantages of Adversarial Procedures
Many of the most compelling arguments for the adversary system are
normative,34 often locating it in several important constitutional provisions.
The broadest of these is procedural due process’s guarantee of fundamental
34.

See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice 26-29 (1998).
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fairness.35 Although the Due Process Clause has been held not to compel
the government to grant individual rights,36 many of the values underlying
procedural due process apply more generally to the government’s relationship with the governed. Thus, for example, just as due-process considerations support an adversarial process in which both sides may pursue
information independently,37 so too the First Amendment has been famously described as seeking to promote a “marketplace of ideas.”38 The
truth-finding capacity of debates about government programs will be enhanced if participants have access to sources of information other than the
government’s own accounts of programs’ operations. Claims of individual
rights violations can provide a valuable check on agencies’ tendency to
congratulate themselves.39
The adversary system also gives individual members of society the
opportunity to participate in the formulation of law. By making legal and
normative arguments for a position, attempting to rebut the other side’s
arguments, and receiving a reasoned explanation for the outcome, a member of society can test society’s fidelity to its stated norms and help buttress
or dismantle that support. Similarly, a system of individual rights allows
35. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 238 (1967) (finding that criminal defendants’ right to
an attorney aids law enforcement by helping to free erroneously arrested individuals, setting the police
back on the trail of the guilty); see also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 318 (1973) (describing the
adversary system as seeking balance by allowing each side to gather its own information); Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) (same); Marvin Frankel, Partisan Justice 12 (1980) (arguing
that the adversary system includes cherished institutions and ideals because it embodies the right to be
heard and is thought to assure truth and sound results); Monroe H. Freedman & Abbe Smith,
Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics §§ 2.01-2.08, 13-33 (2d ed. 2002); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Ethics in the Practice of Law 122-23 (1978) (arguing that in recent years the Supreme Court has
equated the adversarial trial with due process and that the adversarial trial now stands as a pillar of our
constitutional system).
36. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (holding that defining
property interests is ordinarily a matter for a state’s substantive law).
37. See sources cited supra note 35.
38. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting, joined by
Brandeis, J.) (“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market . . . .”). But see Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §
12-1, 785-87 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that this metaphor is historically unsupported and captures only a
small part of the values that the First Amendment represents).
39. To be sure, persons dissatisfied with the operation of government programs can and do speak
out against those programs independently of asserting legal rights. In practice, however, most
individuals may judge the likely personal benefits from speaking out insufficient to justify its cost. See
Olson, supra note 17 (describing the calculus that causes most people to refrain from seeking to
influence government policy). Moreover, many of the groups that have lost individual rights over the
past decade are ill equipped to attract attention to their complaints in the absence of enforceable rights.
Low-income recipients of public benefits, for example, may be unable to afford to make their voices
heard. Immigrants who believe they were excluded or deported without proper attention to their pleas
for asylum will no longer be here to complain—and, if their claims for asylum were justified, may be in
grave peril. And most prisoners have little ability to voice their opinions in a way that will affect the
public debate. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (allowing authorities to curtail prisoners’ First
Amendment rights to serve penological ends).
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those whom government agencies affect to hold those agencies to their
stated norms. To be sure, strict enforcement may lead to the abandonment
of some norms.40 Even then, however, the unsuccessful claimants will have
been far more involved, and will have had far more opportunity to make
appeals to fellow members of society than if the agency had covertly abandoned those norms by allowing its internal enforcement mechanisms to
atrophy.41
Other arguments for an adversary system take a more practical approach and thus have more relevance for this inquiry. These arguments can
be summarized as five broad assertions: (1) the adversary system is more
effective at finding facts, (2) it promotes policy innovation, (3) it preserves the integrity of decision-making process, (4) it facilitates negotiation and accommodation, and (5) it gives participants a sense of the
process’s legitimacy. This Section addresses each of these contentions in
order.
a. Accuracy and Impartiality
The adversary system’s supporters emphasize its perceived strengths
as a fact-finding method.42 Thus, one advantage of the adversarial system
may be its accuracy: a government program cannot provide appropriate
incentives to welfare recipients, for example, if it cannot reliably distinguish those who comply with its requirements from those who do not.43
In particular, the adversary system best preserves the impartiality of
the decision maker. People fear that even the most conscientious decision
maker will tend to judge the merits of a dispute too early and fail to

40. One could argue that making norms enforceable creates a perverse incentive for government
officials not to establish norms that protect the interests of those that might file claims. See, e.g., Sandin
v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (declining to recognize norms in prison manuals as enforceable liberty
interests under the Due Process Clause to avoid discouraging administrators from adopting protective
provisions in their manuals). Frequently, however, the establishment of norms for government agencies
is driven by larger forces that administrators cannot openly defy but may be able to quietly subvert by
adopting and then failing to enforce norms.
41. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 269 (1975)
(noting that the public pays far more attention to substantive norms than to the procedures that enforce
them).
42. See, e.g., Mirjan Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1083 (1975) (criticizing inadequate development of facts in civil-law systems); Benjamin
Kaplan, Civil Procedure—Reflections on the Comparison of Systems, 9 Buff. L. Rev. 409, 420-21
(1960) (same); John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil
Procedure, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 987, 992-1007 (1990) (finding the inquisitorial approach hopelessly
inconsistent with the American legal system). But see David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An
Ethical Study 98-103 (1988) (holding out hope that some aspects may be adapted).
43. The Court made this point in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970), finding that
without pre-termination hearings many eligible claimants would become so preoccupied with their
immediate survival that they would not be able to demonstrate their eligibility.
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complete a truly rigorous investigation.44 Our society believes “that truth is
likely to emerge more from bilateral investigation and presentation,
motivated by the strong pull of self-interest, than from judicial
investigation, motivated only by official duty.”45 Deviations from the adversarial model thus risk corrupting even the best-intentioned decision
makers. Professor Judith Resnik has demonstrated that even in the relatively well-ordered realm of pretrial development of litigation, judges that
become actively involved are likely to form premature opinions about the
merits and to develop favorable and unfavorable opinions of the parties.46
This erodes the impartiality that is an essential feature of the adjudicatory
process.47 Judges’ reception of information about the merits unfiltered
through the rules of evidence undermines the value of those rules.48
Professor Resnik has also raised the danger that judges will develop their
own agendas in the process, if not in favor of either party then at least in
favor of an expeditious settlement; if the judge perceives one party to have
obstructed those goals, the judge may have difficulty retaining equanimity
toward that party.49 These problems are compounded by the lack of public
visibility and judicial review of pretrial managerial decisions.50 More
broadly, Professor Resnik has expressed concern about adding to judges’
already vast powers.51
Each of these concerns has a close analogue in government-program
administration.52 Many of the decisions eligibility workers make are already highly subjective. For example, they may choose how to conduct
interviews and which claimants’ documentation of eligibility to believe.
Increasing these already vast powers poses a severe risk of corrupting
44. See Fleming James, Jr., et al., Civil Procedure § 1.2, at 5 (5th ed. 2001); Lon L. Fuller,
The Adversary System, in Talks on American Law 30, 39-40 (Berman ed., 1961); Stephen A.
Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge, 64 Va. L. Rev. 1, 17-19
(1978).
45. James et al., supra note 44.
46. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 376, 426-27 (1982).
47. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 391 (1978).
48. Resnik, supra note 46, at 427.
49. Id. at 384-85.
50. Id. at 413-14.
51. Id. at 424-25.
52. For example, staff determining eligibility for public-assistance programs may be given the
general goals of reducing the public-assistance rolls and increasing the level of employment by
claimants that remain. The process of trying unsuccessfully to “divert” an applicant is likely to leave an
eligibility worker with an opinion of whether the applicant was at fault for the failure, just as trial
judges may come away from failed settlement negotiations with a strong sense of which party was
obstructionist. This impression may be based on the merits but may also be based on whether the
applicant was confident and articulate enough to express problems clearly (e.g., explaining her child’s
special needs that make day-care services difficult to find). Agencies clearly want their eligibility
workers to press claimants hard to abandon their applications for, or to quickly leave, cash assistance;
this pressure is likely to lead to conflicts that will impair eligibility workers’ ability to fairly determine
claimants’ eligibility.
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decisions that have virtually no public visibility and, in a non-entitlement
program, little opportunity for impartial review. By adding as complex and
subjective a goal as progress toward self-sufficiency to the mission of public-assistance programs,53 Congress dramatically expanded the range of
eligibility workers’ discretion. Disentitlement added to that already vast
power.
b. Policy Innovation
An adversarial process also is likely to facilitate policy innovation.
Different decision makers, bringing differing ideologies and confronting
adversaries of differing skills and dispositions, are likely to produce a variety of results.54 As the adversaries elevate these adjudications through the
decision-making hierarchy, their relative merits can be compared. This is
likely to present senior decision makers with alternatives they might not
have developed on their own.55 Thus, the litigation process has at least as
much value for the advancement of public policy as for the private benefit
of the parties.56 As costly, and perhaps as politically embarrassing, as adjudicating immigrants’ claims of asylum may be, the results of some of those
adjudications are likely to enlighten senior policymakers about forms of
political and religious oppression targeting small groups in countries they
had generally believed to be free of human-rights violations. In the publicassistance sphere, federal food stamp regulations facilitate this process on
an intrastate level by explicitly requiring states to compile fair hearing decisions and to make them available to the public.57 Similarly, audits produce valuable information about the variety of enforcement when local

53. See 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2) (2000) (establishing “job preparation” and “work” as two of the
primary purposes of the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) block grant). The
complexity of this concept can be seen from PRWORA’s treatment of what compliance with a work
requirement means. Participation in any of twelve different kinds of activities, ranging from education
to unsubsidized employment, can count toward TANF’s work participation rate. 42 U.S.C. § 607(d)
(2000). Several of these activities, however, are disfavored by being subject to various quotas and
limitations. Id. § 607(c)(1)(A), (B)(i), (2)(A), (D). For purposes of the requirement that adults work
within twenty-four months of receiving aid, a different, state-crafted definition may apply. Id. §
602(a)(1)(A)(ii).
54. See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and
Innovation, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 639, 662-72 (1981).
55. Id. at 672-80.
56. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1089-90 (1984).
57. See 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(q)(5) (2004). States must remove information identifying the claimant
and any other members of the public. Id. To the same effect, litigation challenging New York City’s
administration of the food stamp program caught the attention of federal administrators, who
investigated and directed New York to make changes apart from those ordered by the court. Compare
Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) with Northeast Regional Office, USDA,
New York Program Access Review: November-December 1998 (1999). Similar sequences have
occurred elsewhere. See, e.g., Harley v. Lyng, 653 F. Supp. 266, 274 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
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offices contest adverse findings to central managers.58 With the uncertainties inherent in implementing complex sets of policies such as those required to administer a prison or to determine which immigrants face wellfounded fears of oppression, developing policy through these adversarial
processes should help policymakers identify and correct problems more
rapidly.
c. The Integrity of the Adjudicatory Process
Adversarial processes also preserve the integrity of the decisionmaking process.59 Professor Lon Fuller noted that adjudication is distinguished from other forms of social ordering, such as elections or contracts,
in that it depends upon rational decision making.60 Participants’ interests
may be affected adversely, but only as a result of reasoned arguments that
they had the opportunity to meet.61 To assure that the results of an adjudication really are fair and rational, Professor Fuller identified four key elements that a process must include: (1) the claimant’s participation through
presentations of proof; (2) a principle of relevance that explains which
proofs will be considered; (3) a claim of right (as distinguished from a
naked demand or statement of interest); and (4) a decision maker’s application of previously accepted principles in a transparent way to the proofs
presented.62 The decision maker’s reasoned opinions guide participants’
future conduct and reduce the likelihood of further conflict by announcing
a standard that allows observers to predict future decisions.63 Several of
these (admittedly somewhat idealized) characteristics of adjudication may
appear in other decision-making processes, but if they are not assured, the
participants cannot know to what extent their interests are being decided
based on reasoned argument rather than whim or caprice.
Professor Fuller’s procedural requirements, it should be noted, have
no substantive content. The rules defining the parties’ rights and obligations may be quite one-sided, yet the process can be expected to produce a
reasoned application of whatever rights the parties do have if these standards are met. Thus, they could administer the most opulent social-benefit
program or one conditioned on meeting the most stringent work requirements. The value of this procedural fairness can be seen by considering the
case of a participant that seeks an exemption from a work requirement to
complete an educational program. If the eligibility worker simply rejects
the claimant’s proposal, she may suspect that whim, indifference, or
58. See 7 C.F.R. § 275.12(e), (f) (2004) (establishing procedures for analysis of errors
committed by local food stamp offices).
59. See Freedman & Smith, supra note 35, § 2.14, at 46-48.
60. Fuller, supra note 47, at 363-67.
61. Id. at 382.
62. Id. at 369.
63. Id. at 387-88.
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personal animus led to the denial. The claimant may wait until the eligibility worker is on vacation and renew her request or otherwise contrive to
present the request again to another agency staff person. In the meantime,
the claimant may go through the motions of complying with the work requirement, but as long as she remains convinced that the training course is
a better, and still potentially approvable, alternative means of obtaining
permanent employment, her efforts are likely to be inferior. If, on the other
hand, the claimant had received the opportunity to press the claim through
an adversarial hearing and had been confronted with a rule, or a set of factual concerns about the training program, militating against the course’s
approval, she might have come to understand and to accept the agency’s
reasoning. Even if the claimant remained unconvinced, however, she
would be far more likely to accept the irrevocability of the decision and
move forward on that basis. In addition, her future interactions with the
eligibility worker would be less likely to be tainted by the claimant’s suspicions about the eligibility worker’s motives. To be sure, even in a nonentitlement program, eligibility workers could, and many would, try to explain the basis for their decisions.64 Human nature being what it is, however, if that explanation is purely voluntary and is immune from any test,
the eligibility worker may formulate it incompletely, and the claimant may
receive it skeptically.
d. Negotiation and Accommodation
A process that recognizes that adverse interests must be reconciled
may provide the basis for negotiation and accommodation. PRWORA’s
advocates argued repeatedly that they were rewriting the “social contract”
between welfare claimants and the government.65 Indeed, the TANF statute
discusses “individual responsibility plans,” which, although apparently not
enforceable against state agencies, nonetheless adopt the appearance of
contracts and are enforceable against claimants.66 A system that acknowledges some rights for claimants and provides them with some means for
vindicating those rights could allow more meaningful negotiations, promoting accommodations between claimants’ interests and the state’s policy
64. Ideally, they would follow the model of what Professor Eisenberg calls the “consultative
process.” Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An
Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 410 (1978). As Professor Eisenberg suggests, however, the
primary situations in which it is appropriate to substitute this sort of process for a full adjudication are
those in which a decision maker must simultaneously resolve the conflicting claims of a large number
of persons, as they would in the case of farmers competing for a limited supply of irrigation water. Id.
at 424. In those cases, adjudication may simply not be feasible. That generally is not the case in meanstested public-benefit programs.
65. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Mead, Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of
Citizenship (1986); Amy L. Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program, 8 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 477, 48586 (2001).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 608(b)(2), (3) (2000).
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in insisting upon work. With a properly constructed counter-entitlement
ensuring that the eligibility worker insists upon compliance with work requirements, an active give-and-take over the manner in which a claimant
complies could prove fruitful. For example, a claimant who has been assigned to a welding training course to prepare her to work in high steel
could both save the state money and expedite her own reemployment if she
has some leverage to object that she experiences vertigo and would prefer
to seek immediate work in a field where she already has experience.67 A
settlement reflecting the ideas of the claimant as well as the eligibility
worker is likely to lead to a more desirable outcome than an unchallengeable decision of the eligibility worker.68
e. Legitimacy and Acceptance
Finally, because adversarial processes are the norm in this country in
so many contexts, they have become an important way to give participants
a sense of a government process’s legitimacy.69 Achieving most programmatic goals—certainly the promotion of work—is likely to benefit from
participants’ sense that the expectations imposed on them result from a fair
and deliberative process. Claimants believing that their views have not
been taken seriously could easily become cynical, and this could undermine their success in pursuing required activities. Claimants that think they
have been sanctioned out of pique or arbitrariness rather than for failing to
work are less likely to see any benefit to complying with work requirements. The values of the adversary system, embodied in legal entitlements
(for instance, the entitlement to receive benefits if one is in fact complying
with work requirements), reflect and provide a practical response to the
instinctive distrust of arbitrary governmental authority.70
67. Similarly, state administrators may have decided to train welfare recipients to work in high
steel without realizing that no skyscrapers are being built in a particular part of the state. A recipient
preferring to seek work in a field where she already has skills is likely to have a stronger incentive to
raise such an objection than an eligibility worker whose primary responsibility is to ensure that the
recipient is engaged in some work activity.
68. But see Fiss, supra note 56 (expressing misgivings about settlements’ success in achieving
broad social goals).
69. See generally John W. Thibaut & Laurens Walker, Procedural Justice: A
Psychological Analysis (1975); Douglas R. Rendleman, Bankruptcy Revision: Procedure and
Process, 53 N.C. L. Rev. 1197 (1975). This argument differs from the third point made above—
concerning the integrity of the adjudicative process—in that it depends not on the normative legitimacy
of the process but on the actual perceptions (right or wrong) of an individual subject to that process.
70. See Freedman & Smith, supra note 35, § 2.13, at 45-46. Similarly, “individuals or groups
should not be required to trust in or defer to the competence, resources, or enthusiasm of others in the
protection or advancement” of their interests. Martin H. Redish, The Adversary System, Democratic
Theory, and the Constitutional Role of Self-Interest: The Tobacco Wars, 1953-1971, 51 DePaul L.
Rev. 359, 366 (2001); see also Stephen Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System and the
Changing Role of the Advocate in that System, 18 San Diego L. Rev. 251 (1981); Stephen L. Pepper,
The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. B.
Found. Res. J. 613.
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2. The Disentitlement Movement and Critiques of Adversarial Procedures
Despite its long lineage in Anglo-American jurisprudence, the adversary system is not without its critics. Because many of the principal arguments in support of the adversary system also suggest advantages of
entitlements, we should consider whether arguments against the adversary
process might suggest disadvantages of entitlements. As it happens, many
of the characteristics of the adversary process that have drawn criticism are
absent, or are present only in muted form, in the context of entitlements.
Professor Martin Redish suggests that scholars have followed three
main lines of assault against the adversary system, each broadly communitarian.71 First, some condemn the social costs they perceive the pursuit of
narrow self-interest to cause.72 Second, some argue that an adversarial
process encourages adversaries to manipulate the facts, thus undermining
the search for truth.73 Third, some fear the adversary system’s emphasis on
conflict is toxic to values of social comity.74 Other scholars offer a fourth
strain of criticism, related to the first: that adversarial processes magnify
the effects of social and economic inequalities, allowing the rich and powerful to control the adjudicative process with superior resources.75Each of
these views finds some resonance in arguments against entitlement structures for public-benefit programs. In the end, however, none proves especially compelling.
a. Narrow Self-Interest
Some have argued that entitlement programs encourage claimants to
think about their narrow rights against the government rather than about
how to become more self-sufficient.76 Put crudely, entitlements might
71. See Redish, supra note 70. See generally, David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in
The Good Lawyer: Lawyers’ Roles and Lawyers’ Ethics 83, 93-118 (David Luban ed., 1983)
(canvassing arguments); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev.
589, 596-600 (1985) (criticizing the adversary system broadly); David Schuman, Beyond the Waste
Land: Law Practice in the 1990s, 42 Hastings L.J. 1, 9 (1990) (condemning the adversary system
generally as a moral “wasteland”). Some scholars accept the adversary system as a grim necessity in
criminal proceedings but not in civil ones. See, e.g., John Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil
Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823 (1985); Rhode, supra, at 640. Although the disentitlement
movement has targeted many important interests—subsistence benefits, health care, prisoners’ rights to
humane treatment, etc.—arguments for changes in criminal procedure have been structurally different.
72. Simon, supra note 34, at 53-76; Marvin Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View,
123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031 (1975); Redish, supra note 70, at 361-62.
73. Redish, supra note 70, at 362.
74. Id.; see also Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (finding
Congress’s perceived interest in preventing veterans’ disability cases from becoming adversarial a
sufficient reason to uphold a statute effectively prohibiting the paid representation of veterans);
Freedman & Smith, supra note 35, § 2.03, at 23-24; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the
Adversary System in a Post-Modern, Multi-Cultural World, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 5 (1996).
75. See Freedman & Smith, supra note 35, § 2.15, at 48-49; David Luban, Lawyers and
Justice 64-66, 237-66 (1988).
76. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice 21, 26-29 (1983).
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make people feel “entitled.”77 This argument has several flaws. First, it assumes that the ability to question the application of rules will somehow
negate the effects of those rules. An entitlement to a modest reward for a
great deal of hard work is of no value to someone who has not performed
the required work. (It is of little enough value even to those that have.)
Second, the argument implicitly assumes that denying claimants the ability
to assert claims under a program’s chosen rules will motivate them rather
than demoralize them. This is implausible, and even the most ardent advocates for the new welfare order generally have avoided suggesting it.78
Finally, the argument assumes that the extremely rare administrative hearings—and even rarer lawsuits—that occur in an entitlement system79 will
somehow transform the attitudes of the overwhelming majority of claimants that never participate in either.
b. Manipulation of Evidence
A legal entitlement does little to affect claimants’ incentives to deal
truthfully with administrative agencies. For example, with or without entitlements, claimants’ ability to meet their basic needs will depend upon
their ability to persuade agency staff that they have complied with a publicbenefit program’s rules. In some instances, this may create a temptation to
shade the truth where the claimant has not complied fully. This temptation,
however, should not be noticeably different whether individual eligibility
workers have absolute power or are subject to some form of review.
Indeed, to the extent that claimants perceive a program without an entitlement as giving eligibility workers largely unfettered discretion, that program may create a wider array of troubling incentives; for instance, it
might encourage claimants not just to misrepresent the facts but also to
curry favor with the eligibility worker through a variety of other, perhaps
illicit, means. Such an outcome is possible in an entitlement system, too,
but the threat of a counter-entitlement is likely to render eligibility workers
less susceptible to persuasion.
c. Social Comity
The public-benefits analogy to the communitarian critique of the adversarial process suggests that a regime of individual rights will interfere
with the therapeutic, professional relationship between eligibility workers

77. See Super, Political Economy, supra note 22, at 643 (describing strengths and criticisms of
“subjective entitlements”).
78. Indeed, even as PRWORA was increasing pressure on low-income people to work, it also
included measures designed to increase the dignity of those families that did work. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §
2026(d) (2000) (allowing states to cash out food stamp benefits to households with substantial,
sustained earnings).
79. See infra Part II.A.
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and their clients.80 This argument, however, cannot withstand scrutiny.
Most obviously, the overwhelming majority of eligibility workers that administer cash-assistance and similar public-benefit programs are not in fact
professionals.81 In addition, eligibility workers’ incentives often are starkly
inconsistent with those of claimants, largely precluding the development of
the sort of sensitive professional relationships that an entitlement might
theoretically disrupt.82 In contrast to eligibility workers, the idealized inquisitorial judge of the civil-law system is not held accountable to outside
forces for achieving a certain number of particular results from her adjudications.83
d. Social and Economic Inequalities
Finally, arguments that the adversary system produces unjust results
because it gives the upper hand to those with the most resources does not
apply to discussions of public-benefit entitlements without considerable
irony. The forces advocating strong counter-entitlements—all those that
have other agendas for funds that could be saved from reduced spending on
a program—have far more numbers and resources than do claimants for a
program’s benefits and their allies.84 Even before PRWORA, the counterentitlement balancing the entitlement to Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) was far stronger than the entitlement, influencing agencies’ behavior far more powerfully.85 Thus, in a public-benefit program
with a combination of entitlements and counter-entitlements, claimants will
indeed be at a severe disadvantage. That disadvantage surely exists to an
80. See Mashaw, supra note 76, at 21, 26-29 (describing the “professional treatment” model of
public-benefit programs).
81. See Diller, supra note 15, at 1208-09 (noting that the current welfare regime resembles the
social-work model that prevailed until the 1960s, in its heavy reliance on professional discretion, but
that it vests that discretion in eligibility workers that, unlike their predecessors, are not in fact social
workers subject to a professional code of conduct).
82. See David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice Model for
Rationing Public Benefits, 113 Yale L.J. 815, 844-48 (2004) [hereinafter Super, Offering an Invisible
Hand] (describing pressure on eligibility workers to reduce caseloads).
83. See Stephen Landsman, The Adversary System: A Description and Defense (1984);
Ronald J. Allen et al., The German Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea for More Details and Fewer
Generalities in Legal Scholarship, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 705 (1988); Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the
Dark: The Normative Incoherence of the Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 Md. L. Rev. 1, 91-98
(1992). Cf. Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1376-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding
unobjectionable the Social Security Administration’s practice of scrutinizing more carefully the work
of ALJs that allow more than a certain fraction of the claims they hear), vacated on other grounds, 801
F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
84. But see Olson, supra note 17, at 45-52, 165-67 (arguing that widely shared interests often do
not achieve ascendancy in the political process because few individuals would benefit enough from the
vindication of those interests to justify the costs of political action).
85. See Timothy J. Casey & Mary R. Mannix, Quality Control in Public Assistance: Victimizing
the Poor Through One-sided Accountability, 22 Clearinghouse Rev. 1381, 1385 (1989); Anna Lou
Dehavenon, Charles Dickens Meets Franz Kafka: The Maladministration of New York City’s Public
Assistance Programs, 17 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 231 (1989-90).
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even greater degree in a non-entitlement system where local agencies’ staff
members feel unbalanced and often undisclosed86 pressure to determine
eligibility in a particular manner.87
B.

The Economic Efficiency of Individual Rights

In The Vision of the Anointed, Thomas Sowell complains that liberals
seek to have third-party adjudicators “replace the systematic processes of
the marketplace.”88 No doubt some do. It does not follow, however, that
enforceable individual rights are incompatible with the efficient operation
of markets. To the contrary, the concept of outside review of entities’ compliance with norms is at the very heart of market economics. This section
analyzes the similarities between market economies’ reliance on selfinterested consumers and rights-based regimes’ reliance on affected individuals to make claims when government agencies violate behavioral
norms.
In modern society, where organizations seek to accomplish complex
tasks, incentives prove more reliable than compulsion to win the loyalty of
line employees and solidify their identification with the organization’s
goals.89 Incentives only work, however, if the organization has the capacity
to distinguish between higher- and lower-achieving employees. In the first
instance, this task is assigned to managers in the chain of command. A
manager, however, is likely to face conflicted loyalties: criticizing staff
members’ performance implicitly reflects badly on their supervisor.90
Moreover, the manager may have criteria for evaluation that differ substantially from those of the organization: a mediocre employee who is pleasant
or who washes the manager’s car, for example, may receive an excessively
favorable evaluation. Thus, having some independent means of evaluation
is vital to ensuring that the incentive structure promotes the organization’s
broader goals.91
Free markets can be seen as a way to maximize the independent
evaluation of economic entities’ work. In a planned economy, managers
may be largely free to judge themselves, with predictable results. They
may declare their lumpy sofas, fuzzy televisions, and unreliable cars as the
86. See Super, Offering an Invisible Hand, supra note 82, at 839-42 (describing the ease with
which eligible claimants can be invisibly discouraged from receiving public benefits as one of the main
appeals of current informal rationing devices).
87. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (granting political officials broad
leeway to apply pressure on administrative decision makers).
88. Sowell, supra note 5, at 130.
89. Id.; see also John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State 130-39 (1967)
(setting out a general theory of motivation).
90. See Sashkin & Kiser, supra note 19, at 62-67 (describing corrosive effects of fear on the
reliability of managers’ reports).
91. See Posner, supra note 6, § 14.7, at 426-28 (discussing difficulties arising when ownership
and control of corporations are separated).
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best that can be produced. In a free market, self-interested consumers
evaluate a company’s products. If they can find better products elsewhere,
the consumers issue what amounts to negative audit findings on the company’s operations. Thus, when the collapse of communism opened Eastern
Europe’s markets, many factories whose self-evaluations had consistently
found them performing well suddenly discovered that their output was
wholly unacceptable to free consumers. Consumers’ independent evaluations of quality and value discredited managers’ self-evaluations.
Public agencies that are not subject to enforceable individual rights
risk falling into the same trap as the self-congratulatory managers of
Soviet-era factories. They may declare that they are treating prisoners humanely and honoring all legitimate claims for asylum or all genuine requests for food, but the lack of independent verification renders those
assertions suspect. Even if other government agencies are charged with
overseeing them, politics within the executive branch may effectively insulate an agency’s actions.92
Auditors can provide some verification of line managers’ reports of
their own behavior. Auditors’ effectiveness, however, depends upon their
motivation and independence. Auditors that are salaried employees of the
entities they are asked to supervise may be pressured or co-opted in a number of ways.93 Outside auditors working under contract may be immune
from some of these influences, but as recent corporate-accounting scandals
demonstrate, longstanding personal relationships and the desire to renew
and expand contracts can severely impair even outside auditors’ objectivity.
An outside reviewer entirely independent from the entity being evaluated will provide the most reliable appraisal. Market economies cast consumers in an analogous role, independent of producers and motivated to
make whatever decisions will maximize their own utility. Because many
government programs, from welfare to immigration to prisons, operate as
effective monopolies, consumer choice cannot judge their effectiveness.
On the other hand, allowing individuals whom those programs affect to
assert claims when those programs violate important norms has many of
the same virtues of a marketplace: persons independent from the agency in
question who see its operation on the ground level are motivated by selfinterest to identify its deficiencies.
Particularly severe problems arise in maintaining an organization’s
balance among competing priorities. Organizational structures typically
92. See, e.g., James Q. Wilson & Patricia Rachal, Can the Government Regulate Itself?, in
Corporate and Governmental Deviance: Problems of Organizational Behavior in
Contemporary Society 309, 311-16 (M. David Ermann & Richard J. Lundman eds., 1978)
(describing several examples of politically strong agencies resisting oversight designed to compel their
compliance with norms to which they nominally were bound).
93. Harold J. Leavitt et al., The Organizational World 261 (1973).
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make each employee responsible to only one supervisor;94 guiding an organization to achieve multiple objectives simultaneously therefore requires
multiple people in the chain of command to appreciate the proper balance
among those objectives and to transmit that understanding to their subordinates.95 Should any manager fail to do this, the parts of the organization
under her authority will go awry. Auditors charged with enforcing multiple, sometimes contradictory norms may suffer similar difficulties in prioritizing among them in a way that sends meaningful messages to line
employees.96
Some norms, of course, do not lend themselves to enforcement
through individual rights. For example, although all members of the community benefit from the avoidance of unnecessary expenditures, none
benefit enough personally from an agency’s frugality to have an interest in
monitoring the agency’s activities.97 In these cases, independent audit systems may suffice. But where individuals’ self-interest can be pressed into
service to monitor programs’ operations, proponents of command-andcontrol systems bear the heavy burden of explaining why their approach is
more efficient and reliable.
To be sure, systems of individual rights require the government to hire
someone to adjudicate claims.98 Agency staff also must spend time responding to claims and may take additional time documenting their actions
in case of a subsequent challenge. These costs, however, all have their
counterparts in a traditional auditing system: auditors must be hired, staff
must spend time preparing for audits and disputing audit exceptions, and
the prospect of an audit will induce staff to document their actions more
carefully.
In sum, it is no small irony that the disentitlement movement comes at
the same time another broad movement seeks to privatize many aspects of
government administration.99 Private business’s claim to efficiency derives
primarily from the independent assessments of performance that consumers
provide and secondarily from audit systems designed to ensure that products are acceptable to consumers. The elimination of legal entitlements for
persons whom government programs affect strips government programs of
an analogous system of checks and balances. As a result, senior policy94. Id. at 258.
95. Id. at 261.
96. See Posner, supra note 6, § 23.3, at 637-40 (describing the complex process of selecting
cases to audit from diverse candidates).
97. See Olson, supra note 17, at 123 (describing how the political process tends to undervalue
policies providing diffuse benefits to large numbers of people). But see supra note 16.
98. See Mashaw, supra note 76, at 18-19 (describing the cost of the Social Security
Administration’s system for adjudicating disability claims).
99. See generally Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare: How the Dominant Narratives of
Devolution and Privatization Subverted Federal Welfare Reform, 34 Seton Hall L. Rev. 573 (2004)
(comparing the effects of disentitlement and privatization, as well as devolution, in 1996 welfare law).
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makers and the public they represent become increasingly vulnerable to the
untested, self-serving accounts of line staff and managers.
C.

Criticism of Entitlements to Public Assistance

Legislation eliminating enforceable rights for many immigrants, prisoners, and others has passed with relatively little controversy or public attention.100 The arguments for and against preserving enforceable individual
rights in those areas thus were not fully developed. The 1996 welfare law,
however, came out of highly publicized, pitched battles over a two-year
period. Its supporters thus were compelled to develop a relatively elaborate
explanation for why a structure of individual rights was incompatible with
the new substantive norms they sought to establish. Public-assistance programs therefore provide the ideal context for assessing arguments against
individual rights generally. Two programs that the 1996 law affected most
profoundly provide a useful contrast: cash assistance to low-income families and food stamps. The principal cash assistance program, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),101 was repealed, with its funding diverted to the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) block
grant102 that explicitly disavowed any enforceable legal rights.103 The food
stamp program also saw its substantive norms change dramatically as
Congress cut an estimated $27.7 billion from the program over six years.104
The food stamp program, however, retained legal rights through which individuals could enforce the government’s compliance with these new, less
generous norms.
1. Weaknesses of the Anti-Entitlement Narrative
The anti-entitlement narrative has two fundamental flaws. First, it
grossly overstates the power of legal entitlements to interfere with the
achievement of other programmatic goals. Specifically in the publicbenefits context, it exaggerates entitlements’ impact on program administration and fails to understand fundamental limitations on the leverage that
entitlements provide claimants—including, most importantly, the power of
counter-entitlements to balance pressures from legal entitlements. Second,
the narrative minimizes the difficulties that non-entitlement programs face
in reconciling competing substantive priorities.

100. David A. Super, The New Moralizers: Transforming the Conservative Legal Agenda, 105
Colum. L. Rev. 2032, 2053-57 (2004) [hereinafter Super, New Moralizers].
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-620 (1994) (repealed 1996).
102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (2000).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (2000).
104. See David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare” Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp
Program in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1271, 1299 n. 97, 1301 (2004)
[hereinafter Super, Quiet Revolution].
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Although criticism of legal entitlements commonly focuses on their
supposed shortcomings, legal entitlements (and their offsetting counterentitlements) play important roles in helping central administrators impress
their policy choices on their local offices. Specifically, non-entitlement
programs must find ways of replicating three major functions that a rightsbased system performs: communicating policy to frontline eligibility staff,
determining how that staff is in fact applying policy, and guarding against
unintended disparate impacts upon vulnerable subpopulations of claimants.
In addition, others interested in understanding a program—legislators, senior executive-branch officials, journalists, scholars, and taxpayers—must
find alternative means of discerning what that program is doing. No longer
can one learn what a program is doing simply by reading the U.S. Code,
the Code of Federal Regulations, or even their state counterparts. The content of senior managers’ guidance to their staff, the compliance of that staff
with those directives, and any variations in the program’s treatment of
demographic, geographic, or other subpopulations of claimants must be
gleaned elsewhere.105
2. Confounding Substantive and Structural Changes
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (PRWORA)106 transformed both the substantive goals and the
legal structure of cash-assistance and child-care programs for low-income
families. Substantively, it dramatically rearranged the programs’ priorities,
elevating work and other behavioral standards at the expense of meeting
families’ basic needs. Structurally, it replaced entitlements in federal law
with non-entitlement benefits provided at the sole discretion of state and
local officials.
Four prominent House Republicans captured the conventional wisdom
about the relationship between these substantive and structural components:
Because recipients were guaranteed payments regardless of their
behavior, entitlement policy permitted or even encouraged
dependent behavior such as nonwork and nonmarital births.
105. The lack of transparency of a non-entitlement program, it should be noted, can afflict liberals,
conservatives, and moderates alike because a legalistic structure is essentially content neutral. In an
entitlement system, a liberal would determine the amount of benefits a program is providing in the
same way a conservative would determine what work or other behavioral conditions attach to the
program: by referring to the program’s rules. If a program does not develop effective means of
performing the functions traditionally handled by entitlements, no one can have any confidence that the
program is performing as intended. Whatever one’s perspective on the 1996 legislation’s changes in
programs’ substantive priorities, it made the achievement of those priorities considerably more
complicated by transforming cash-assistance programs’ structures at the same time it was transforming
their content. To date, however, most scholarship has focused on the substance of that legislation rather
than the impact of the structural changes on adherence to its policies.
106. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
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Moreover, as long as recipients had a legal right to benefits, it
would be impossible to create the type of reciprocal welfare system
conservatives wanted to establish. . . . Republicans saw clearly that
entitlement blocked all serious steps toward creating a system
based on work and individual responsibility. Hence the entitlement
to cash welfare had to end.107
To date, the assumption that the 1996 welfare law’s substantive and
structural themes are necessarily intertwined has gone surprisingly unquestioned. Most of the bill’s supporters favor both; most of its opponents have
qualms about both. Indeed, each side has taken some pains to conflate the
two. PRWORA’s supporters have found it advantageous to emphasize its
substantive focus on work. President Clinton had campaigned heavily on a
platform of “end[ing] welfare as we know it” but had been vague on the
structure of the programs he would put in their place.108 With polls showing
overwhelming public support for work requirements, conservatives tended
to treat the elimination of the entitlement as merely a necessary corollary of
requiring claimants to work, with little impact on the availability of benefits to those willing to work.109 Indeed, some treated it as a largely incidental matter.110
When moderate and conservative Democrats offered alternative legislation that increased work requirements while preserving a federal entitlement to cash assistance for those that complied, they focused almost
exclusively on the work requirements—even though the continued entitlement was the main feature that distinguished it from the Republican bill.111
107. House Republicans, supra note 25, at 8-9.
108. Bill Clinton & Al Gore, Putting People First: How We Can All Change America
164-65 (1992). Although President Clinton’s campaign manifesto devoted five pages to a chapter on
“welfare and work,” id. at 164-68, after making some vague references to state control and promoting
work, it shifted its focus away from cash-assistance programs to issues such as health care and family
medical leave.
109. This approach presumably reflects conservatives’ recognition that their mandate from the
public did not extend to cutting off aid to needy families willing to work: “public opinion polls show
that . . . voters [still] want the government to assist needy families,” albeit subject to work
requirements. Douglas J. Besharov, Am. Enter. Inst., State Implementation of Work
Requirements and Time Limits in Welfare Programs (2002) (quoting fellow conservative
commentator Lawrence Mead).
110. “[E]liminating entitlement status alone is not reform, or even a small part of reform. The
impact of eliminating the entitlement nature of AFDC has been greatly overrated.” Rector, supra note
31, at 7.
111. For example, Tennessee Representative Clement emphasized that the Democratic alternative
to the Republican welfare bill would require recipients to complete a minimum number of hours of
work or work-related activity each week to receive benefits:
We deny benefits to any recipient who refuses a job or refuses to look for a job. And in
exchange, we remove all incentives that make welfare more attractive than work and remove
the biggest barriers to work—health care and child care. In short, we guarantee recipients that
if they will go to work we will provide the money and take all the necessary steps to ensure
that recipients have a real opportunity to become self-sufficient.
141 Cong. Rec. H3359 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995). Even more liberal Democrats either avoided
discussing entitlements at all or emphasized how limited they were. See id. at H3363 (statement of Rep.
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State officials charged with implementing the welfare law were equally
vague about structural issues. Although united in their opposition to the
legalistic model of public-benefit programs that had arisen in the 1960s,112
with strong feelings about what the substantive requirements of cashassistance programs ought to be, few seemed much concerned about what
structure those programs ought to take.113
The legislation’s critics have been more willing to discuss its structure, but largely because of the impossibility of mobilizing broad political
opposition to its work requirements. Eyeing polls showing continued public interest in protecting low-income people from hardship,114 they condemned PRWORA for its abandonment of guarantees of aid.115 Subsequent
scholarship, too, has failed to examine critically how the welfare law’s
elimination of entitlements advances or impedes its substantive purpose of
making work a condition of receiving assistance. Most discussion of the
entitlement to date has focused on its expressive character116 and its impact
on the rights and well-being of low-income claimants.117

Hoyer) (“Our society cannot—and should not—afford a social welfare system without obligations.”);
142 Cong. Rec. S8525 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Sen. Mikulski) (describing the
Democratic alternative as “a time-limited and conditional entitlement” that “would have required all
able-bodied adults to go to work.”).
112. See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare Rights
Movement, 1960-1973, at 10-21 (1993).
113. See, e.g., Gerald H. Miller, Block Grants: Challenges and Opportunities (1995);
Gary Stangler, Lifeboats vs. Safety Nets: Who Rides . . . Who Swims (1995).
114. E.g., Steven Kull, Ctr. for the Study of Pub. Attitudes, Fighting Poverty in
America: A Study of American Policy Attitudes 2-3, 5, 7 (1994); R. Kent Weaver, Ending
Welfare as We Know It 172-75 (2000).
115. For example, former Clinton Administration official Peter Edelman declared that:
[A]ny decent nation has to provide a safety net of assistance for its children. Flawed as it was,
the previous system had that safety net. Benefits varied widely, but everywhere in America a
family coming to a welfare office could get help if they met the federal requirements. This
had been true for sixty years. Now no state had any federally defined obligation to help needy
children.
Peter Edelman, Searching for America’s Heart: RFK and the Renewal of Hope 140 (2001).
Similarly, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan declared that PRWORA “terminates the basic Federal
commitment of support for dependent children. [It puts] those children at risk with absolutely no
evidence that this radical idea has even the slightest chance of success.” 142 Cong. Rec. S9329 (daily
ed. Aug. 1, 1996).
116. See generally Michaels, supra note 99.
117. See, e.g., Edelman, supra note 114; Michael B. Katz, The Price of
Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare State 328-40 (2001); Todd Cosenza, Preserving
Procedural Due Process for Legal Immigrants Receiving Food Stamps in Light of the Personal
Responsibility Act of 1996, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 2065 (1997); Cynthia R. Farina, On Misusing
“Revolution” and “Reform”: Procedural Due Process and the New Welfare Act, 50 Admin. L. Rev.
591, 618-23 (1998) (asserting that PRWORA’s disclaimer of an entitlement to cash assistance was
intended to eliminate private rights of action, not to disclaim the existence of a property interest
sufficient to trigger due-process scrutiny); Rebecca Zietlow, Two Wrongs Don’t Add Up to Rights: The
Importance of Preserving Due Process in Light of Recent Welfare Reform Measures, 45 Am. U. L.
Rev. 1111 (1996).
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In fact, the question of whether a program should operate as an entitlement profoundly affects the program’s management and its ability to
achieve its substantive goals, at least as much as it affects the well-being of
individual claimants. To analyze this question requires first an understanding of the true nature of substantive change in programs. Although often
cast in terms of giving programs new substantive goals, even radical legislation far more typically readjusts the balance between preexisting programmatic goals. PRWORA did not eliminate the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program’s goal of helping families meet basic needs: if it had, it would simply have terminated cash assistance outright.118 Nor did it originate the idea of moving families from welfare to
work: the multi-billion-dollar Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS)
program119 had been devoted to just that for the previous eight years.
Instead, PRWORA elevated the priority of the latter objective relative to
the former.
The question, then, is which programmatic structure most reliably adjusts a program’s operations to reflect new substantive priorities. The two
major alternatives are (1) a legal entitlement system in which claimants’
assertion of positive rights helps shape the program’s behavior and (2) a
non-entitlement model in which directives from program administrators
determine the program’s content and operations.
II
The Impact and Limits of Enforceable Rights in Public-Benefit
Programs
A cornerstone of the argument against enforceable individual rights is
the assertion that they invest claimants with so much power that they can
crush state policies adverse to their interests. If this were true, then finding
some alternative structure, even a profoundly flawed one, would be an urgent errand. Federal and state governments inevitably must accommodate
competing policies in their programs; any structure that gave claimants,
even very needy claimants, effective vetoes over those accommodations
could not be sustained.
This Part analyzes the theory of overpowering legal entitlements and
finds it gravely lacking. Part II.A explores the history of the legal entitlement not as a triumph of claimants’ rights but rather as a device for improving program management. Part II.B criticizes the exaggerated
assumptions underlying the omnipotent-entitlement theory: the effectiveness of administrative fair hearings and affirmative litigation in vindicating
claimants’ legal rights, the availability of legal counsel to vindicate those
rights, and the system’s resistance to change and experimentation. On the
118.
119.

Some commentators have proposed this. E.g., Charles Murray, Losing Ground (1984).
42 U.S.C. §§ 680-685 (1994).
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other hand, Part II.C shows that elaborate, specialized audit systems that
may be termed “counter-entitlements” are more than capable of giving substantive priorities antagonistic to claimants the upper hand over the claimant-friendly policies vindicated through legal entitlements. Thus, a shift in
substantive priorities away from claimants’ interests—such as the 1996
welfare law’s work requirements or other programs’ efforts at costcontainment—can be supported structurally by augmenting or redirecting
an existing counter-entitlement.
A.

Origins of Legal Entitlement as a Management Tool

For all the centrality it has assumed in debates about public-welfare
law, the legal entitlement is a remarkably recent contrivance. Thus, managing public-benefit programs without legal entitlements is not so much a
new challenge as it is a rediscovered one. Prior to the 1960s, eligibility requirements for means-tested programs (those limited to claimants with incomes below specified levels) included a combination of objective and
subjective components, many of which were established in a highly decentralized manner. Many means-tested programs—variously called general
assistance (GA), general relief, home relief, etc.—were entirely creations
of state or local governments. Even in the largest federal-state programs—
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)120 and the programs for
the aged,121 blind,122 and disabled123 that Supplemental Security Income
(SSI)124 later replaced—states freely added eligibility conditions to those
established in federal statutes and regulations. Many of those statedesigned eligibility rules, in turn, effectively delegated authority to set eligibility requirements to local administrators or individual eligibility workers. Authorizing local offices to deny AFDC where the children did not
live in a “suitable home” is effectively a delegation of authority to determine eligibility subjectively, without meaningful control from rules.125 This
is particularly true when the state makes no serious attempt to define a
“suitable home.”
King v. Smith126 started the systematic development of legal entitlements to public benefits. It interpreted the statutory requirement that “aid
shall be paid promptly to all eligible persons that make application”127 as
120. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1994) (repealed 1996).
121. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-306, nn.1381-1385 (2000) (now effective only in Guam, Puerto Rico,
and the U.S. Virgin Islands).
122. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1206, nn.1381-1385 (2000) (now effective only in Guam, Puerto
Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands).
123. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1355, nn.1381-1385 (2000) (now effective only in Guam, Puerto
Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands).
124. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f (2000).
125. Walter I. Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State 310-11 (5th ed. 1994).
126. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10)(A) (1994) (repealed 1996).
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prohibiting state and local agencies from imposing their own additional
conditions of eligibility (in that case a ban on aid to women with frequent
male visitors). The application of these additional, generally subjective
conditions of eligibility varied considerably by state, by locality within
some states, and, in particular, by the race of the claimants.128 King and its
progeny made the process of establishing eligibility criteria for AFDC both
more centralized and more objective. Indeed, since the more subjective
criteria had been the ones set on the state and local levels, these two
changes went largely hand in hand.
The King suit was brought by, and obviously benefited, low-income
AFDC claimants. But it also highlighted and addressed several serious
management problems in the program. First, the federal government was
having great difficulty communicating its policies to the frontline eligibility workers charged with implementing them. Eight years earlier, the federal Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare had issued a ruling
prohibiting similar sorts of rules,129 and Congress had endorsed that judgment.130 Yet those directives were having only limited impact on the local
level. Moreover, central administrators had no good way of assessing compliance with their directives on the local level. They could examine state
legislation,131 but they had little means for evaluating whether eligibility
workers complied with that legislation or how they interpolated policy in
the broad areas where that legislation was silent. Local agencies had no
incentive to report details that could invite interventions from higher-level
agencies.132 Claimants had neither obvious means nor any real incentive to
report how the program was being run; perhaps more importantly, without
clear objective eligibility standards against which they could test their
treatment, they most likely did not realize that local agencies might be deviating from higher officials’ goals. Finally, and most obviously, AFDC’s
management was failing because it was unable to ensure consistent treatment, under any standard, of similarly situated claimants.
AFDC’s entitlement structure was one way to address these failings.
Another alternative was federalization of administration.133 In 1965,
128. See Dorothy K. Newman et al., Protest, Politics, and Prosperity: Black Americans
and White Institutions, 1940-1975, at 257-62 (1978).
129. President Eisenhower’s Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), Arthur
Flemming, wrote, “‘A State plan . . . may not impose an eligibility condition that would deny assistance
with respect to a needy child on the basis that the home conditions in which the child lives are
unsuitable, while the child continues to reside in the home.’” King, 392 U.S. at 322 (quoting State
Letter No. 452, Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Administration, Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare) (emphasis removed).
130. Id. at 323.
131. A new Louisiana statute triggered the Flemming Ruling. Id at 322.
132. Instead, they classified large numbers of rejected claimants simply as “obviously ineligible.”
Newman, supra note 128, at 259.
133. In practice, Congress found it politically and administratively convenient to make the most
important federally administered public-benefit programs legal entitlements, too.

1084

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1051

Congress transferred responsibility for providing health-care assistance to
many elderly people and persons with disabilities from states to a new federal Medicare program.134 Similarly, although cash-aid programs for the
elderly, blind, and persons with disabilities appear not to have been quite
so severely afflicted with local arbitrariness, a few years after King
Congress sharply reduced states’ roles in designing and administering programs for these populations by replacing a set of federal-state programs
similar to AFDC with the SSI program.135
For means-tested programs, particularly those serving families with
children, the federal government remained reluctant to take over administration. Entitlement structures became the favored method of communicating policy directives to local officials, of verifying (and correcting) those
officials’ compliance, and of ensuring comparable treatment across subgroups of claimants. Eligibility criteria in the new Medicaid program followed those of the now-centralized AFDC program. Legislation in the late
1960s and early 1970s similarly eliminated much state and local discretion
to set food stamp eligibility criteria. Although states received considerable
discretion to expand financial eligibility for Medicaid in the 1980s, they
nonetheless were required to exercise that discretion through explicit
rules.136
Thus, enforceable individual rights became a substitute for federalization of administration, a means of preserving state and local control over
most phases of program design and operations. The individual legal entitlement allowed the federal government to limit its intervention to enforcing norms of overriding federal importance, such as eliminating racist
program administration. The recent coupling of disentitlement with further
devolution hence is a noteworthy departure from the historic relationship
between those two approaches and leaves open the question of how the
federal government can measure and ensure adherence to each of the

134. Trattner, supra note 125, at 327.
135. Many states are required to supplement federal SSI benefits, and all states have the option to
do so. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382e, 1382g (2000). Since states’ compliance with this maintenance-of-effort
requirement can be measured on the basis of aggregate expenditures, in theory they retain some ability
to modify their eligibility criteria. See id. § 1382g(b)(1). In practice, states generally have not felt
strongly enough about the design of these programs to bear the expense of a separate bureaucracy to
administer their own criteria after the federal Social Security Administration (SSA) has applied its own
rigorous criteria. States also have the option to provide “interim assistance” to claimants whose SSI
applications are being adjudicated in the sometimes-ponderous SSA eligibility-determination system.
Id. § 1383(g). Finally, some states operate GA programs for persons whose disabilities lack the severity
or duration to qualify for SSI. Nonetheless, for the vast majority of low-income elderly people and lowincome people with severe disabilities, state policies have little or no effect.
136. Thus, for example, states were permitted to liberalize, but not narrow, financial eligibility
rules for most classes of Medicaid claimants. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(r)(2) (2000).
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norms it has set for a program whose primary funding it continues to supply.137
B.

Legal Entitlements’ Impact on Political Control of Public-Benefits
Policy

The textbook model of entitlements to public benefits makes entitlements seem imposing. In theory, Goldberg v. Kelly138 recognized the continued receipt of cash welfare benefits as a property interest for dueprocess purposes, thus giving the power to enforce programs’ rules to those
with the strongest interest in doing so: individual claimants. A related dueprocess doctrine sought to ensure that claimants received sufficiently clear
notices of the agencies’ actions that they could recognize situations where
the agency was deviating from its rules—and pursue administrative remedies.139 Federal and state administrative-procedure acts, which legislation
or agencies’ voluntary elections had made applicable to public-benefit programs,140 would ensure thoughtful rules. These rules would in fact contain
programs’ operative principles because still another line of due-process
cases barred rules so vague as to leave essentially standardless, and hence
unreviewable, discretion to eligibility workers.141 Where an agency’s noncompliance was more global, or where its rules abridged statutory or constitutional rights, legal services attorneys would represent the claimants in
class-action litigation against the agency. Finally, policy experimentation
would be sharply constrained since any claimant treated less generously
than the program’s basic rules required could sue.
If this model did indeed fairly reflect reality, public-benefits claimants
would be formidable foes for officials seeking to impose a less generous
balance of programmatic priorities, and disentitlement plausibly could be
seen as necessary to return control of programs to the political process. In
fact, however, evidence calls into question each major assumption in this
model. Part II.B.1 tests the importance of Goldberg v. Kelly and the right to
an administrative hearing against available data and implications that can
be drawn from states’ behavior. Although skepticism about the efficacy of
137. Without the assurance that states are complying with those conditions, continued federal
financing is likely to disappear. See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 Harv. L. Rev.
2544, 2574, 2648 (2005) (suggesting that, absent state compliance with federal policies, Congress may
continue a longstanding grant program for a few years to avoid a sudden shock to states’ budgets but is
likely to allow funding to erode fairly rapidly).
138. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
139. Id.; see, e.g., Ortiz v. Eichler, 794 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986); Buckhanon v. Percy, 708 F.2d
1209 (7th Cir. 1983); Hill v. O’Bannon, 554 F. Supp 190 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Willis v. Lascaris, 499 F.
Supp. 749 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).
140. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 2013(c), 2014(b) (2000) (requiring USDA to control the food stamp
program through “uniform national standards” promulgated through informal rule-making).
141. Carey v. Quern, 588 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1978); White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir.
1976); Holmes v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968).
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fair hearings in shaping eligibility workers’ behavior is not new,142 this
quantitative examination facilitates a comparison with the force of counterentitlements developed below.143 Part II.B.2 examines the role of affirmative litigation based on public-benefit entitlements to determine how serious a threat it is to the political branches’ ability to reshape programs’
goals in ways disadvantageous to claimants. Part II.B.3 assesses the availability of legal representation to help low-income claimants exercise their
legal rights against public-benefit programs’ administrators. Finally, Part
II.B.4 briefly discusses the flexibility that Congress and federal agencies
increasingly have sought to incorporate into entitlement programs—and
the courts’ acceptance of that flexibility. This suggests that the necessarily
local and subjective elements of work requirements—assessing what opportunities exist in a community and selecting assignments for particular
claimants—could easily have been incorporated into a cash-assistance program that continued to operate as a legal entitlement. Similarly, it suggests
that utilization controls and other cost-containment measures could be
added to Medicaid without the curtailment of legal rights involved in mandatory managed care.
1. The Promise and Limits of Procedural Due Process
Over time, the fair-hearing system has shown significant limitations in
policing eligibility workers’ behavior. Even if every mistreated claimant
sought a fair hearing, the process would be unlikely to deter eligibility
workers’ misapplication of rules: virtually all eligibility workers work
fixed hours and will likely be only modestly inconvenienced by having to
attend hearings. Adverse hearing decisions are generally not detrimental to
eligibility workers; they merely restore claimants to the position they
would have been in had policy been applied correctly in the first place.
Thus, the mere possibility of a fair hearing is unlikely to influence an eligibility worker that otherwise would have disregarded the program’s rules.144

142. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 15 (arguing that Goldberg had relatively little impact on
AFDC’s operation); Charles F. Scott, The Reality of Procedural Due Process, 13 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 725 (1972) (same); William H. Simon, The Rule of Law and the Two Realms of Welfare
Administration, 56 Brook. L. Rev. 777 (1990) (finding that fair hearings and other elements of
procedural due process did not suffice to empower systematically subordinated claimants); Lucie E.
White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes, 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1 (1990) (same).
143. See infra Part IV.B.3.
144. Any deterrent effect of the fair-hearing system depends upon additional, voluntary actions by
managers relying on fair-hearing decisions for indications of problems on their staffs. Although this
undoubtedly happens in a number of offices, it can hardly be said to be an impediment to the sound
administration of the program. If a manager feels that fair-hearing results are commanding too much
attention from their staff, she is free to reduce or eliminate her follow-up. Thus, to the extent fair
hearings have an impact on policy, it is in their role as a management device rather than through
empowering claimants.
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Even if it did, however, the number of fair hearings requested is consistently small, with the number of victorious claimants all but negligible.
Data that is most comparable across states is available from the food stamp
program. The results in Table 2 are stark: the number of fair hearings requested each year is generally less than half of one percent of the number
of claimants participating in the program in an average month.145 Moreover, of those requesting hearings, Table 3 shows that in most states fewer
than a third prevail.146
This result cannot be interpreted solely as evidence that eligibility
workers are faithfully applying the program’s rules, for the food stamp
quality control (QC) system has found a significant number of mishandled
food stamp cases. Until very recently, as Table 4 shows, underissuances to
eligible participating households typically equaled 2.5% to 3% of the total
value of food stamp benefits issued.147 It should be noted that the underissuances reported here include only those involving households that received at least some food stamps.148 Although USDA does not record the
value of benefits lost to households improperly denied benefits, Table 5
shows that at least 2.5% to 4% of denials and terminations reported each
year were erroneous.149 Estimating the number of cases mishandled each
year from these average monthly error rates is difficult since some cases
presumably are underissued several months in a row. Nonetheless, it appears that even if all those requesting fair hearings have valid grievances,
over 90% of the claimants with such grievances are not requesting fair

145. State Admin. Branch, USDA, Food Stamp Program State Activity Report Fiscal
Year 2002, at 23 (2003) [hereinafter 2002 State Activity Report]. Since the total number of people
receiving food stamps at some point during the year is typically about one and one half times the
number receiving benefits in an average month during that year, fewer than one third of one percent of
the claimants that could request a hearing during a year do so.
146. Id. at 13, 23. Claimants do significantly better in New York, year in and year out. According
to USDA officials, this appears to reflect the fact that many claimants in New York City win by default
when their eligibility workers elect not to take the time to travel to the central hearings office.
147. Quality Control Branch, USDA, Food Stamp Program Quality Control Annual
Report Fiscal Year 2002, at 22 (2004) [hereinafter 2002 Program Quality Control Annual
Report]; 2002 State Activity Report, supra note 144, at 13.
148. See 7 U.S.C. § 2025(c)(1) (2000) (including only cases where households received some
benefits in the definition of “payment error rate”). The food stamp program does require each state to
examine random samples to determine what percentage of its denials and terminations are procedurally
or substantively incorrect. 7 C.F.R. § 275.13 (2004). During the 1990s, USDA did not test most states’
assertions about these “negative case error rates,” which likely led to some underreporting. See U.S.
General Accounting Office, Food Stamp Program: Evaluation of Improper Denial or
Termination Error Rates (GAO/RCED-88-12 1987). Even when USDA did begin to verify all
states’ reported negative-case error rates in the 2000 fiscal year, it generally reviewed only the states’
case files. Presumably other claimants’ denials and terminations would prove faulty if their side of the
story were considered.
149. 2002 Program Quality Control Annual Report, supra note 146, at 23.
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hearings. And even if all of those winning hearings deserve to do so, the
QC estimates suggest that many meritorious claims likely fail.150
Instead, the low rate at which aggrieved claimants seek hearings may
be the result of confusing or opaque notices, particularly those that merely
direct recipients to call their eligibility worker to learn the reason for the
agency’s action.151 Another factor is likely to be recipients’ inability to understand food stamp rules well enough to know when the food stamp office
has mishandled their applications—or to understand the fair-hearing rules
well enough to know what to do in response to the food stamp office’s error.152 Recipients also have insufficient child care or transportation to allow
them to pursue a remedy of uncertain utility. Those that are marginally literate may fear that a hearing will expose them to embarrassment. Working
claimants may lose more in wages (and their employer’s good will) by attending than they would win from a successful result. And many claimants
may fear that requesting a hearing will antagonize their eligibility workers
and result in retaliatory exercises of discretion.
The modest impact of the right to a fair hearing on states’ administrations also can be inferred from states’ own behavior. The Food Stamp Act
of 1977 purports to deny continued benefits—in effect, a pre-termination
hearing—to households appealing a reduction or denial of assistance beyond the period for which the state previously determined the household
eligible (its “certification period”).153 This is true even though the household has the right to a new certification period if it reapplies and remains
eligible.154 The Sixth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of this provision
in 1983,155 followed by the Fourth Circuit in 1987.156 Food stamp regulations gave states broad discretion, allowing them to set certification periods
150. Compare 2002 State Activity Report, supra note 144, at 13, with 2002 Program
Quality Control Annual Report, supra note 146, at 14.
151. See, e.g., Hill v. O’Bannon, 554 F. Supp. 190 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (requiring termination notices
to provide a list of possible alternative bases of eligibility); Jackson v. O’Bannon, No. 80-500 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 8, 1980), reprinted in CCH Medicare & Medicaid Guide ¶ 31,108 (requiring notices to clearly
specify the benefits being terminated).
152. See generally Handler, supra note 15 (describing factors that might cause claimants not to
request a hearing despite feeling wronged); Mashaw, supra note 14 (same).
153. The Food Stamp Program, like other means-tested public-benefit programs, requires
recipients to re-establish their eligibility periodically in order to receive benefits. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2012(c),
2020(e)(4) (2000). Thus, the statutory right to a pre-termination hearing applies to terminations the
state initiates between these periodic reviews but not to those arising from the household’s participation
in the review process.
154. Id. § 2020(e)(4), (e)(10).
155. Banks v. Block, 700 F.2d 292, 297-98 (6th Cir. 1983).
156. Holman v. Block, 823 F.2d 56, 59 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Jackson v. Jackson, 857 F.2d 951,
957 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that food stamp claimants have no property interest beyond the end of
each certification period). These holdings are difficult to square with the rejection of the “bitter with the
sweet” theory of property rights in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540
(1985): the requirement to seek periodic reviews of eligibility is purely procedural, and Loudermill
rejects attempts to incorporate procedural restrictions into the definition of property rights.
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as short as three months or as long as twelve.157 Since states have more
than sixty days to decide and implement the results of hearings,158 a state
can completely eliminate the right to a pre-deprivation hearing by giving
households three-month certification periods.159 Thus, if states found that
the right to a pre-deprivation fair hearing was interfering with their operation of the food stamp program, they had a ready means to eliminate it. In
fact, most states found short certification periods far more burdensome
than the occasional fair hearing. As the table below shows, neither the 1977
Act nor the subsequent decisions upholding its constitutionality led to any
significant increase in the incidence of short certification hearings. When
states finally did move to short certification periods, it was in response to
pressure from USDA to reduce food stamp quality control error rates rather
than out of any aversion to fair hearings.160
2. The Limited Role of Affirmative Litigation Under Public-Benefits
Entitlements
Affirmative litigation in means-tested family-assistance programs
scored some important successes during the decade and a half before 1981.
The Supreme Court struck down longstanding policies denying aid to
women on the basis of supposed moral shortcomings.161 The Court also
struck down state-imposed rules artificially reducing claimants’ AFDC
grants based on income that was not actually available to them.162 The
Court rejected state policies arbitrarily disqualifying families based on unusual configurations or other circumstances that did not affect need.163
157. 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(f)(3) (2001) (subsequently amended).
158. 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(c)(1) (2004).
159. Even if a household appeals immediately upon receiving the state’s certification decision, the
state can issue benefits at the level it has selected for all three months of that certification period, while
the hearing remains pending. If the household wins the hearing, it will receive retroactive benefits;
however, the state can reset the household’s benefit level at its preferred level for the next certification
period while the household appeals again. Alternatively, if the household appeals the denial of a
benefit, upon losing the hearing, the state can provide benefits for the months following its decision but
require the household to reapply on the ground that it would have received only a three-month
certification period had its application been approved. The state then could, if it still felt the household
was ineligible, deny the new application and provide no current food stamps for the next three months.
160. Super, Quiet Revolution, supra note 104, at 1311-12.
161. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 (1968); see also Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 559-60
(1970) (rejecting the California rule that arbitrarily attributed substantial amounts of income to claimant
families when a man was present in a household).
162. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 712-19 (1975) (refusing to allow states to disqualify
families based on unemployment-compensation benefits for which they were eligible but that they did
not receive); Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338, 346 (1975) (prohibiting reduction of aid to a family
with a non-paying lodger); Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1974) (requiring states to deduct
claimants’ actual commuting costs from their earned income before considering that income available
to the family).
163. Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 145 (1979) (requiring state to provide foster care assistance
to children in relatives’ care); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 604 (1972) (rejecting
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Perhaps the most ambitious decision was the D.C. Circuit’s 1975 directive
to USDA to increase food stamp benefits to a level sufficient to assure a
nutritionally adequate diet for most recipients.164
These results, while impressive, do not suggest that litigation is likely
to frustrate the political branches’ efforts to change the substantive conditions of entitlements. First, the overwhelming majority of successful public-benefits litigation came during the thirteen years between the Court’s
1968 decision in King v. Smith, recognizing public-benefits claimants’
right to sue under the terms of federal statutes, and the first of President
Reagan’s major pieces of budget-cutting legislation in 1981.165 During this
period, a series of political impasses over welfare-reform proposals from
Presidents Nixon and Carter diverted Congress from developing any significant substantive AFDC legislation;166 the expectation that welfare reform was in the offing apparently dissuaded the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) from initiating major AFDC rulemakings during
this period as well. Thus, the courts were left largely on their own without
political guidance. As the Court noted, “Congress . . . frequently . . . has
voiced its wishes in muted strains and left it to the courts to discern the
theme in the cacophony of political understanding.”167 Its resolution of
cases under those circumstances is hardly indicative of a willingness to
challenge the political branches’ primacy in defining the terms of entitlements.
Second, even during this period, the courts sought whatever political
direction they could find to guide their decisions. King v. Smith struck
down Alabama’s disqualification of women with male visitors based on a
memorandum from Health, Education and Welfare Secretary Arthur
Flemming rejecting this very policy.168 The D.C. Circuit ordered an increase in food stamp benefits based on explicit language in the Food Stamp
Act of 1964 and the explicit rejection of a proposal to give USDA more
discretion by the conference committee that drafted the language in question.169 The Supreme Court denied states authority to limit recipients’ deductions for employment expenses upon finding that “Congress has spoken
with firmness and clarity.”170 And the Court, speaking through Justice
Rehnquist, broadened the eligibility of unemployed people for AFDC upon
disqualification of families in which the father’s absence was due to military service); Townsend v.
Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 290-91 (1971) (barring state from disqualifying college students).
164. Rodway v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 514 F.2d 809, 842-43 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
165. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35 [hereinafter “OBRA 1981”]
(codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and other titles).
166. Michael D. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare
in America 269 (1986).
167. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 412 (1969).
168. 392 U.S. at 325.
169. Rodway, 514 F.2d at 818-24.
170. Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 265 (1974).
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finding that Congress had crafted a disqualification for recipients of unemployment compensation narrowly.171
Third, even in the heyday of affirmative welfare litigation and even
without political guidance or specific statutory support, the Court has
proven unwilling to disturb states’ authority to impose genuine behavioral
requirements. Even in King v. Smith, the Court declared beyond question
“Alabama’s general power to deal with conduct it regards as immoral and
with the problem of illegitimacy.”172 Subsequently, it ignored principles it
had just laid down in other cases and upheld state rules disqualifying strikers173 and claimants that refused to comply with work requirements.174 It
gave states free reign to require claimants to submit to invasive inspections
of their homes.175
Fourth, the Court also proved reluctant to impose fiscal obligations on
state or federal agencies without clear congressional authority. Again, the
Court made the limited scope of its intervention clear from the outset in
King v. Smith, declaring that “[t]here is no question that States have considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC resources, since each State is
free to set its own standard of need and to determine the level of benefits
by the amount of funds it devotes to the program.”176 It declined an opportunity to interpret AFDC’s statute as requiring states to base grant levels on
the actual cost of maintaining a family.177 It unanimously allowed states
broad discretion to arbitrarily meet one set of emergency needs while disregarding others.178 And despite its insistence that only income “actually
available” be counted in AFDC, the Court refused to extend that principle
to the food stamp program.179 When disabled Medicaid recipients invoked
the Rehabilitation Act’s antidiscrimination provision to challenge some
states’ cost-cutting rules that disproportionately denied them health care, a
unanimous Court, speaking through Justice Marshall, read the Medicaid
statute very narrowly to preserve states’ fiscal discretion.180
Fifth, when Congress did act to change AFDC’s purposes, the courts
not only consistently upheld the legislation but generally endorsed federal
agencies’ most aggressive interpretations of that legislation. Prior to
171. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713-19 (1975).
172. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320 (1968).
173. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977); accord, Lyng v. UAW, 485 U.S. 360 (1988)
(rejecting constitutional challenge to Food Stamp Act’s disqualification of most strikers).
174. N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 422 (1973).
175. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 324 (1971).
176. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1968).
177. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1970) (noting that Congress has left states a “great
deal of discretion” in determining how much assistance families will be given).
178. Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 741-46 (1978) (construing the emergency assistance
program to be unfettered by rules previously applied to AFDC).
179. Knebel v. Hein, 429 U.S. 288, 293 (1977).
180. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
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PRWORA, Congress’s major efforts to alter AFDC’s substantive purposes
involved efforts to restrain spending, specifically through a series of
budget-cutting bills President Reagan pushed through Congress in 1981,181
1982,182 and 1984.183 Since states controlled actual benefit levels, the federal government could reduce costs most easily by changing AFDC’s
grant-group composition and income-attribution rules—the very rules the
courts had liberalized over the preceding decade and a half. Although legal
services lawyers filed a welter of suits seeking to invalidate or limit these
changes, few challenges won even temporary relief in the lower courts and
none did so in the Supreme Court.184 Indeed, once it became clear that cost
containment was an accepted congressional purpose in AFDC, the Court
even allowed states to go further than the federal government in denying
benefits to families with unusual living arrangements.185
Finally, the Court has taken several steps, independent of specific
congressional actions, to prevent claimants from prevailing on interpretations of ambiguous statutory passages that might go beyond what the political process intended.186 To be sure, claimants did win a few cases on
181. OBRA 1981, supra note 165; Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-98 (1982).
182. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-253 (1982); Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248 (1982).
183. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369 (1984).
184. See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 494 (1990) (allowing AFDC to count Social Security
survivors’ benefits specifically for one child as available to all members of a family); Gardebring v.
Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 417-18 (1988) (allowing lump-sum disqualification to be imposed on a family
that had spent the funds, unaware of the AFDC amendment providing that families receiving nonrecurring lump-sum income are ineligible for benefits for the number of months determined by dividing
the family’s standard of need into the sum received); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 600 (1987)
(finding it rational for Congress to adjust the AFDC program to reflect the fact that support money
generally provides significant benefits for entire family units); Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 387
(1987) (upholding the rule that disqualified families from AFDC for a fixed number of months
whenever a family member received a personal injury award without regard to the continued
availability of the award money); Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 131 (1985) (upholding imposition of
food stamp reductions without giving recipients an opportunity for a pre-deprivation hearing under
Goldberg v. Kelly if the family was untimely in their request for a hearing); Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S.
184, 211-12 (1985) (allowing Congress to cap deductions for work expenses, effectively overruling
Shea v. Vialpando); see also Skidgel v. Me. Dep’t of Human Servs., 994 F.2d 930, 939-41 (1st Cir.
1993) (upholding the requirement that stepparents’ unemployment compensation be deemed available
to children whom they had no legal duty to support); Falin v. Sullivan, 776 F. Supp. 1097, 1100-02
(E.D. Va. 1991), aff’d per curiam, 6 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1036 (1994)
(upholding rule disqualifying families from AFDC based on the equity value of a motor vehicle that
exceeds $1,500); Grimesy v. Huff, 876 F.2d 738, 745 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding statute denying relief
to families previously denied AFDC benefits based on a policy deeming the income of grandparents
“available” in determining eligibility for AFDC that was concededly unlawful).
185. Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1995) (upholding rules states initiated without
federal authorization requiring all children with a single caretaker to have their needs considered
together, effectively deeming income received for minor children available to their cousins).
186. E.g., Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 323-33 (1997) (finding no private right of action to
services under the child-support enforcement program); Suter, 503 U.S. at 350 (holding that the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 does not create an enforceable right on behalf of
families); Halderman, 451 U.S. at 17-18 (requiring clear evidence of congressional intent before
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constitutional rather than statutory grounds.187 In general, however,
Congress was able to accomplish many of the same goals through other
means.188 And, of course, most constitutional claims do not depend on
whether claimants have an entitlement to a program’s benefits.189
In sum, although affirmative litigation in entitlement programs did
significantly liberalize the availability of assistance for low-income claimants, it did so primarily when the political branches, actively or by default,
accepted that the programs’ primary goal was preventing hardship for lowincome people. When the political branches have established different substantive priorities, the courts have not stood in their way and, indeed, at
times have sought to anticipate changes without explicit statutory or regulatory direction. The fear of affirmative litigation is thus an implausible
basis for rejecting entitlement structures.
3. The Paucity of Legal Assistance to Public-Benefits Claimants
Even if fair hearings and affirmative litigation gave claimants far
more influence over programs’ policies than they do, the availability of
legal representation is generally essential to exercise that influence.190 Yet
in many areas, public-benefits claimants lack access to attorneys who will
litigate against programs’ managers. Even before 1995, legal services programs had the resources to assist only a tiny fraction of people seeking assistance with public benefits. Indeed, legal services programs in many parts

finding Congress has intended the states to fund certain entitlements as a condition of receiving federal
funds).
187. See, e.g., United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537-38 (1973) (invalidating
the rule that prevented unrelated individuals from forming food stamp households together); U.S. Dep’t
of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973) (invalidating the rule that denied food stamps to persons
who had been claimed on a non-household member’s most recent tax return). These were efforts to
disqualify “hippie communes” and college students, respectively.
188. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2015(e) (2000) (denying food stamp eligibility explicitly to college
students); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638-43 (1986) (allowing Congress and USDA broad
flexibility to configure the food stamp household definition in ways that denied benefits to people who
were at one time eligible).
189. Compare Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969) (invalidating discrimination
against interstate migrants in the entitlement AFDC program), with Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 49293, 507-11 (1999) (invalidating discrimination against interstate migrants in the non-entitlement TANF
program).
190. To be sure, most claimants’ victories in fair hearings come without the benefit of counsel. In
2001, attorneys from programs funded by the federal Legal Services Corporation (LSC) represented
claimants in 892 food stamp cases decided by fair hearings. LSC, Fact Book 2001 (2002) [hereinafter
LSC 2001]. Even if all these were victories, they represent only 8% of the 11,320 food stamp hearings
decided in favor of plaintiffs that year. State Admin. Branch, USDA, Food Stamp Program State
Activity Report, Fiscal Year 2001, at 22 (2002). Most of the fair hearings that pro se claimants
won, however, likely involved simple factual disputes. Apart from being quite rare, as demonstrated
above, an adverse determination on the facts of one case is unlikely to affect the way eligibility workers
or managers treat other claimants.
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of the country largely eschewed family-based public-benefits cases, and
only a small minority engaged in affirmative litigation.191
In 1995, the new Republican majority in Congress slashed legal services’ funding and curtailed many of the areas of practice that most annoyed parties opposing legal services’ clients. Several of these rules
specifically sought to limit claimants’ ability to influence policy in publicbenefits programs. Since then, legal services programs receiving federal
funds have been barred from bringing class-action lawsuits192 and lawsuits
challenging “welfare reform.”193 They also have been forbidden from making claims under statutes shifting liability for attorneys’ fees to unsuccessful defendants.194 In addition to deterring some unlawful behavior, these
fees had been crucial to the financial viability of many legal services programs’ public-benefits practices.195 A few areas are served by legal services
“spin-offs” that rely on nonfederal funds to engage in forms of advocacy
now prohibited to the Legal Services Corporation’s (LSC’s) grantees. In
many states, however, affirmative litigation is not even a theoretical possibility for ensuring that agencies’ practices conform to statutes and other
policies established by political officials.196
Although data is only intermittently available from LSC, legal services programs’ involvement in family public-benefit programs has been
declining steadily over the past two decades.197 Some 5.4% of the cases
191. Although a substantial number of lawyers and law firms engage in pro bono representation of
low-income people, few are attracted to, or are immediately competent to handle, cases involving
complex public-benefit programs.
192. 45 C.F.R. § 1617.3 (2004).
193. Id. § 1639.3.
194. Id. § 16.
195. Programs that were willing to represent public-benefits litigants in affirmative litigation often
budgeted based upon the likelihood of receiving these fees. Continuing that litigation without the
ability to benefit from fee-shifting statutes meant that this work could continue only to the extent that
programs were willing to divert resources from other representation—at the same time they already
were having to make deep reductions in services in response to federal budget cuts. Moreover, publicbenefits lawyers’ ability to bring in attorneys’ fees also was particularly important in some states
because the agencies whose actions they challenged often had influence over state legal services
funding.
196. Obviously private lawyers in these states are not subject to LSC’s restrictions, but few have
the substantive knowledge of public-benefit programs to identify unlawful actions or to prosecute
litigation. They also lack contact with claimants that are subject to unlawful practices. Those few that
do have the requisite substantive knowledge, such as former legal services lawyers, typically work in
practices that can ill afford to wait years for possible recovery under fee-shifting statutes.
197. Although data is insufficient to determine the cause of this decline with any certainty, it
appears that discouragement from federal and state funders and the perception that the courts were no
longer receptive to public-welfare litigation played a significant role. Since 1987, the author has sought
to encourage legal services programs to become more actively engaged in public-benefits work,
particularly involving the Food Stamp Program. He has conducted scores of trainings for legal services
programs in over forty states, written over a dozen articles for the legal services journal, and responded
to thousands of calls, emails, and letters seeking information about these programs. His results have
been decidedly mixed. Although some individuals have become enthusiastic and expert advocates as a
result, many met resistance from their program directors or were not permitted to specialize sufficiently
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LSC programs closed in 1983 involved AFDC or “other welfare” programs;198 by 1996, that share had already fallen to 3.5% despite the growth
of behavioral requirements leading to sanctions that presumably many recipients would want help contesting.199 By 2001, the most recent year for
which data are available, only 2.6% of legal services cases closed involved
TANF and related programs.200 Similarly, food stamp cases shrank from
1.7% of the total cases in 1983201 to 1.1% in 2001.202 As small as they are,
these numbers nonetheless overstate legal services’ impact on publicbenefit programs: with LSC funding declining over this period, publicwelfare representation was claiming a declining share of a shrinking pie.203
As a result, even though the Food Stamp Program still was functioning as
an entitlement, only a little more than one claimant in a million had her
case taken to court.204

to develop the expertise required for difficult cases. And when a program loses its public-benefits
experts, the complexity of the law, and its lack of application in the private bar, makes it difficult to
hire or train effective replacements.
198. LSC, 1984 Fact Book 17 (1984) [hereinafter LSC 1984].
199. LSC, Facts 1996 (1997) [hereinafter LSC 1996].
200. LSC 2001, supra note 190.
201. LSC 1984, supra note 198.
202. LSC 2001, supra note 190. Legal services programs’ involvement with Medicaid actually
rose from 1.1% in 1983 to 2% in both 1996 and 2001. Id.; LSC 1996, supra note 199; LSC 1984, supra
note 198. This may reflect the dramatic increase in Medicaid eligibility Congress legislated between
1984 and 1990 (expansions that were still phasing in until 2002). In 1983, relatively few low-income
people could qualify for Medicaid without receiving cash assistance from AFDC or SSI; by 1996,
Medicaid eligibility was often determined separately. Also, LSC’s figures do not distinguish between
family Medicaid cases and those involving long-term care.
203. Due to funding cutbacks, legal services programs closed 39% fewer cases in 2001 than they
did just five years earlier. LSC 2001, supra note 190; LSC 1996, supra note 199. Moreover, the vast
majority of these cases involved only brief advice and similar casual involvement, not active challenges
to public-benefits agencies’ actions. Cases in which legal services advocates challenged an agency’s
actions in court or during an administrative hearing, including those that settled amicably, constituted
only one-sixth of the TANF cases and one-tenth of the food stamp cases LSC recorded in 2001. LSC
2001, supra note 190. That year, legal services lawyers took only thirty-six food stamp cases to court,
id.; most of those were simply appeals of individual unfavorable fair-hearing decisions.
204. The food stamp program served an average of about 17.3 million people per month in 2001.
State Admin. Branch, USDA, Food Stamp Program State Activity Report, Fiscal Year 2001,
at 5 (2002). Over the course of the year, slightly more than half of all food stamp recipients left the
program, meaning that about 27 million people received food stamps at some point during 2001.
Several million more people unsuccessfully apply for food stamps each year. Therefore, the total
number of people getting or seeking food stamps in 2001 was likely over thirty million.
Indeed, the non-entitlement TANF program yielded substantially more court challenges, albeit still
a trivial ratio of the whole. Roughly four million families received cash assistance per month in 2001.
Assuming a turnover rate of 50%—AFDC’s turnover rate was somewhat less than that in food stamps,
but time limits and sanctions have likely increased TANF’s turnover to at least that level—means that
six million people received TANF assistance over the course of the year. If another million tried and
failed to obtain cash assistance, the 231 “TANF and other welfare” cases legal services lawyers
litigated to a judicial decision would represent one case for every thirty thousand claimants—hardly an
imposing ratio.

1096

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1051

4. Entitlement Systems’ Tolerance for Administrative Flexibility
At the same time as some programs have been stripped of their legal
entitlements, the rules of those that continue to provide enforceable rights
to eligible claimants have become increasingly malleable. Whatever other
constraints programs’ managers may face, courts’ interpretation of legal
entitlements have proven no obstacle to their flexibility. As public-benefit
programs become increasingly caught up in federal and state budgetary
politics, agencies are often asked to implement changes in policies more
rapidly than they can change their administrative rules. This has caused
them to make policy by sub-regulatory memos. Even when agencies continue to rely upon rules, some programs have become so complex that, at
least when rendered to claimants and other nonexperts, they become difficult to distinguish from open-ended grants of discretion.205 Lacking an understanding of the rules constraining agencies’ discretion, claimants are in
no position to challenge them.
For the most part, courts have accepted broad administrative discretion and flexibility within entitlement programs. Contrary to the popular
image of robust legal entitlements yielding formalistic results, courts have
responded very pragmatically to practical arguments from programs’ managers. Courts have allowed agencies to change policies quickly in response
to newly legislated priorities without following rulemaking procedures206 or
giving claimants the opportunity for pre-deprivation hearings.207 They have
rejected arguments that agencies must promulgate detailed policies on all
issues of program administration in order to impose their views.208 And

205. Consider, for example, the exceptions to the food stamp program’s three-month time limit on
certain childless adults. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o) (2000); 7 C.F.R. § 273.25 (2003). The statute lists six
distinct exceptions, one of which cross-references another statute with six more. In addition, the statute
embodies several more exceptions within its definitional language and other paragraphs. It also makes
exceptions for persons working in any of three designated ways, with one of those defined in terms of
three subtypes, one of which cross-references another statute containing eight possible forms of work
activity. Barring an exceptional burst of creativity or dedication, eligibility workers and those that
design claimant notices for the state will be tempted to summarize the rule merely as creating a threemonth limit subject to a number of (unspecified) exceptions. For the vast majority of claimants lacking
expert representation, this wholly indefinite description will be all they know of the rule and will make
it all but impossible for them to judge when the rule has been misapplied to them. But see Hill v.
O’Bannon, 554 F. Supp. 190, 198 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (requiring state to send GA recipients a notice
explaining each of ten exceptions to the general assistance program’s three-month time limit).
206. E.g., Phila. Citizens in Action v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 877, 880-82 (3d Cir. 1982) (allowing
HHS to reduce AFDC benefits in response to OBRA 1981 without going through notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures to interpret its provisions).
207. E.g., Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 129-30 (1985) (finding implementation of food stamp
reductions in OBRA 1981 was sufficiently legislative in nature that it did not require due process).
208. E.g., New York v. Lyng, 829 F.2d 346, 348, 353-54 (2d Cir. 1987) (accepting USDA’s
argument that restaurant allowances for the homeless did not fall within the income provisions for
“reimbursements” despite the department’s failure to promulgate rules providing the basis for denying
such treatment).
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they have refused to apply state constitutions’ procedural provisions to obstruct policy changes that governors have sought to implement.209
Even where clear, legally enforceable rules appear to constrain discretion, administrative waivers have allowed managers to disregard those
rules with little accountability. Congress and federal agencies have granted
states waivers to experiment with different ways of accommodating programs’ various priorities. This growth in administrative waivers as a vehicle for policymaking in benefit programs renders rules far less significant.
In general, the courts have declined to scrutinize agencies’ grants of even
the most sweeping waivers to states.210 Indeed, a series of waivers led to
both the expansion of work requirements for cash-assistance recipients211
and mandatory Medicaid managed care.212 It thus seems that legal entitlements are not an obstacle to the exploration of new accommodations of
competing programmatic priorities through waivers213 and similar devices.214
C.

The Rise of Counter-Entitlements

Whatever the strength of the legal entitlements that support programs’
humanitarian purposes, they are not designed to vindicate programs’ other
goals. In particular, a necessary objective of any spending program is to
prevent unnecessary expenditures. Weakening a legal entitlement alone
will not do this; a weaker entitlement might cause the program to deny
more worthy claimants, but it would not prompt agency staff to be more
careful to deny benefits to unworthy ones. Programs have developed
counter-entitlements to provide that balancing function.
Unfortunately, narratives about the supposed power of legal entitlements typically fail to account for these counter-entitlements and hence
present a one-sided view of the pressures on frontline agency staff. These
209. E.g., State ex rel. Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 424 N.W.2d 385, 473 (Wis. 1988) (allowing the
governor to reduce AFDC benefits by item vetoing word fragments and digits within numbers); Harbor
v. Deukmejian, 742 P.2d 1290, 1299, 1301 (Cal. 1987) (acknowledging a violation of a governor’s
item-veto authority but finding underlying liberalizing legislation violates other constitutional
requirements).
210. See, e.g., C.K. v. N.J. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 189-90 (3d Cir. 1996)
(finding no right to public comment on proposed AFDC waiver). But see Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.2d 1057
(9th Cir. 1994) (finding HHS’s approval of an AFDC waiver without responding to objections raised by
some members of the public arbitrary and capricious).
211. Michael B. Katz, The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare
State 90-98 (2001).
212. Nat’l Health Law Program, An Advocate’s Guide to the Medicaid Program ch. 2,
at 7 (2001).
213. Indeed, Congress has required expedited consideration of proposed Medicaid demonstration
waivers. Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-554, § 703 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1315(f)).
214. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2035 (2000) (giving states the option to conform food stamp rules to
rules they have chosen to apply in their TANF-funded assistance programs through a “simplified food
stamp program”).
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narratives posit that agency staff are asked to determine eligibility and
benefit levels to the best of their abilities but face a profoundly skewed risk
of error: improper denials or underpayments are subject to review at the
claimant’s behest while, we are told, approvals of ineligible applicants and
overpayments go unchallenged. Were this true, even the relatively feeble
administrative and judicial enforcement mechanisms described in the preceding section over time might bias such a system in favor of allowing
benefits: eligibility workers inclined to grant benefits freely would have
trouble-free jobs while more conscientious ones would have to defend
themselves periodically in administrative hearings or even in court.
This one-sidedness would be profoundly at odds with the values of
our adversary system, which generally relies upon balance. Even where
one side in a dispute has much in its favor, some counterweight typically
seeks to guard against overreaching.215 The majority may dominate policymaking but may not prosecute minority legislators for their dissenting
speeches or choke off criticism from the press.216 Few legal rights are offered without qualification: copyrights are subject to fair use, contract
rights are subject to defenses such as impossibility of performance. Here
again, if the simplistic model were correct, the political process’s ability to
change substantive priorities might seem to depend upon the elimination of
legal entitlements, even weak ones. Thus, if we focus only on affirmative
legal rights and not their counterweights, we might think that we could expand public access to literary and artistic works only by abandoning copyright protection, rather than by broadening fair use; we might think that we
could protect consumers only by abandoning the enforceability of contracts, rather than by expanding contract defenses to include, for instance,
certain oppressive contracts of adhesion.
This simplistic model cannot be reconciled with reality. Fearing just
this kind of pro-claimant bias, Congress and program administrators have
developed counter-entitlements to provide counterweights to entitlements.
Since private parties generally lack standing to oppose awards of benefits,217 these devices, sometimes called “quality control” systems, typically
215. For example, even a defendant that blatantly failed to perform her contract nonetheless has a
right not to be required to pay more than necessary to satisfy the expectation she created in the contract.
Our political system tends to fear that one-sided adjudicative processes will lead to overreaching.
More open-ended systems, such as tort awards for wrongful death or pain and suffering, are frequent
subjects of political criticism. And the federal criminal-sentencing guidelines are an example of an
effort to impose a countervailing pressure on what had been a relatively open-ended judicial function,
the honoring of sympathetic defendants’ pleas for mercy (or prosecutors’ pleas for vengeance against
unsympathetic ones).
216. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 105-16 (1980) (finding the protection of
minorities’ opportunities for political participation central to the structure of the Constitution).
217. Cf, e.g., Kitchens v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1337, 1340-41 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissing on
federalism grounds an absent parent’s suit seeking the right to a hearing concerning the custodial
parent’s application for AFDC benefits where the state would seek reimbursement for these benefits
from the non-custodial parent if the application is successful). But see 20 C.F.R. § 404.932 (2003)
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take the form of specialized audits in which an independent unit examines
a subset of cases in which benefits were granted to check for errors. As a
result, agency staff whose sympathies might otherwise tempt them to grant
benefits in questionable cases face the risk of being held accountable.
Indeed, sophisticated policymakers have at times sought to change
programs’ operations by manipulating counter-entitlements rather than by
changing the terms of the programs’ entitlements.218 Accordingly, when
Congress sought to transform the substantive priorities of its cashassistance programs in the mid-1990s, or when a future Congress or administration seeks to modify the substantive priorities of another entitlement program, it makes sense to consider whether creating or modifying
counter-entitlements might be a more effective means of implementing the
change. Thus, for example, instead of denying public assistance to families
in which children are not immunized—curtailing an entitlement—
policymakers could consider reducing Medicaid’s per capita reimbursements of managed-care plans where more than a minimal share of child
beneficiaries have not received their shots—creating a counter-entitlement.
Similarly, when Congress became concerned about long-term foster-care
placements, it could have reduced payments under the Child Welfare
Services program to states that failed in large numbers of cases to take
specified efforts to reunify families instead of requiring states to commence
actions to terminate the rights of parents whose children have been in foster
care for fifteen months.219
Making policy by manipulating counter-entitlements will only be viable if counter-entitlements can exert strong enough pressure on humanservices agencies and their staffs to offset the pressure that entitlements
exert. Just as Part II.B demonstrated that legal entitlements have exerted far
less pervasive influence on benefit programs’ design than is commonly
assumed, this Section argues that counter-entitlements can be much more
powerful than is generally recognized. Part II.C.1 identifies the defining
characteristics of counter-entitlements, briefly sketches their history in major federal public-benefit programs, and offers thumbnail descriptions of
some of the more important counter-entitlements attached to major
(allowing any party whose interests would be adversely affected to request a hearing on a Social
Security dispute); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.403-404.406 (reducing the benefits of Social Security beneficiaries
based on other persons’ claims for benefits on the account of the same wage-earner).
218. For example, the Reagan Administration pursued its desire to reduce spending on SSI and
Social Security disability benefits, AFDC, and food stamps as much by strengthening counterentitlements in those programs as by narrowing the terms of those programs’ substantive entitlements.
The Clinton Administration’s desire to expand the availability of health insurance was marked by a
relaxation of Medicaid’s counter-entitlement. Towards the end of its term, the Clinton Administration
also relaxed the food stamp program’s counter-entitlement to help low-income working families that
were eligible but not participating.
219. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2000); Super, New Moralizers, supra note 100, at 2054-55
(criticizing requirement).
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entitlement programs today. Part II.C.2 demonstrates the programmatic
power of counter-entitlements with a case study.220 Finally, Part II.C.3 considers how a counter-entitlement might have enforced work requirements
had PRWORA not eliminated the entitlement to cash assistance in 1996.
1. The Rise of Counter-Entitlements in Public-Benefits Programs
Following the initial landmark cases of the late 1960s, the 1970s saw
the blossoming of legal entitlements as a means of managing public-benefit
programs. At about the same time, however, the major federal meanstested public-benefit programs were developing counter-entitlements.
These systems most commonly sought to restrain programs’ costs and enforce high standards of integrity.
In significant respects, counter-entitlements operate almost as a
shadow to fair-hearing systems. As such, they have five generic characteristics. First, like fair hearings, they are specific to particular cases. Just as
each fair hearing examines one specific set of decisions involving one particular claimant, each counter-entitlement review analyzes a case handler’s
decisions involving one particular claimant. In place of the aggrieved
claimant’s appeal, a counter-entitlement needs a system for selecting cases
to be reviewed. Some counter-entitlements rely on random sampling; others have selection processes that target cases in which it appears that an
error favoring the claimant has occurred.221
Second, counter-entitlements, like fair hearings, rely upon independent reviewers to make judgments about cases. Goldberg concluded that the
supervision of eligibility workers’ regular overseers was not sufficient to
ensure that those workers paid benefits to all eligible claimants. It therefore
required that hearing officers be individuals not previously involved in the
disputed decision. In the same vein, counter-entitlements introduce independent reviewers to supplement regular supervisors’ oversight—and, presumably, to give those supervisors incentives to watch their staff more
carefully.

220. Specifically, it shows how the food stamp program’s quality control (QC) system
overwhelmed one of the stronger entitlements in the mid and late 1990s and reshaped the program’s
substantive priorities. When the administering agency and Congress ultimately sought to realign the
food stamp program’s priorities, they focused not on transforming or strengthening the terms of its
entitlements but rather on weakening and redirecting its counter-entitlement. See Super, Quiet
Revolution, supra note 104, at 1354-58.
221. An example of the latter is the Bellmon review process of the Social Security Administration
(SSA). Bellmon reviews evaluate an SSA administrative law judge (ALJ) by re-examining a sample of
cases that she has decided. They sample a larger fraction of cases in which the ALJ allowed benefits
than of those in which the ALJ rejected the disability claim. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
Similarly, the portion of the food stamp quality control system that imposes sanctions on states only
samples cases where states granted at least some benefits, thus ignoring terminated and denied cases in
which any error would be adverse to the claimant.
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Third, like fair hearings, counter-entitlements seek to rely on objective
standards—typically the agency’s rules—for making decisions. A fairhearing officer, at least in principle, is not free to award benefits simply
because she finds the claimant’s circumstances subjectively compelling.
So, too, a reviewer in a counter-entitlement system may not reject the case
handler’s decision unless she can show that it violates specific agency
rules. For example, if a program’s rules direct case handlers to accept the
medical assessments of claimants’ treating physicians, a subsequent reviewer would not be free to criticize the case handler’s acceptance of a
claimant’s disability simply because she believes—even for compelling
reasons—that the doctor was wrong.222
Fourth, counter-entitlements generalize from the cases they examine
and draw conclusions about how program administrators are doing their
jobs.223 Remedies typically affect the entire caseload rather than just those
individual cases found in error. In a sense, this mimics the role of affirmative class-action litigation, which sometimes allows claimants with entitlements to argue that the agency is mistreating other claimants and achieve
agency-wide relief.224
Finally, counter-entitlements have the capacity to impose consequences on the basis of their reviews. Fair-hearing decisions can compel
awards of benefits to individual claimants. Counter-entitlements’ consequences typically are more systemic. Some counter-entitlements produce a
ranking system that embarrasses underachievers225 or holds high performers out as models.226 With other counter-entitlements, the consequence may
be a requirement to take corrective action, to impose additional limitations
on managerial flexibility, to provide less administrative funding, or to demote or otherwise affect the employment status of individual case handlers.
These consequences give counter-entitlements their ability to change case
222. Thus, counter-entitlements, like fair hearings, give case handlers incentives to reduce the risk
of reversal by basing their decisions whenever possible on those criteria that are subjective and hence
immune from second-guessing.
223. See, e.g., supra notes 120-23, and accompanying text for a description of the food stamp QC
system.
224. See, e.g., Robertson v. Jackson, 972 F.2d 529, 533 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding the state
Commissioner fully responsible for ensuring compliance with federal laws and regulations concerning
the acceptance and processing of applications for food stamp assistance); Alexander v. Hill, 707 F.2d
780, 784 (4th Cir. 1983) (awarding the eligible applicants remedial fines in their class action to compel
timely processing of federal-aid-program application); Harley v. Lyng, 653 F. Supp. 266, 280-83 (E.D.
Pa. 1986) (issuing an order setting forth requirements that the department had to meet in order to
comply with federal standards for the food stamp program).
225. See, e.g., Jim Lynch, State Fumbled Food Stamps: Washington Ranks Worst Among States
for Errors and Fraud, Seattle Times, Aug. 10, 1998, at A1; Steven Rosenlind, County Off $53.9M in
Food Stamp Payments: Audits Show Fresno County’s Error Rate is Among the Highest, Fresno Bee,
Aug. 29, 1998, at A1; Leslie Tayler, State Has Worst Error Rate for Food Stamps, Roanoke Times,
Feb. 15, 1998, at B5.
226. See, e.g., John Butch, Miss. Ranked 8th in Food Stamp Distribution Accuracy, ClarionLedger, Oct. 23, 1999, at 1A.
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handlers’ and local administrators’ behavior, particularly since losing a fair
hearing ordinarily has no consequences beyond the individual case involved.
Beyond these five basic characteristics, counter-entitlements differ
from one another considerably. Food stamps, Medicaid, and the former
AFDC program have measured the accuracy of eligibility decisions
through “quality control” (QC) systems that both ranked states’ performance and imposed fiscal penalties on states not meeting specified goals. In
each of these programs, the QC systems served the primary values of cost
minimization and program integrity. Medicaid policymakers determined
that reimbursements to providers for unnecessary services cost the program
more than inaccurate eligibility determinations. Accordingly, they established a variety of counter-entitlements requiring states and providers to
review utilization to ensure that it was truly necessary.227 In 2004, seeking
to cut Medicaid’s costs, the Bush Administration proposed administrative
rules that would reinstitute strict QC for eligibility decisions.
Related monitoring systems also arose in child-support enforcement228
and foster care.229 Thus, for example, states face loss of federal childsupport funds if they do not move a large percentage of cases beyond each
major milestone in the process (e.g., establishment of paternity, issuance of
a support order) within a specified period of time. The school meal programs impose state-supervised counter-entitlements on local school foodservice authorities’ eligibility decisions.230
The Social Security Administration (SSA) operates two major
counter-entitlements for the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program’s disability determination, both of which also are designed to cut
costs. One relatively little-known counter-entitlement redetermines eligibility in samples of cases in which state disability determination services
(DDSs), which make initial disability determinations for SSA, grant
227. Although the reviews involve particular claimants, and the outcomes affect those claimants’
receipt of benefits, the claimants are often not permitted to participate. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991, 994 (1982) (requiring each nursing home to establish a utilization review committee of
physicians who periodically assess whether each patient’s continued stay in the facility is justified);
O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 775-76 (1980). But see Fifty Residents of Park
Pleasant Nursing Home v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 503 A.2d 1057 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1986) (noting that HEW notified Town Court that it no longer met the statutory and regulatory
standards for skilled nursing facilities and that, consequently, its Medicaid provider agreement would
not be reviewed).
228. See, e.g., Hodges v. Thompson, 311 F.3d 316, 317 (4th Cir. 2002) (upholding fiscal sanctions
against states); Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2000) (upholding child-support
enforcement conditions on availability of TANF block grant funds).
229. See, e.g., Conn. Dep’t of Children & Youth Servs. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 9
F.3d 981, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (upholding sampling procedure to determine states’ performance for
purposes of allocating bonus funds); cf. Harvey v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 1252, 1253 (8th Cir. 1994)
(rejecting the state’s attempt to correct case files retroactively to justify federal foster-care payments).
230. 7 C.F.R. §§ 210.18, 225.7, 226.8 (2003).
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benefits.231 The other, one of the best-known of all counter-entitlements, is
Bellmon reviews. These subject administrative law judges (ALJs) that
grant a high percentage of appeals from adverse decisions to more intensive reviews.232
Just as entitlements became more formalized in the decade and a half
following King v. Smith233 and Goldberg v. Kelly,234 counter-entitlements
became more institutionalized during this period. Indeed, as courts were
imposing one set of procedural changes that tended to increase the chance
that agencies would grant claims for AFDC benefits, the Department of
Health and Human Services was imposing another that expanded the same
agencies’ authority to conduct intrusive investigations into claimants’ applications235 and established a QC system to pressure local agencies into
exercising that authority.236
Food stamp QC findings initially served only as a source of management information that could lead to discretionary enforcement action by
USDA. In the early 1980s, however, after President Reagan, Senator Jesse
Helms, and others criticized AFDC and food stamps as causing “waste,
fraud, and abuse,” Congress made fiscal penalties automatic for states
whose error rates exceeded statutory targets.237 Because few members of
Congress wanted to be seen as defending “high error rates,” the threshold
for fiscal sanctions was set so low that all but a handful of states were liable for sanctions. Neither Congress nor the Reagan and Bush Administrations had much stomach for collecting hundreds of millions of dollars from
states. Yet even as a series of collection moratoria were followed by legislative and administrative actions to moderate the sanction threshold238 and
231. See Social Security Advisory Board, Disability Decision Making: Data and
Materials 62 (2001).
232. Compare, e.g., Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding “Bellmon
reviews” of ALJs “not substantially justified” and hence sufficient to justify an award of attorneys’ fees
to a claimant challenging their use) with Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1376-97 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (finding Bellmon reviews unobjectionable), vacated on other grounds, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.
1986). From time to time, recommendations have been made for other counter-entitlements in the
Social Security and SSI disability-determination processes, such as allowing an advocate for the
Commissioner to participate in hearings. See, e.g., Social Security Advisory Board, Charting the
Future of Social Security’s Disability Programs: The Need for Fundamental Change 19
(2001).
233. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
234. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
235. Casey & Mannix, supra note 83, at 1385 (describing the repeal of regulations limiting home
visits and eligibility workers’ calls to third parties that accompanied the establishment of AFDC QC).
Thus, the due-process revolution resulted in the legalization of welfare-eligibility determination
procedures in two ways: it not only mandated one set of procedural protections but also indirectly
contributed to the disappearance of many of those that it did not constitutionalize.
236. Id. at 1381.
237. 7 U.S.C. § 2025(c)(1) (2000).
238. In the late 1980s, Congress raised the sanction threshold in AFDC and the food stamp
program to the national average error rate or something similar to it. Even with only about half the
states subject to sanction each year, many others were near enough the threshold to be intimidated.
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forgive or compromise most accrued penalties,239 states and their frontline
eligibility staffs were given strong incentives to avoid paying benefits to
ineligible households or overpaying eligible ones.240
2. The Programmatic Impact of a Powerful Counter-Entitlement: The
Case of the Food Stamp Quality Control System
The power of counter-entitlements to effect substantive changes in
spite of an existing entitlement structure is best demonstrated by example.
Several counter-entitlements have profoundly shaped the administration of
the programs to which they are attached. Bellmon reviews likely resulted in
denials and terminations for large numbers of claims that might otherwise
have been granted and may have contributed to the glut of Social Security
and SSI cases hitting the federal courts in the 1980s.241 Medicaid utilization
Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Preventing Potential Food Stamp Quality Control
Liabilities from Derailing the Administration’s Food Stamp Agenda 21 n.11 (1999).
239. USDA allowed states to “reinvest” many of their sanctions in error-reduction activities.
Although reinvested sanctions are not paid directly to the federal government, from the state’s point of
view reinvestment represents an appropriation of state funds it would not have otherwise made. Agency
officials, in turn, must undertake the embarrassing task of justifying these appropriations within the
executive branch and to the legislature. Unlike the costs of most other administrative activities, for
which states receive a 50% match from the federal government, states do not receive any federal match
for reinvestment activities. According to USDA, states reinvested about $140 million in liabilities
accrued between 1986 and 1998.
240. The history of counter-entitlements in Medicaid is more complex. The cost of health care is
so high that, even paying well less than half of the cost, each additional Medicaid beneficiary has a
substantial impact on states’ budgets. In recognition of this, federal law has made little effort to impose
detailed oversight of the accuracy of states’ eligibility decisions. States must have a quality control
system, but for more than a decade, they have been free to design whatever system they decided best
suited their needs. Over the past decade, the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) has penalized no state for improper allowances of benefits. The Bush Administration recently
published a notice of proposed rulemaking to establish a federally directed quality control system for
Medicaid that arguably would be the most severe in the history of the federal government: it would, for
example, punish states for correct payments that reviewers believe are miscoded.
The absence, until recently, of a strong federal role designing a Medicaid counter-entitlement has
left states largely on their own. Their financial responsibilities have served as an imperfect incentive to
ensure accurate eligibility decisions. During periods of relative fiscal health, states may be unconcerned
with errors that cover beneficiaries with incomes or resources modestly exceeding the program’s stated
eligibility limits. During recessions, periods of rapid growth in health-care costs, and other periods
when state budgets are under stress, even correct decisions may be a source of anxiety. Thus, states
may have little incentive to scrutinize cases closely during booms, and may even be tempted to erect
procedural barriers that discourage eligible families when savings seem essential. The effect is to make
Medicaid spending more cyclical, although perhaps not enough to balance the naturally countercyclical nature of spending on means-tested programs. The difficulty of organizing and dismantling
effective counter-entitlements has likely interfered with many states’ efforts to control their Medicaid
programs. In addition, some states probably lack the sophistication to resolve the important issues
associated with designing a counter-entitlement. It is far from clear, however, that CMS’s proposal
provides a sensible response to these issues.
241. See, e.g., F. William Hessmer IV, Own Motion Review of Disability Benefit Awards by the
Social Security Administration Appeals Council: The Improper Use of an Important Procedure, 2
Admin. L.J. 141 (1988); L. Hope O’Keeffe, Administrative Law Judges, Performance Evaluation, and
Production Standards: Judicial Independence Versus Employee Accountability, 54 Geo. Wash. L.
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review has transformed the way nursing homes and, to a lesser extent, hospitals operate.242 AFDC QC was implicated in a proliferation of paperwork
requirements that even Kafka could have admired.243
None, however, has overwhelmed as many opposing philosophical,
political, legal, and administrative forces as the food stamp QC system.
Accordingly, this Section illustrates the transformative potential of a
counter-entitlement by examining food stamp QC. That the legal entitlement to food stamps provided no means for blunting the effects of the food
stamp QC system demonstrates that counter-entitlements can have drastic
effects on the substantive priorities of programs that retain legal entitlements.
a. The Operation of the Food Stamp Quality Control System
The food stamp program’s financing structure was virtually unique
when it was established and remains highly exceptional: states have primary responsibility for determining eligibility under relatively complex
criteria for a broadly available entitlement benefit funded entirely by the
federal government.244 The Food Stamp Act of 1964 initially gave oversight authority to USDA,245 but with limited resources the Department had
little capacity to identify any but the most egregious state administrative
deficiencies. The Food Stamp Act of 1977 sought to improve USDA’s
oversight capacity by requiring states to conduct QC reviews of their eligibility decisions. Where a review showed a deficiency in a state’s administration, USDA could press the state’s administrators for corrective action
and could withhold some of the states’ administrative funding to compel
compliance. Although USDA did sanction states on a number of occasions,
states’ error rates provided ready support for the program’s critics’ charges
of weak administration.246
Rev. 591 (1986); Richard J. Pierce, Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency
Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 481, 503 (1990).
242. See, e.g., David S. Douglas et al., Rx for the Elderly: Legal Rights (And Wrongs) Within the
Health Care System, 20 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 425, 476-77 (1985).
243. See Dehavenon, supra note 85.
244. Other programs have superficially similar financing structures but differ dramatically from
the food stamp program. Although school breakfast and lunch benefit programs are funded entirely
with federal dollars, for instance, these subsidies are relatively modest, and states determine eligibility
for meals merely by classifying a family’s income into one of three ranges. And though state or local
agencies determine eligibility for WIC, LIHEAP, and federal housing-assistance programs, none of
these programs are responsive (“open-ended”) entitlements: the federal government’s financial
exposure is limited by the formula specifying each state or public housing authority’s allocation. See
Super, Political Economy, supra note 22, at 654-55. In a responsive entitlement program, by contrast,
costs are constrained by eligibility and benefit-calculation rules. If states poorly enforce those rules, the
federal government’s financial exposure could be substantial.
245. H.R. Rep. No. 95-464, 292-98 (1977).
246. USDA ultimately forgave most of the fiscal sanctions it initially assessed against states.
Particularly under the Carter Administration, fiscal sanctions were seen more as a way of increasing
leverage to compel compliance than a penalty that would actually be collected.
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As a result, in 1981 Congress imposed automatic, mandatory fiscal
penalties on states that issued more than an arbitrarily set percentage of
benefits incorrectly.247 The levels chosen, however—9% in the first year,
7% in the second year, and 5% thereafter—were well beyond the capacity
of most states to meet.248 Because QC error rates now had direct fiscal consequences, this legislation resulted in the development of a much more
formal and extensive set of rules for measuring errors. These included
sampling standards, review procedures, minimum completion rates to
avoid biasing the sample, and rules specifying which types of variances
would and would not be charged as errors.249 The sample size became quite
formidable: in fiscal year 2000, the number of food stamp QC reviews exceeded the number of food stamp fair hearings by 40%.250 To guard against
underzealous state reviews of their own performance, federal officials rereviewed a sample of states’ samples.251
The unrealistic targets selected left over forty states facing fiscal penalties each year. It soon became evident that a system that sanctioned such
large numbers of states was politically unsustainable.252 Rather than abandoning the concept of automatic sanctions, however, Congress attempted to
design a system that would sanction a small enough number of states to be
enforced.253 Nonetheless, until a final round of QC liberalization in 2002,
247. See 7 C.F.R. § 275.10 (2004).
248. These targets were proposed by Senator Bob Dole, a strong supporter of the food stamp
program, who concluded that error rates were undermining political support for the Program.
249. Pub. L. No. 97-253 (codified as subsequently amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2025(c) (2000)).
AFDC’s QC system was tied to similarly unrealistic error-rate targets at about the same time. See 42
U.S.C. § 603(i), 608 (1994) (repealed 1996). A somewhat analogous system applied to Medicaid under
42 U.S.C. § 1396b(u) (2000). Initially, states stalled through administrative appeals and litigation to
challenge the method by which error rates were calculated. Eventually, Congress intervened to impose
a series of moratoria on error-rate collections. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 603(m) (1994) (repealed 1996).
250. In fiscal year 2000, the most recent year for which USDA has published data, states
completed food stamp QC reviews of 48,275 cases. Quality Control Branch, USDA, Food Stamp
Program Quality Control Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2000, at 5 (2002). Only 34,451 food
stamp fair hearings were decided that year. State Admin. Branch, USDA, Food Stamp Program
State Activity Report, Fiscal Year 2000, at 22 (2001).
251. See 7 C.F.R. § 275.3(c), 275.23(e)(8) (2004). From the discrepancies between the state and
federal QC reviewers’ findings, a regression is used to project what federal reviewers might have found
had they reviewed the entire state sample. Id. § 275.23(e)(8). Notably, federal officials re-reviewed
18,550 of the cases state QC bureaus had sampled and reviewed, some 38% of the total. Quality
Control Branch, USDA, supra note 250. USDA considered and rejected having federal officials
review states’ fair hearings for accuracy, apparently because doing so would be too costly. See 7 C.F.R.
§ 273.15(u) (2003).
252. See National Academy of Sciences, Rethinking Quality Control: A New System
for the Food Stamp Program 84-86 (Dennis P. Affholter & Fredrica D. Kramer eds., 1987).
253. The Hunger Prevention Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-435, changed the sanction threshold to
the lowest national average ever achieved plus one percentage point. It also sought to improve the
balance of the measure by counting underissuances—cases in which eligible households received some
benefits but less than food stamp rules direct—along with overissuances. Improper denials and
terminations were not counted because states often lack sufficient information to determine the amount
of benefits lost by improperly denied households.
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the substantial majority of states were at financial risk based on their food
stamp QC error rates in any given year.254
Moreover, even states that have performed better than the national
average in prior years may fear sanctions because the measurement of
states’ error rates is subject to some statistical uncertainty255 and because
substantial improvements in other states’ error rates could lower the national average.256 The number of states over, or within one percentage point
of, the national average climbed from twenty-three to thirty-three during
this period, putting more states at risk as a direct consequence of states’
own improvement in administration.
Overall, from 1993 through 2000, almost forty states were sanctioned
at least once. In addition, through fiscal year 1997 a standard part of the
settlement agreements USDA negotiated to resolve states’ sanction liabilities involved holding some of a state’s sanction “at risk” based on its performance in future years. If the state achieved specified error-reduction
targets, the “at risk” money would be forgiven; if not, that money would
have to be reinvested or paid to USDA. Each “at risk” agreement typically
set error-rate targets for several future years.
Nor was QC’s impact limited to states with high error rates. States
that received enhanced funding because of a very low error rate257 could
quickly come to budget in reliance on those funds.258 Should the state’s
The Mickey Leland Childhood Hunger Relief Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, changed the
sanction threshold to the current year’s national average (without the previous one-point margin for
error) and established a sliding scale for QC penalties that greatly reduced the impact on states whose
error rates modestly exceeded the national target. Pub. L. No. 103-66 § 13951(c).
Finally, the 2002 farm bill modified the threshold further so that only about three to five states will
face penalties each year. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, §
4118, 116 Stat. 134, 316 (repealing 7 U.S.C. § 2025(c)(1)(A) (2000)) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. §§
2022, 2025, 2027, 2031); see Super, Quiet Revolution, supra note 104, at 1357.
254. With sanctions applied to states whose error rates exceed the national average, by definition a
substantial number of states would be sanctioned every year. As several large states reduced their error
rates in the mid-1990s, the national average error rate fell from 10.81% in 1993 to 9.23% in 1996 while
the number of states in sanction increased from sixteen to twenty-five. Quality Control Branch,
USDA, Food Stamp Quality Control Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1997, at 13 (1998). The
threshold for sanctioning states is the national combined payment error rate, which is the sum of the
national overissuance error rate and the national underissuance error rate. Each of those component
error rates is computed by dividing all errors of that type by the total national benefit issuance. Thus,
the error rates of states with large volumes of food stamp issuances have far more impact on the
sanction threshold than do those of states issuing relatively few benefits.
255. The margin of error for most states’ error rates is between one and two percentage points. In
other words, a state with an error rate just below the national average faces a nontrivial chance that, in
the following year, its error rate will rise above the national average simply because of an unlucky
sample.
256. A state cannot know until the end of the year how low its error rate needs to be to avoid
sanction. If a few large states lower their error rates substantially and thereby reduce the national
average, a state that has consistently performed reasonably well may unexpectedly face a sanction.
257. 7 U.S.C. § 2025(c)(1)(B) (2000) (repealed 2002).
258. For 2002, thirteen states received $77 million in enhanced funding. Food Stamp Program,
Error Rates, Potential and Adjusted Liabilities, and Enhanced Funding, Fiscal Year 2002
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error rate rise above 6% and cause a cessation of that funding, the humanservices agency may find a hole in its budget and criticism from the governor’s budget office, the state legislature, or the media.259
The ultimate effect of the QC program was to drive both federal and
state administrators to obsess over “payment accuracy.” Although payment
accuracy was but one of several objectives set out for the Food and
Nutrition Service (FNS) in USDA’s strategic plan under the Government
Performance and Results Act,260 it was the only one that FNS had a ready
means of quantifying at the state level.261 Error reduction permeated almost
all aspects of FNS’s relations with states.262 FNS regional offices, which
previously had brought together state agencies’ staffs for annual discussions of a wide range of food stamp administrative issues, now convened
dedicated “payment accuracy conferences” each year. On the national
level, despite the varied challenges the food stamp program was facing in
the post-TANF world, the two national conferences to which FNS flew
state agency staff in the years immediately following PRWORA were devoted to “payment accuracy.”263 Much of the food stamp-related travel of
senior FNS officials was QC-related, and error rates became the primary
focus of most meetings between regional FNS officials and state administrators.264 At least one FNS regional administrator twice met personally
with a state governor and extracted a commitment from the governor to
reduce the state’s error rate to 7%, a level well below the sanction
(2003). Eleven other states had combined payment error rates between 6% and 8%, id., giving them
realistic prospects of achieving enhanced funding in the near future. Between the states potentially
subject to liabilities and those aiming for enhanced funding, the overwhelming majority of states had
strong incentives to seek policies that would lower their error rates.
259. See, e.g., Arkansas Earns $2.7 Million for Handling of Food Stamps, Arkansas DemocratGazette, Aug. 14, 1998, at B3; Noelle Phillips, Owensboro, Ky., Department Awarded for Excellence
in Foodstamp Administration, Messenger-Inquirer, June 7, 1977; Carl Redman, Louisiana Gets $3
Million Extra for Food Stamp Administration, Advocate (Baton Rouge), Aug. 4, 1998, at 11A.
260. Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (codified in various sections of 31 U.S.C.).
261. See 31 U.S.C. § 1115(a)(2) (2000) (requiring quantifiable goals).
262. USDA’s publications on program management similarly reflected this single-minded focus
on error rates. See, e.g., Food & Nutrition Service, USDA, Managing for Payment Accuracy: A
Review of State Practices (1999); Food & Consumer Service, USDA, Managing for Payment
Accuracy: A Review of State Practices (1997); KRA Corporation, Evaluation of Grants to
States for the Reduction of Payment Error in the Food Stamp Program (1996) (report
commissioned by USDA); Food & Consumer Service, USDA, Managing for Payment
Accuracy: A Review of State Practices (1996); Food & Consumer Service, USDA, Managing
for the Public Trust: National Food Stamp Payment Accuracy Report (2d ed. 1995-96);
Food & Consumer Service, USDA, Managing for the Public Trust: National Food Stamp
Payment Accuracy Report (1995).
263. Having seen a severe reprimand in Congress’s prolonged flirtation with a food stamp block
grant, it appears that some FNS staff, particularly on the regional level, were eager to find a means of
redemption. Since critics of the program long had focused on error rates, and since error rates were one
of the most readily quantifiable measures of performance, improving payment accuracy seemed the
obvious vehicle for winning back congressional favor. See Super, Quiet Revolution, supra note 104, at
1320-22.
264. See id. at 1302-03.
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threshold.265 With so many states subject to sanctions or competing for enhanced funding for extremely low error rates, both federal and state officials came to evaluate substantive policy proposals based on their likely
effect on error rates.266 In contrast to AFDC, where states sought waivers to
implement work requirements, family caps, and other social policies,
states’ food stamp waivers typically sought to define away categories of
errors.267
b. How QC Skewed Incentives in the Food Stamp Program
Although the food stamp QC system provided an incentive to process
cases correctly, that incentive is not unbiased. Since improper awards of
eligibility count as errors and improper denials do not, a policy of “when in
doubt, deny” would have much to commend it. One hopes that few if any
agency staff would espouse so crude a policy, but this bias in QC’s measurement system nonetheless is likely to affect outcomes.268
In addition, the QC counter-entitlement, although nominally treating
all cases the same, in fact counterbalanced the entitlements of some eligible
households far more than others. Eligibility and benefit levels are more
difficult to determine correctly for some types of households than for others. States are less likely to set benefit levels inaccurately—or to see onceaccurate benefit levels become erroneous because of changes in a household’s circumstances—when serving households with fixed incomes, such
as cash assistance, SSI, or Social Security, than when serving those with
earnings or irregular child-support income.269 Similarly, households subject
to specialized categorical eligibility rules, such as immigrants and college
students, are likely to be more error prone than households not containing a
member in one of those categories.270 Here again, it seems unlikely that
265. See id. at 1312 n.148.
266. See, e.g., General Accounting Office, Food Stamp Program: States Seek to Reduce
Payment Errors And Program Complexity (2001) (treating error reduction as the primary goal of
program simplification); Editorial, Revamp Food Stamp Rules, Deseret News, Mar. 8, 2002, at A12
(citing state’s error rate as evidence that food stamp rules need to be changed).
267. See Center on Budget & Policy Priorities, Preventing Potential Quality Control
Liabilities from Derailing the Administration’s Food Stamp Agenda 6-8 (1999).
268. For example, with limited time and staff resources available for training eligibility workers
and improving automated eligibility systems, those areas of policy in which staff have been too lenient,
causing overissuances, are likely to be well known to state administrators and to receive priority;
indeed, program administrators may be unaware of which policies are being misapplied to cause
substantial numbers of improper denials and terminations. (Because a state’s negative error rate is not
relevant to its potential sanction liability, USDA did not check states’ reported negative error rates
during the 1990s.)
269. Indeed, in fiscal years 1998 and 1999, all but one state reported having a higher payment
error rate for households with earned income than it did for households without earnings. See Center
on Budget & Policy Priorities, Preventing Potential Quality Control Liabilities from
Derailing the Administration’s Food Stamp Agenda 11 (1999).
270. In fiscal years 1998 and 1999, over forty states had higher error rates for immigrant
households than they did for nonimmigrant households.
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state administrators or even individual eligibility workers would deliberately deny or discourage a household simply because it falls in a more error-prone category. These households may, however, receive special
scrutiny and be subject to additional verification requirements that have the
effect of increasing the costs of participating and the likelihood of a procedural default by the household.271
The QC counter-entitlement’s dominance in ruling state administration is underscored by the fact that no other aspect of states’ performance
in administering the food stamp program is subject to a remotely comparable measurement-and-incentive system. For example, USDA does not have
a systematic way of measuring states’ success in meeting statutory deadlines for providing food stamps to eligible applicants, for supporting working poor families, for providing accurate information to those who might
apply for food stamps, or for maintaining basic customer service to applicants and recipients (by, for example, answering telephones or limiting
waiting times for persons with appointments). States do conduct a separate,
much less rigorous review of “negative” cases—those denied or terminated
from food stamps.272 These reviews, however, usually consist only of a
desk review of the eligibility worker’s case record. More importantly, no
sanctions attach to states with high rates of improper denials and terminations.
c. The Results of the Counter-Entitlement’s Dominance
The simplistic model of legal entitlements holds that as long as claimants retain an enforceable right to benefits, administrators’ hands are tied.
Such a model might accept that systems like food stamp QC could influence administrators’ behavior in ways not affecting benefits, but the model
would insist that the legal entitlement would block any policies seriously
disadvantaging claimants. By contrast, the adversarial model of program
administration, in which frontline staff balance pressures they receive from
both entitlements and counter-entitlements, would predict that eligible
claimants’ access to benefits could suffer if a strong counter-entitlement
overwhelms a weak entitlement. The history of states’ responses to food
stamp QC, particularly in the late 1990s, lends powerful support to the adversarial model and undercuts its rival.
Because of their powerful impact on states, QC error rates increasingly began to drive states’ policymaking on issues relating to the food
stamp program. The effect on claimant households, for the most part, was
quite negative. A particularly dramatic example of the impact of food
stamp QC on policymaking can be seen in the case of short certification
periods. Often at USDA’s recommendation, states required households
271.
272.

See Super, Quiet Revolution, supra note 104, at 1311-12.
See 7 C.F.R. § 275.13 (2003).

2005]

RIGHTS AND EFFICIENCY

1111

with current or recent work histories to come to food stamp offices every
three months to reapply. Frequent visits to the welfare office can be very
inconvenient for households with earnings because many states assign interview times without regard to households’ work schedules.273
Nonetheless, between 1994 and 1999 several states sharply increased the
proportion of working families with children that were required to reapply
every three months. Nationally, data gathered through the food stamp QC
system demonstrate that the proportion of working families with children
required to come into food stamp offices at intervals of three months or
less more than tripled between 1994 and 1999, rising from less than onetenth to a full one-third of such households.274 Four of the five states with
the largest declines in food stamp participation among working families
between 1994 and 1999 all dramatically expanded their use of three-month
certification periods during those years.275 Similarly, participation rates—
the percentage of eligible households of all types that received food stamps
in an average month—fell from 74% to 55% between 1994 and 1998 in the
eleven states that increased their use of three-month certification periods
for working families with children by more than 50 percentage points during this period.276 In other states, the participation rate fell only half as
much, from 70% to 61%.277
The rapid increase in short certification periods in the food stamp program was remarkable in part because it dramatically increased states’
workloads. At a time when most states were under strong political pressure
to devote all available resources to driving down their cash-assistance
caseloads, the willingness of many states—including “welfare reform”
poster child Wisconsin—to accept the burden of recertifying households
two to four times more often is a testament to the power of this counterentitlement.
Perhaps even more telling is the fact that this mass conversion of
cases to three-month certification periods was illegal. Food stamp regulations required that each household be given the longest certification period
possible based on its individual circumstances, with a presumption of at

273. Most local welfare offices are not open in the evenings or on weekends. A USDA survey of
food stamp recipients in 1996 found that the average applicant spent five hours applying for food
stamps initially, and two to three hours applying for recertification. Food & Nutrition Service,
USDA, Customer Service in the Food Stamp Program (1999).
274. See infra tbl. 1.
275. See id. Overall, ten of the twelve states that increased the proportion of working families that
were required to apply every three months by at least fifty percentage points experienced declines in
participation for working families that exceeded the national average for this period.
276. Allen L. Schirm & Laura A. Castner, Mathematica Policy Research, Reaching
Those in Need: State Food Stamp Participation Rates in 1999, at 2 (2002).
277. Id.; see also Randy Rosso, Trends in Food Stamp Program Participation Rates: 1994
to 1999, at 16 (2001).
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least six months except in unusual circumstances.278 Evidently, neither
USDA nor the states that took its advice in converting their caseloads to
three-month certification periods feared either fair-hearing requests or litigation to enforce claimants’ entitlement to longer certification periods. It
appears this confidence was well placed. Thus, for working families in particular, the counter-entitlement of food stamp QC swamped the entitlement
to food stamps.279
Table 1: States with the Five Largest Declines in Food Stamp
Participation Among Working Families, 1994 to 1999
State

Proportion of Working
Families with Children
Required to Reapply Every
Three Months

Texas

1994
3%

1999
60%

Change in
Participation
Among
Working
Families
1994 to 1999
−39%

Indiana

0%

45%

−37%

Arizona

1%

87%

−37%

Mississippi*

0%

0%

−37%

Ohio

1%

68%

−34%

U.S.

9%

31%

−5%

Source: Tabulations by author and his former research assistant, Daniel Tenny, from USDA’s Food
Stamp QC database.”
* Instead of requiring working families to reapply every three months, Mississippi required them to
submit detailed reports of their circumstances every month, whether or not those circumstances have
changed. See Gilman v. Helms, 606 F. Supp. 644 (D.N.H. 1985); 7 C.F.R. § 273.21. Failure to submit
such a report shortly after the close of a month, or failure to attach all of a worker’s pay stubs or other
required documentation, results in termination of the household’s food stamps. Studies conducted in the
1980s found that such monthly reporting requirements caused benefits to be terminated to many eligible households. Although all states once required food stamp households to report monthly, most other
states have abandoned this requirement.

278. 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(f)(3), (4) (2000) (subsequently amended).
279. Barriers to participation are not limited to repeated, often lengthy, office visits that are
scheduled during working hours. For example, some states call a worker’s employer every three
months to verify the employee’s earnings. Low-wage workers who are concerned this may alienate
their employers and endanger their jobs may conclude they do not wish to continue receiving food
stamps. These practices, too, likely violate the terms of the food stamp entitlement. See 7 C.F.R. §
272.1(c), 273.2(f)(4), (5) (2000) (subsequently amended). Once again, no affirmative challenges were
filed, and if these practices were challenged in fair hearings, the challenges were too rare to concern
federal or state administrators.
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Indeed, the counter-entitlement seemed to dominate the entire food
stamp program. Between 1994 and 1999, eight states reduced their error
rates by four or more percentage points, which represented very large reductions, considering that the national average error rate was around 10%.
Food stamp participation in these states—Arizona, Florida, Indiana,
Mississippi, Ohio, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming—declined by 44%
over those years, compared to a 30% participation decline in the remaining
states. Other states achieving more modest declines in food stamp error
rates did not have unusually sharp declines in participation.
This perverse result became the subject of criticism across the political spectrum. Dr. Ron Haskins, former Staff Director of the House
Subcommittee on Human Resources and the architect of the 1996 welfare
law, testified on June 27, 2001 before a subcommittee of the House
Agriculture Committee that it was only a slight exaggeration to say that “in
the TANF program, states are penalized if they don’t put people to work.
In the Food Stamp program, states are penalized if they do put people to
work” because of the threat of food stamp QC penalties.280 It is evidence of
the power of the food stamp QC counter-entitlement that states would disregard the overwhelming pro-work ideology of the era to impose policies
that systematically disadvantaged low-wage working families.
d. The Political Character of Responses to the Food Stamp Quality
Control’s Problems
With the legal entitlement to food stamps hopelessly overmatched,
political efforts to change food stamp policy have increasingly focused on
changing the QC counter-entitlement. In September 1999, recognizing that
the emphasis on QC may conflict with the goal of serving working families
effectively, USDA exercised its discretion to adjust the sanction amounts
downward for those states serving relatively high or increasing shares of
working households and households with immigrants.281 Recent legislation
has further moderated QC pressures on states. Spurred primarily by claimants’ advocates rather than states, the Farm Security and Rural Investment
Act of 2002 increased the sanction threshold to 105% of the national average and provided for automatic fiscal penalties only against states that
280. See also Ed Bolen, A Poor Measure of the Wrong Thing: The Food Stamp Program’s Quality
Control System Discourages Participation by Working Families, 53 Hastings L.J. 213 (2001).
281. Both of these groups had higher rates than the food stamp population as a whole, the former
because of fluctuating income and the latter because of complex eligibility rules imposed in the 1996
welfare law. Because sanctions are based on a state’s error rate compared to the national average, states
that serve relatively more households with earnings or immigrants will tend to have higher error rates.
This means that in the absence of adjustments, states that maintain effective access for the working
poor and immigrant families will be at greater risk of fiscal sanction. To counteract this inequity,
USDA’s adjustments lowered liability amounts to hold states harmless for the extent to which they had
a growing share of households with earners or immigrants, or a share of such households above the
national average.
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USDA determines to a 95% statistical certainty exceeded that level for two
years in a row.282 USDA has said it will continue some form of sanction
adjustment, although those adjustments may no longer cover immigrants
and may not fully offset the impact of high or rising shares of working
households on states’ error rates. Nonetheless, the new legislation is expected to reduce the number of states under sanction each year to between
three and five. The 2002 legislation also restructured the system for awarding states enhanced funding to allow USDA to consider factors other than
low error rates. Whereas in prior years, benefit expansions and procedural
protections for claimants had formed the centerpiece of liberal food stamp
legislation,283 the 2002 legislation’s food stamp title was dominated by QC
relief and new options to help states reduce their QC error rates.
Counter-entitlements’ centrality to food stamp policymaking extends
beyond changes to QC. The 2002 legislation also included a modest new
counter-entitlement to enforce aspects of the food stamp rules not readily
amenable to fair-hearing requests, such as timely application processing.284
3. Making Counter-Entitlements Work
Although counter-entitlements to date have been employed primarily
in pursuit of cost avoidance and program integrity, they can readily be
adapted to serve other principles by which Congress wishes to limit an entitlement. As noted at the outset, policymakers seeking to rein in legal entitlements have three choices. First, they can narrow or condition the scope
of that entitlement. This is the most transparent approach and was the more
visible theme of the Reagan Administration’s treatment of AFDC and food
stamps in the early 1980s. It also has been a frequent theme of states’
budget-cutting initiatives during economic slowdowns. Second, policymakers can establish or strengthen counter-entitlements. This, too, was a
significant Reagan Administration theme in the early 1980s, but one that
received relatively little attention. It is exemplified in the dominance over
the food stamp program by QC discussed in the preceding section. Finally,
policymakers can eliminate legal entitlements completely. In eliminating
entitlements, policymakers can elect to retain counter-entitlements or to
eliminate them as well.
The Family Support Act of 1988 was an attempt to strengthen work
requirements in cash-assistance programs through the first two strategies: eligibility for AFDC became more conditional on compliance with
work requirements, and states became subject to penalties if they could not
282. Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 4118 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2025(c)).
283. See, e.g., Hunger Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 100-435 (1988); Stewart B. McKinney Homeless
Assistance Act, tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 100-77 (1987); Food Security Act, tit. XVI, Pub. L. No. 99-198
(1985).
284. Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 4120 (2002) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2025(d)).
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establish that they were enforcing those limitations by engaging specified
percentages of claimants in workfare or other employment or training activities.285 This sketchy, feeble, and much-postponed counter-entitlement286
hobbled that initiative, particularly when the recession of the early 1990s
deprived states of the funds they needed to match federal work-program
money. This failure of the counter-entitlements caused many to draw the
erroneous conclusion that narrowing legal entitlements was ineffectual and
that only the complete elimination of legal entitlements for cash-assistance
claimants could succeed.
In fact, TANF’s counter-entitlement—its work-participation rates—
have had a far more profound impact on states, and through them on claimants, than the elimination of legal entitlements. Of necessity, however, that
counter-entitlement has been crudely framed because it lacked a clearly
drawn entitlement against which to be juxtaposed. For example, with states
enjoying virtually unlimited discretion as to what kind of aid to provide to
families, Congress had no reliable way of stating what benefits were conditioned on working.287 Moreover, because PRWORA gave states virtually
complete control over eligibility for cash assistance, policymakers were
concerned that states needed incentives to reduce participation in those
programs. Thus, an incentive to do so—the caseload-reduction credit,
which reduces states’ TANF work-participation rates—was grafted onto
TANF’s work rules.288 Building these two inconsistent goals—having welfare recipients work or having them simply leave the welfare system—into
a single counter-entitlement without reconciling the tension between them
inevitably sent a muddled message to the states and guaranteed that, in one
way or the other, their performance would be subject to criticism.
Had AFDC’s eligibility structure remained, states could have been
held accountable for work participation alone. To the extent that conservatives have become dissatisfied with the rate at which welfare recipients
have been working,289 this is largely traceable to the lack of a clear

285. See 42 U.S.C. § 603(l)(3) (1994) (repealed 1996).
286. 42 U.S.C. § 687(a) (1994) (repealed 1996). The law effectively gave HHS five years to
recommend performance standards to Congress, which then would have to take further action for any
significant consequences to be attached to those standards.
287. Few would argue that claimants should be required to work in exchange for casual jobseeking advice. The problem, then, is where to draw a line between such incidental services and
ongoing “welfare” benefits. The choice PRWORA made—to tie its work requirements to receipt of
“assistance” from a TANF-funded program—essentially delegated a resolution of this problem to HHS.
HHS’s regulatory definition gave states broad discretion to shape the aid they provided as “assistance”
or “non-assistance.” 45 C.F.R. § 260.51 (2003).
288. 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(3) (2000).
289. See, e.g., Brian M. Riedl & Robert E. Rector, Heritage Foundation, Myths and
Facts: Why Successful Welfare Reform Must Strengthen Work Requirements (2002)
(asserting that just 34% of adult TANF recipients worked in 2000). But cf. Sharon Parrott, Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities, Are States Requiring TANF Recipients to Participate in
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entitlement that would allow a more precise counter-entitlement to have
been designed.290
If Congress had specified whom it wanted to work and what sorts of
exceptions it was willing to allow for how long, those expectations could
have been enforced through the existing AFDC QC system. For example, if
Congress wanted 75% of single parents with only school-age children to be
working, states could be required to record for each such family whether
the parent was working. AFDC QC291 then could check the validity of the
states’ tabulations and adjust the state’s reported participation rate based on
its findings. States whose adjusted participation rates fell below 75% could
be subject to sanction. This would not prevent eligibility workers from
granting exemptions but would impose strong pressure to limit the granting
of those exemptions. Alternatively, if Congress did not favor allowing eligibility workers flexibility in defining exemptions, it could codify the work
requirements and permissible exemptions, allowing QC to assign errors to
cases in which benefits were paid to non-exempt families not engaged in
work. Either way, ambiguities in the definition of work, or of any exemptions authorized by Congress, could be clarified in the course of resolving
disputed cases in the QC system. In the current system, by contrast, states’
reporting is largely unsupervised. States’ interpretations vary considerably,
with little opportunity to resolve those questions authoritatively.292
Alternatively, if Congress shared some Republican governors’ conviction that work should be promoted and supported without regard to fiscal
cost,293 it could replace the cost-avoidance-based AFDC-QC system with
one devoted to enforcing work requirements. One Democratic welfare bill
in 1995 proposed to do just that—to maintain the entitlement to cash assistance conditioned on compliance with strict work requirements and to shift
AFDC QC’s focus to “measur[ing states’] performance in moving
Welfare-to-Work Activities? (2002) (showing that TANF’s reporting procedures result in
substantial underestimates of true participation in TANF work activities).
290. See Gene Falk et al., Cong. Research Serv., Welfare Reform: State Reporting
Requirements Under the TANF Program 12-13 (2001) (finding that many states take advantage of
TANF’s flexibility to provide little information to HHS about what activities they are counting as
“work”); General Accounting Office, Welfare Reform: With TANF Flexibility, States Vary
in How They Implement Work Requirements and Time Limits 10-16 (2002) (finding wide
variations among states in the definition and intensity of work requirements).
291. 42 U.S.C. § 608 (1994) (repealed 1996).
292. See General Accounting Office, Welfare Reform: Challenges in Maintaining a
Federal-State Fiscal Partnership 16-26 (2001) (identifying state manipulations of TANF’s financial flexibility to shift funds to activities far removed from TANF’s purposes).
293. See, e.g., Jack Tweedie, From D.C. to Des Moines—The Progress of Welfare Reform, State
Legislatures, Apr. 1, 2001, at 22 (quoting then-Governor of Wisconsin, now HHS Secretary, Tommy
Thompson as declaring, “I have always said—as loudly and publicly as I can—that for welfare reform
to be successful you have to make an investment up front. It can’t be done on the cheap.”). But see
Frances Fox Piven, Thompson’s Easy Ride, The Nation, Feb. 26, 2001, at 4 (suggesting that Gov.
Thompson’s Wisconsin did in fact underfund supportive services for low-wage workers).
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recipients of such aid into permanent employment.”294 Other Democratic
bills made gestures in a similar direction.295 By then, however, the momentum for disentitlement was unstoppable, and this more promising approach
was ignored.
III
Controlling Public-Benefit Programs Without Enforceable
Rights
As the foregoing discussion reveals, legal entitlements are not barriers
to changes that disfavor claimants, even ones that affect them profoundly.
Indeed, modifying the AFDC QC system or creating a new counterentitlement to press eligibility workers not to aid persons refusing to work
might have proven highly effective in moving state agencies’ staffs to impose tough behavioral requirements, just as the food stamp QC system
prompted those same agencies to increase the costs of receiving food assistance. Even if elimination of legal entitlements was not necessary to changing cash assistance programs’ substantive priorities, however,
disentitlement might nonetheless be compatible with the implementation of
those changes. If that were true, policymakers that disliked legal entitlements for ideological or philosophical reasons unrelated to their desire to
change the program’s priorities could plausibly pursue both their structural
and substantive agendas at once.
In fact, however, eliminating legal entitlements greatly complicates
the task of implementing a new balance of substantive priorities. In particular, non-entitlement programs must struggle to replicate three crucial functions that legal entitlements perform in helping administrators and political
officials govern programs. First, legal rules provide explicit messages from
senior officials to agency staff about how the latter are to perform their duties. If a program’s goals were unitary, providing appropriate messages
might not be terribly difficult. For example, in disaster relief programs, the
overwhelming goal is usually to comfort the afflicted. A general message
to grant aid in all questionable cases is likely to tell local staff what they
need to know, and a welcoming announcement is likely to reach potential
claimants through the news media and word-of-mouth.296 More commonly,
however, policymakers seek to accommodate multiple, partially inconsistent goals. They want to help as many of the eligible as possible, for example, but also want to deny as many ineligible claims as possible. In TANF,

294. S. 840, 104th Cong. § 101 (1995) (proposed section 407(a)) (Sen. Conrad).
295. E.g., S. 828, 104th Cong. § 101 (1995) (Sen. Moynihan).
296. Of course, even disaster programs must balance the goal of aiding the afflicted with concern
about preventing fraud, partly because scandals that arise from one response may undermine public
support for future disaster-relief programs.
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the goals of promoting work and self-sufficiency must be balanced with the
goal of aiding destitute families.297
Second, rules allow for an implicit response from those frontline eligibility workers to senior officials, confirming that the program is in fact
being run as directed. If the program were being run too harshly, claimants
presumably would be requesting administrative hearings or filing lawsuits.
If the program were being operated too leniently, the rules would provide
an explicit basis for criticism under applicable counter-entitlements.
Finally, entitlements provide the means for ensuring that the program
is administered uniformly across all groups of claimants—or at least that
any deviations result from deliberate policy choices. Again, if the program
were treating any one group of claimants more harshly than the rules permitted, members of that group could be expected to seek administrative or
judicial redress. Similarly, if one group were getting more generous treatment than the rules authorized, auditors operating the counter-entitlement
could cite an error in the more lenient cases without needing to know how
other claimants were being treated.
This Part considers alternative means by which administrators might
accomplish the purposes served by rule-based entitlement programs.298 Part
III.A explores whether a return to reliance on eligibility workers’ discretion
is a plausible way to advance new substantive priorities in a nonentitlement program. This discretion could be guided either by professional
standards of the kind that dominated anti-poverty programs prior to the
1960s or by impressionistic guidance from central policymakers emphasizing, for example, the primacy of work. Alternatively, Part III.B considers
the possibility of central policymakers’ controlling a program’s local administration through automated systems to ensure that their substantive
priorities are honored. Finally, Part III.C explores the substitution of contractual terms for entitlement rules. Ultimately, none of these alternatives
can reliably perform the three key functions of legal entitlements. As a result, none offers an adequate means of ensuring adherence to the desired
297. Although not prominent in the rhetoric surrounding PRWORA, the original goal of AFDC—
to aid families in need—clearly remains in TANF. It is the first goal explicitly set forth in the TANF
statute. 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(1) (2000). More simply, if promoting work and reducing receipt of
government assistance were Congress’s only goals, a simpler and cheaper approach would be to repeal
AFDC and create no successor program. The fact that no important participant in the welfare debates of
the mid-1990s proposed to do this demonstrates that continuing to provide financial aid to families in
need remained an important, if clearly not exclusive, programmatic goal.
298. In theory, states could try to rely upon the complaints of now-disentitled claimants to alert
them when local offices are deviating from policy, at least when those deviations disadvantage claimants. In practice, this is unlikely to prove reliable. In a disentitled environment, claimants are
particularly unlikely to know what policies are and hence what standards they may demand their local
offices follow. They may feel particularly susceptible to retaliation. And their paucity of rights may
make the dispute resolution system so ineffectual that it holds little appeal. See generally Suzanne
Lynn, Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, Dispute Resolution in the
Context of Welfare Reform (2001).
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mix of substantive policies. In addition, some of these alternatives suffer
from the very rigidity and arbitrariness that are commonly attributed to entitlements.
A.

Returning to Discretionary Program Administration

When Congress eliminated claimants’ entitlement to cash assistance
in 1996, states theoretically could have sought to recreate the system of
discretionary eligibility criteria299 that existed before King v. Smith300 gave
claimants a right of action to enforce benefit programs’ rules and Goldberg
v. Kelly301 established the right to an administrative fair hearing before the
state may terminate a claimant’s benefits. Federal law, and the laws of
most states, would have permitted that.302 States might not want to bring
back the “suitable home” or “man in the house” rules,303 but they could
empower eligibility workers to make subjective judgments about whether a
claimant seems to be trying hard to find work. To be sure, states did vastly
increase eligibility workers’ discretion,304 sometimes with troubling consequences.305 Discretionary administration alone, however, cannot reliably
implement central policymakers’ designs.
A traditional medium for guiding discretion is a profession’s code of
ethics. Up through the 1960s, the social-work profession’s standards of
practice provided some general guidance for individual welfare workers.
Individuals naturally would interpret this guidance in differing ways, and
some would reject parts of it outright. Nonetheless, it provided a common
starting point.
The explosion in welfare caseloads during the 1960s, and criticisms of
the intrusiveness of the social-work model of program administration, led
states to turn the administration of their public-benefit programs over to
299. See Super, Offering an Invisible Hand, supra note 82, at 819-20 (describing the rise and fall
of the social-work era in public-welfare programs).
300. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
301. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
302. But see Weston v. Cassata, 37 P.3d 469 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that despite language
in federal and state statutes disclaiming any entitlement to cash-assistance benefits, claimants had a
property interest cognizable under the Due Process Clause, based on the definiteness of the state’s
eligibility rules); Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449 (N.Y. 1977) (applying New York’s constitutional
guarantee of welfare benefits); Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1132, 1144-53, 1168-83 (1999) (describing state
constitutional guarantees of welfare rights).
303. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
304. See generally Diller, supra note 15 (criticizing this trend because the eligibility workers
receiving this authority typically lack the professional training and standards to exercise it
appropriately).
305. See, e.g., Susan Tinsley Gooden, All Things Not Being Equal: Differences in Caseworker
Support Towards Black and White Welfare Clients, 4 Harv. J. Afr. Am. Pub. Pol’y 22 (1998) (finding
gross racial inequalities in the ways cash-assistance recipients are informed of transportation subsidies
and other important resources).
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paraprofessional eligibility workers.306 These workers lacked the training,
time, or expectations to follow social work’s professional standards. This
may not have made an obvious difference while all of these programs were
operating as highly routinized, rule-based entitlements. When Congress
ended the AFDC entitlement in 1996, however, this transformation of
states’ workforces precluded a return to the pre-Goldberg regime of professional judgment: state and local welfare offices no longer employed staff
with professional training to determine eligibility. Although some tried to
reinvent their income-maintenance workers as “employment specialists,”
they could not turn poorly paid, and often poorly educated, staff members
into trained professionals overnight.
Even if states did have the means to return administration of nonentitlement programs to professional social workers, this would be unlikely
to effectuate their new welfare policies or the interplay between entitlements and counter-entitlements. In the social-work model, staff making
eligibility decisions respond to professional norms that policymakers have
little direct role in shaping. With regard specifically to the new emphasis
on work, one can imagine that social workers generally would regard work
as beneficial for most families. Less clear, however, is whether they would
concur with state policymakers on what kinds of family crises justify postponing searches for employment or the severity of sanctions to be applied
to those not working.307 Because agencies would lack the ability to claim
that eligibility workers’ decisions about claimants’ substantive eligibility
reflected professional judgment, legal and media sources could easily scrutinize those decisions.308 With researchers and reporters eagerly watching
to see whether “welfare reform” would succeed, states have felt the need to
exercise more direct control over their programs. Similarly, whether eligibility workers’ interactions with claimants go well or badly provides senior
managers little insight into whether frontline employers are following the
organization’s priorities.309 Finally, because professional norms rely upon
subjective exercises of judgment and are likely to be interpreted differently
by different social workers, they offer little prospect for promoting uniform
treatment of claimants. Accordingly, they have sought other means for
guiding the actions of local offices.

306. See Diller, supra note 15, at 1140 (describing states’ transfer of responsibility for eligibility
determinations from professional social workers to employees lacking professional training).
307. Reconciling time limits with social-work norms likely would be considerably more
problematic.
308. See Diller, supra note 15, at 1205.
309. Thus, for example, conflict between a social worker and a claimant could result not from
enforcement of a work requirement but from the claimant’s resentment of another kind of intervention
the social worker made. Conversely, a skilled social worker could push a claimant very hard to work
without alienating the claimant.
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The absence of a professional code, however, does not mean that eligibility workers cannot be organized to exercise their considerable discretion in relatively consistent ways without formal rules. Eligibility workers
read the same newspapers and watch the same television news programs
that other members of the community do. If the governor and other senior
federal and state officials consistently describe welfare programs in terms
of fraud, eligibility workers are likely to give program integrity a high priority. If the governor calls a news conference each month to congratulate
her administration on having reduced caseloads, eligibility workers are
unlikely to want to do anything to prevent the governor from announcing
similar “achievements” in the future. If the governor or the welfare commissioner brags about the percentage of welfare recipients that are employed, eligibility workers may feel they can be lenient with low-wage
workers but should be tough with other claimants. These messages can be
reinforced through internal newsletters, staff meetings, and awards.
Conveying impressionistic policies in this manner can nonetheless be
quite problematic. First, broad messages convey little nuance and offer
scant guidance about how to accommodate competing priorities. Although
senior policymakers can ensure that their staff members see the same
newsletters and attend similar meetings, they cannot be sure that all of
them will interpret the messages similarly. If the governor brags about reducing the welfare roles and having people go to work, which of the two is
more important? The answer will determine whether applications from
low-wage workers should be welcomed or shunned. Different workers in
the same organization are likely to draw differing conclusions.310 To the
same effect, if the president of a managed-care organization congratulates
staff for controlling costs and maintaining high patient satisfaction, which
is more important? Approvals of treatment in many close cases may hang
on a staff member’s divination of the organization’s priorities.311
Ironically, however, recent moves to eliminate entitlements have
come just as programs’ priorities have become more complex, creating
more difficult conflicts that staff need to resolve. Congress eliminated
AFDC’s entitlement at the same time it asked cash assistance programs to
add a strong emphasis on work to their existing mission of aiding the
310. See, e.g., Quint et al., supra note 330, at 69-71, 104-05 (1999) (reporting that eligibility
workers and employment specialists drew differing conclusions from central managers’
pronouncements).
311. Some policymakers may avoid admitting, or addressing, the existence of conflicting priorities
by insisting that one—such as reducing caseloads—has absolute priority. If this were true, of course,
they would simply terminate all cash-assistance programs. The fact that they do not shows that assisting
those in need does in fact remain a priority. The inconsistency between categorical statements of
priorities and measured implementation suggests that policymakers are counting on a combination of
the personal sensibilities of eligibility workers and their impressionistic policymaking to arrive at a
desired balance. This method combines many of the deficiencies of the two variants of impressionist
policymaking discussed in this section.
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needy. Similarly, states are eliminating important features of the Medicaid
entitlement through managed care and waivers as they seek to accommodate the goals of beneficiary care and cost containment.
Even where weak entitlement structures remain in some programs,
impressionistic policies established in other programs jointly administered
by the same staff are likely to distort administration in unanticipated and
undesirable ways.312 The decline in food stamp participation in the late
1990s provides a poignant example. Participation was depressed by some
governors’ failure to distinguish between cash assistance and food stamps
when bragging about caseload declines.313 States relentlessly reminded
their eligibility workers that potential claimants that decided to forego applying and recipients that left public assistance should be considered successes that should be zealously promoted; eligibility workers applied these
policies to food stamps too.314 Food stamp participation also was hurt by a
relentless drumbeat of meetings, rankings, and awards relating to QC error
rates. Even if eligibility workers understood that no statistically valid inferences could be drawn from a single case that was found to have a payment
error, after seeing how colleagues responsible for such cases were treated,
they were determined not to suffer a similar fate. Participation in food
stamps rebounded as senior policymakers began to refer to them as “work
supports”—instead of the reviled “welfare”315—and moderated their efforts
to reduce their error rates.316
Management through impressionistic signaling also fails to provide
senior policymakers reliable information about how frontline workers are
administering programs. Workers will report, no doubt, that they are faithfully adhering to the prescribed priorities. But how they are interpreting
those priorities, particularly in cases of conflict, is likely to remain obscure.

312. See, e.g., Vivian Gabor & Christopher Botsko, Health Systems Research, Changes
in Client Service in the Food Stamp Program After Welfare Reform (2001) (finding that
efforts to discourage applications for cash assistance may be affecting applications for food stamps as
well).
313. See Kathleen Maloy et al., Mathematica Policy Research, State of
Indiana: Strategies for Improving Food Stamp, Medicaid, and SCHIP Participation (2001)
(describing the effects of emphasis on caseload reduction that did not discriminate between TANF and
food stamps).
Medicaid participation stalled during this period even as its eligibility rules liberalized. Similar
factors appear to be at work. A survey sponsored by the Kaiser Family Foundation found that 79% of
low-income parents of Medicaid-eligible uninsured children erroneously believed that welfare time
limits also applied to Medicaid. Kaiser Commission on Medicaid & the Uninsured, Medicaid and
Children, Overcoming Barriers to Enrollment: Findings from a National Survey (2000).
Some 72% of the parents of children enrolled in Medicaid were under a similar misconception.
314. See Gabor & Botsko, supra note 312, at 14-17.
315. See, e.g., Budget Initiatives on Transportation for Working Families, 36 Wkly. Comp. Pres.
Docs. 359 (Feb. 28, 2000) (describing food stamps as essential to help low-wage working families).
316. Super, Quiet Revolution, supra note 104, at 1380-90.
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Finally, impressionistic guidance provides little help in ensuring that
claimants with similar circumstances are treated similarly. Whether an eligibility worker grants benefits to a favorite or denies aid to a claimant she
dislikes, she will have some broad priority available to invoke.317
B.

Governing Through Automated Systems

The legal entitlement to public benefits grew up in an era when automation had little impact on the operation of public-benefit programs. At
most, perhaps a basis accounting program tracked the flow of funds.318 By
1996, however, this had changed dramatically. Computer systems routinely
played central roles in eligibility determination as well as financial management.319 Many states had interactive systems that cued eligibility workers with questions to ask claimants and, when the workers entered the
claimants’ answers, supplied the applicable follow-up questions.320 Upon
obtaining the information necessary for an eligibility decision, these systems would render an eligibility decision, calculate the amount of benefits
for successful claimants, and generate denial notices for others.321 Thus, in
these highly automated systems, eligibility workers were not in fact making most of the important decisions relating to claimants’ eligibility.
This high level of automation transformed the governance of publicbenefit programs. Agencies continued to file state-plan amendments with
federal officials, promulgate regulations through their administrativeprocedure acts, and write eligibility manuals for their workers. With actual
eligibility decisions being made by the automated systems, however, each
of these documents’ practical importance was bounded by its impact on the
state’s computer programs.

317. Conflicting priorities’ potential for concealing willful decision making is well-understood in
other contexts. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Canons of Construction, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950)
(showing that many popular canons have similarly popular counterparts pointing in the opposite
direction, leaving judges free to invoke whichever helps them to achieve their preferred result).
318. General Accounting Office, Food Stamp Program: Progress and Problems in Using
75-Percent Funding for Automation (1988) (finding all but three states had basic food stamp
automation systems but that their capacities varied widely). In the mid 1980s, Congress felt the need to
require states to at least consider systematic improvement to their automation capacity. 7 U.S.C. §
2020(o) (2000). This transition remained problematic for some time. See General Accounting
Office, Human Services Integration: Results of a GAO Cosponsored Conference on
Modernizing Information Systems (2002); General Accounting Office, Welfare
Programs: Ineffective Federal Oversight Permits Costly Automated System Problems
(1992). The lack of a coordinated federal approach to helping states develop information systems likely
will continue to hamper development in this area. Corporation for the Management of Human
Services, Background and Initial Business Plan 2 (2003).
319. Jack Slocum et al., U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, State Automation Systems Study, at I-6 (1995)
(finding that thirty-seven states had automated systems that determined eligibility and forty-one had
systems that determined benefit levels).
320. Id. (finding 21 states had interactive systems guiding interviews).
321. Id. (finding that 44 states had automated systems that generated notices to claimants).

1124

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1051

But the process by which state policies are rendered into operating
instructions for automated systems is far from transparent. Although policymakers and line staff may assume that the system is carrying out the
same policies expressed in the program’s state plan and manuals, deviations may be difficult to detect.322
In some respects, systems-governed programs raise problems similar
to those that govern legalistic ones. In the old system, delays in promulgating amended regulations could leave federal and state agencies applying
inappropriate, outdated policies;323 now states’ ability to modify their policies is constrained by their resources for reprogramming their systems.
States that do their own programming must develop ways of prioritizing
finite programming resources. If the welfare department seeks to change its
policies at the same time the revenue department wants to improve its collection systems, the welfare policy changes are likely to have to wait.
Policy innovation nearly ground to a halt in 1999, across states and across
agencies, as states focused their programming resources on preventing any
systems collapses due to the “Y2K” problem. States that contract out for
programming may face similar difficulties; in addition, their capacity for
policy change may be stunted during budget crises as programming funds
are slashed. Indeed, programming queues may be even slower than the
clearance process for regulations.324 Although agencies’ mastery of the
Administrative Procedure Act varies considerably, few are unable to adjust
their policies because their state has run out of pages in its equivalent to the
Federal Register.
Whatever the cause, this ossification is as subversive to the enforcement of programs’ substantive policy priorities as it is difficult to avoid.325
When states try to instruct their eligibility workers to apply policies that
their systems are not yet programmed to support, chaos rapidly ensues.
Eligibility workers must design “workarounds”—essentially ways of deceiving the automated system into producing the desired result in cases to
which the system is programmed to apply a different policy.326 Although
322. In many states, policy is translated into computer code by private contractors, meaning that
no state employees may even be aware of any deviations from, or possibly erroneous interpretations of,
state policy. Id. at IV-9-IV-10.
323. See, e.g., Schweiker, 669 F.2d at 877 (refusing to delay the implementation of budget cuts
until an agency complied with APA requirements).
324. See Super, Quiet Revolution, supra note 104, at 1305-07 (describing the clearance process for
one federal agency).
325. See Mark Ragan, Rockefeller Institute of Government, Building Better Human
Services Systems 33-34 (2003).
326. Consider, for example, a claimant with earnings of $500. If the system is programmed to
disregard one-quarter of claimants’ earnings in determining benefits but the state has reduced that
deduction to 20%, eligibility workers may falsely enter the claimant’s earnings as $533.33 to achieve
the desired net income figure ($400). Of course, this approach is highly error-prone and may distort the
automated system’s other decision making. In this example, the claimant could be denied benefits
altogether if the program has a $520 gross income limit.
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central program administrators may suggest workarounds that seem to
minimize the corruption of information within the system, once eligibility
workers are authorized to manipulate the system, it becomes extremely
difficult for central managers to control the unintended side-effects of locally designed workarounds. Many states crossed the Rubicon by authorizing workarounds in the pre-Y2K period and are likely to have serious
difficulty restoring their staffs’ deference to their systems.
In addition, systems-driven programs tend to favor objective, brightline eligibility criteria, perhaps even more than the rule-based programs
associated with legal entitlements. Although this is not absolutely inevitable,327 in practice, states have been reluctant to allow overtly subjective
eligibility decisions to be married to systems-driven eligibilitydetermination processes. This may reflect concerns about accountability or
about the possibility that invidious discrimination could poison the resulting decisions.328 It also may reflect a conviction that excluding automated
systems from some of the most important eligibility decisions wastes the
system’s resources. Where the agency relies upon computers to issue eligibility notices to claimants, administrators may fear that awkward and
costly modifications would be required to enable either the system or eligibility workers to issue proper notices.329
In some ways, however, a systems-driven program differs substantially from a rule-driven one. Most obvious is the question of transparency.
Even a badly-written regulation or policy manual is likely to surrender at
least some of its secrets to persistent senior managers, legal services lawyers, lay advocates, researchers, and journalists. With the rarest of exceptions, however, none of these people is likely to have either access to the
code that powers an automated eligibility system nor the skills to interpret
that code. Thus, determining why particular individuals were granted or
denied benefits may sometimes be difficult, and seeing a general pattern
across the range of claimants coming to the state agency may be all but
impossible. The system may be able to generate reports summarizing the
number of claimants granted or denied benefits and perhaps breaking down
the types of reasons on which denials were made. Few states, however,
have devoted the sophisticated programming and policy-development resources that would be necessary to design reports that would provide a
327. Indeed, in theory, neither formal eligibility rules nor automated systems compel reliance on
bright-line standards. Each could be limited to performing triage, directing denials for those whose
objective conditions clearly fall outside the range for which the state might wish to provide benefits and
granting benefits for people with certain extremely compelling objective problems. Eligibility workers
could then be left to make subjective judgments on the remaining cases, which could be quite
numerous.
328. Gooden, supra note 305.
329. See Mayhew v. Cohen, 604 F. Supp. 850 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (finding that early computergenerated notices violated the Due Process Clause for failing to provide claimants with adequate
explanations of the actions the state was taking against them).
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nuanced picture of their program’s administration on the local level.
Privacy concerns, and sometimes the proprietary rights of the companies
that developed the states’ systems, generally deny independent researchers
access to the systems’ data with which to develop reports of their own.
Thus, while automated systems’ importance in governing publicbenefit programs clearly will continue to increase, at present, states seem
not to have surmounted the problems that would keep them from replacing
the control and accountability functions of rule-based systems. Despite
their superficial appeal, they cannot adequately perform any of the three
core managerial functions of legal entitlements. As vehicles for disseminating the policy decisions of central administrators, they have much of the
same rigidity as rule-based systems. Because they can be written and
checked only by skilled programmers, policymakers may have more difficulty learning what policies are currently in force or checking the accuracy
of the changes they have ordered. They also may impose significant administrative costs to change policy, and they induce states to maintain the same
relatively objective eligibility standards that characterized entitlementbased systems—and that are often cited as a prime reason for abandoning
entitlements.
In theory, automated systems control the outcome in local agencies
and thus provide the same assurances of compliance as systems balancing
entitlements with counter-entitlements. They can even produce summary
reports on how cases have been handled at the local level. In practice,
however, their reporting capacity often lags behind changes in policy and
substantive priorities.330 Moreover, ad hoc workarounds can and routinely
do defeat them. States can build systems resistant to workarounds only at
the cost of surrendering their ability to change policies more rapidly than
their staff or contractors can reprogram their systems.
Workarounds also compromise automated systems’ ability to ensure
consistent application of their policies. In the hands of either sentimental or
hostile frontline staff, workarounds can result in treatment of vulnerable
sub-groups that differs substantially from what central policymakers intend.331 Automated systems’ lack of transparency exacerbates both of these
deficiencies.
Even if states surmount these difficulties, however, automated systems’ most productive use likely will be as an adjunct to, rather than a substitute for, legal entitlements. In particular, even the best automated system
depends on the data that program staff enter into it, which in turn reflects
330. See, e.g., Janet Quint et al., Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, Big
Cities and Welfare Reform 71-72 (1999) (reporting officials’ frustration with their computer
systems’ inability to generate reports that would indicate the success of their new policies).
331. Most simply, because workarounds require extraordinary effort, eligibility workers may
easily regard them as acts of grace that they need not afford to claimants they deem unworthy.
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that staff’s understanding of a claimant’s circumstances. Claimants seeking
to enforce legal entitlements will have a different perspective on their
situations, just as auditors may dispute line employees’ characterization of
a transaction.
C.

Governing Through Contractual Provisions

Another relatively formal mechanism for governing a non-entitlement
program is contract law. Under this approach, contractual terms serve purposes comparable to the rules in an entitlement system. Although the
TANF statute and many states make gestures toward contracts with claimants,332 these documents bear few of the important characteristics of contracts. They generally are not binding upon the state, do not limit even the
obligations of claimants, and are not likely to be the product of meaningful
negotiations since claimants have no meaningful leverage and must accept
whatever terms the agency dictates. Thus, pseudo-contracts with claimants
may serve as vehicles for conveying some of the agency’s demands, but
they provide no answer to questions of how those demands are formulated
or how eligibility is determined.
A more meaningful application of contractual principles to publicbenefit programs comes when state or local agencies engage private parties
to perform discretionary administrative functions. Some providers, notably
nursing homes and managed-care plans, exercise great discretion over
which services Medicaid beneficiaries receive. States contract with private
firms to provide employment and training services, which may involve discretionary judgments about claimants’ compliance and their need for supportive services such as transportation reimbursements. With the
elimination of AFDC’s rules requiring eligibility decisions to be made by
state civil servants,333 several states have begun to privatize aspects of eligibility determination for cash assistance. USDA recently granted Florida a
waiver of the food stamp program’s civil service rules,334 for example, to
allow Florida to have private contractors determine food stamp eligibility
for TANF claimants in some counties.335
332. 42 U.S.C. § 608(b)(2), (3) (2000).
333. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(5) (1994) (repealed 1996).
334. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(6)(B) (2000). States’ efforts in this regard are part of a much broader
movement to privatize a vast array of governmental functions. See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Beyond
Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82
Wash. U. L.Q. 1001 (2004).
335. FNS’s waiver was intended as an experiment—a demonstration project. See 7 U.S.C. §
2026(b)(1) (2000) (authorizing such waivers). Florida subsequently sought to expand its privatization
project to cover all counties and most cases within those counties. After the Florida agency became
embroiled in some contracting scandals, FNS offered its tentative approval of this expansion subject to
conditions seeking to ensure the integrity of the bidding process and requiring that the expansion occur
in phases to allow the state to learn from the experiences of the earlier counties to implement the
scheme. Florida rejected these conditions and shifted its attention from privatization to automation.
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The success of these privatization efforts depends upon states’ effectiveness in clearly specifying which policies they want enforced in their
contracts with these private entities.336 To do that, however, states face several significant obstacles. First, contracts are likely to be more difficult to
amend than rules or computer systems. Not only do state agencies require
the approval of their non-governmental partners—who may demand additional compensation in exchange for agreeing to implement new contractual terms—but state and local governments typically have extensive, and
often cumbersome, processes for approving contracts.337 Thus, once discretionary functions are contracted out, government may feel that it is effectively tied to the same set of policies for the term of the contract, which
may run several years. Even once the contract has expired, some contractors may face little competition and hence be able to resist, or extract a
price for, substantial policy changes.
The problems this policy paralysis creates may be compounded by
agencies’ errors in drafting contractual terms in the first place. The considerations involved in drafting sound contractual terms differ substantially
from those involved in drafting sound regulations. State human-services
agencies’ staffs are likely to have far more experience in the latter. Studies
of states’ Medicaid managed-care contracts have revealed widespread and
fundamental shortcomings.338 TANF case-management contracts similarly
seem to reflect considerable naiveté.339
More fundamentally, when state or local agencies engage private parties in the administration of a public-benefit program, they change the balance of policies that must be accommodated in the program’s
implementation. Policies that the agencies impressed upon their staff
through informal means will immediately become irrelevant unless incorporated into the contract. The process of converting policies to contractual
336. See Pamela Winston et al., Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., Privatization of
Welfare Services: A Review of the Literature (2002).
337. Expediting the process of approving contract amendments would be difficult. The resources
required to implement a policy change differ considerably: changing an income eligibility limit will
take far less staff time and systems development than changing the terms of a work program by
establishing new kinds of work placements and then screening the caseload to determine appropriate
placements. Thus, establishing a generic price in advance for modifications will be impossible. And
with new costs and specifications being negotiated between managers and the contractor, appropriate
reviews within the government are needed to guard against cronyism or waste.
338. Sara Rosenbaum, An Overview of Managed Care Liability: Implications for
Patients Rights and Federal and State Reform (2001); Sara Rosenbaum et al., Center for
Health Care Strategies, Inc., Negotiating the New Health System: Findings from a
Nationwide Study of Medicaid Primary Care Case Management Contracts (2002). Although
they had several years of additional experience by the time the SCHIP block grant was created in 1997,
states have done little better with those contracts. Sara Rosenbaum et al., Center for Health
Services Research and Policy, Behavioral Health and Managed Care Contracting under
SCHIP (2002).
339. Sheena McConnell et al., Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., Privatization in
Practice: Case Studies of Contracting for TANF Case Management (2003).
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language may serve to filter out subtler, more impressionistic policies that
are not readily rendered into contractual terms. On the other hand, the interests of the contractor—presumably in reducing costs and perhaps in enhancing its other, related operations—must be accommodated with the mix
of public policies relating to the program.340 Conveying the proper balance
among these priorities to the individual employees interacting with claimants, especially through the distorting lens of contractual conditions, is
likely to be quite challenging.
IV
Choosing Between Entitlement and Non-Entitlement Systems
Part I established that legal entitlements are far from the indomitable
tigers they often are presumed to be. Part II, in turn, showed that the
counter-entitlements that have developed in the shadows of major entitlements now can prove more than a match for claimants’ nominal legal rights
and suggested how the substantive objectives of the 1996 welfare law
might have been implemented through counter-entitlements. Part III explored some of the formidable problems managers face in non-entitlement
programs, problems that tend to drive them back toward entitlement-like
structures.
This Part seeks to provide a basis for selecting between entitlement
and non-entitlement structures for impressing new substantive goals on an
established entitlement. Part IV.A examines the undesirable incentives that
disentitlement often creates. Part IV.B considers the efficiency of entitlement and non-entitlement structures in providing data about program operations. Part IV.C then considers the risk of inequities between and even
within particular groups where programs operate without clear entitlement
rules that reconcile competing priorities.
A.

Skewed Incentives Resulting from Disentitlement

In entitlement programs, administrative decisions spring from the interplay between entitlements and counter-entitlements. When an entitlement is eliminated, the counter-entitlements typically remain. Unless the
340. Although both the public agency and the contractor are likely to be concerned about reducing
costs, these interests are unlikely to align with one another. Most programs’ administrative costs are a
small fraction of their benefit costs. The agency, therefore, is likely to focus on conserving benefit
dollars, while the contractor (who does not pay benefit costs) will strive to reduce its administrative
expenses. Moreover, the government typically will have its administrative costs more or less fixed by
the contract. The private contractor, by contrast, may have no interest in saving benefit dollars but great
interest in keeping its administrative costs as low as possible. Alternatively, if the private contractor is
given a fiscal stake in reducing benefit costs—as managed-care plans typically are—it may have an
interest in minimizing all aspects of the program to the extent it can without being sued by the state.
States’ audit staffs are likely to have more experience policing overexpenditures of public funds and
may have difficulty identifying and obtaining correction of a contractor’s spending less than what is
necessary to achieve the program’s basic purposes.
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purpose originally vindicated by the former entitlement is truly abandoned—rather than merely taken for granted—frontline staff’s incentives
are likely to be skewed toward those objectives enforced through counterentitlements. Moreover, when the offsetting force of the entitlement is removed, these counter-entitlements may prove far more powerful than had
previously been evident. Any deviations between the pressure they apply
on frontline staff and the priorities of policymakers likely will be exaggerated, and that staff’s incentives skewed further. Where the program is a
collaboration of multiple levels of government, or of public and private
entities, the counter-entitlements’ effects will be even harder to predict as
they interact with the disparate priorities of those responsible for implementing the program.
Here again, the 1996 welfare law provides a clear illustration.
Although developments of the 1960s and early 1970s sharply reduced state
and local governments’ formal control over public-welfare policies, they
did not eliminate those governments’ fiscal and philosophical interest in
the operations of these programs. These agencies continued to care intensely about how many people, and which ones, received the benefits that
they continued to administer and helped to fund. Informal rationing,
through intensive verification requirements, long waits in welfare offices,
degrading home visits, and later requirements to participate in work programs helped these agencies restrict the influx of claimants.341 The 1996
legislation therefore devolved power to entities with well-established policy preferences of their own, albeit ones that varied significantly from state
to state. For this legislation to have the greatest chance of achieving the
substantive changes its authors sought, its substantive message and the incentive structure it created for local agencies needed to be well aligned
with one another. In reality, they were not.
PRWORA, and states’ policies under the waivers that preceded it,
provided ideological support and fiscal incentives for what had been common but often ignored practices. They legitimated the notion that poverty
results from bad choices and its corollary that anti-poverty policy should
focus on improving those choices. Rationing benefits through overt efforts
to influence claimants’ and potential claimants’ choices therefore seemed
quite natural. They provided some disincentives to receive benefits by intensifying the stigma associated with welfare receipt, imposing a time limit
on federally funded benefits, and giving many potential claimants the impression that eligibility rules had tightened drastically. More broadly, by
delegitimizing the receipt of benefits, PRWORA gave states political cover
to tighten rationing, particularly if the method chosen had some nominal
relationship with employment.
341.

See, e.g., Dehavenon, supra note 83.
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Fiscal, administrative, and legal concerns, however, left most states
disinclined to mount large-scale work programs.342 TANF’s caseloadreduction credit,343 however, reduced the work-participation rates of states
that reduced the number of families receiving assistance. Caseload reductions also helped shrink the denominator used to calculate workparticipation rates, allowing states to report more impressive rates while
keeping the number of families in work programs manageable. Reducing
participation rapidly was therefore crucial, meeting the legal and political
definitions of strong performance. The simultaneous conversion of states’
former AFDC funding into a fixed block grant gave states a further fiscal
incentive to reduce participation since they could use any resulting savings
in other programs.344
Many states’ income eligibility limits were so low that they already
effectively denied benefits to almost anyone with countable income; tightening those limits further could reduce payments to those participating but
was unlikely to reduce the eligible pool significantly.345 Thus, developing
effective informal rationing methods became essential. And with
PRWORA’s critics having focused attention on the likelihood of a “race to
the bottom” in formal eligibility policy, states’ ratcheting up the pressure
342. Once the Clinton Administration determined that work programs were covered by the Fair
Labor Standards Act, and Congress failed to override that decision, many states could not require
enough hours of work to count towards the work requirements for most families. When fully
implemented, TANF required most recipients to work thirty hours per week in order to count as
“working.” 42 U.S.C. § 607(c)(1)(A) (2000). Claimants finding thirty hours per week of work in the
private sector typically become ineligible for cash assistance immediately or within a few months. And
if claimants unable to find private employment can only be asked to work off their grant in unpaid
community service at the rate of the minimum wage, only those whose grants are at least $664.35 per
month can be assigned thirty hours per week of work. The maximum cash assistance grant in the
median state peaked in the late 1990s at about $400. See Super, Quiet Revolution, supra note 104, at
1318 n.162.
343. See supra note 288, and accompanying text.
344. This was no accident. The Heritage Foundation’s Robert Rector, a principal nongovernmental architect of the 1996 law, wrote as follows:
[A] bedrock premise of the 1996 welfare reform was that entitlement funding created
perverse incentives that led to harmful levels of dependence. By financially rewarding states
for increased caseloads and penalizing them for lower caseloads, the old system gave states
incentives to keep recipients on the rolls and trapped millions of families in unnecessary
dependence. This is why welfare reform abolished entitlement funding.
Robert Rector, Heritage Foundation, The Baucus “WORK” Act of 2002: Repealing
Welfare Reform 6 (2002).
345. One exception was the treatment of families containing an SSI recipient. Under AFDC, SSI
recipients’ needs and incomes were ignored, and this almost always advantaged the remaining family
members. Shortly after PRWORA’s enactment, a handful of states eliminated or sharply limited that
rule, rendering most families containing SSI recipients ineligible. Perhaps because this policy’s
apparent harshness caused political problems that outweighed the effect on states’ caseloads—and
because these states learned that informal means could achieve similar ends without attracting political
fire—several of these states have since abandoned their restrictive policies. See Eileen Sweeney,
Center on Budget & Policy Priorities, Recent Studies Indicate That Many Parents Who
Are Current Or Former Welfare Recipients Have Disabilities And Other Medical
Conditions (2000).
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their overburdened and brutalized local offices were already applying on
claimants went largely unnoticed.
The disentitlement of cash assistance provided the means for substituting caseload reduction for work promotion in the implementation of the
1996 legislation. This development has been the source of considerable
complaint from conservatives346 while confronting liberals with a different
kind of “race to the bottom.” It is, however, the predictable result of attempts to manipulate incentives in the complex relationship that inevitably
surrounds any federal-state program. If work truly was the goal of the 1996
legislation, a specific work requirement enforced by a counter-entitlement
would have been far more likely to achieve the desired result. This could
be done by modifying the existing AFDC QC system to examine recipients’ work efforts and to punish states with unusually high shares of recipients not working.347 Alternatively, AFDC QC could be left to guard the
program’s integrity and a new audit system could be established to monitor
recipients’ work effort. Coupling a work-based counter-entitlement with a
continuing entitlement to benefits for those claimants willing to work
would have prevented states from meeting the work-participation rate requirement by shooing away (“diverting”) needy families. To the extent implementation deviated from policymakers’ intentions, or produced results
they regarded as undesirable, the terms of the counter-entitlement could
have been adjusted far more easily, and likely with less state resistance,
than the TANF funding structure.348
B.

Non-Entitlement Programs’ Lack of Reliable Data on Impacts on
Claimants

Nobody knows a program’s impact on claimants better than claimants
themselves. An entitlement program relies upon claimants to alert policymakers of concerns by requesting fair hearings and filing litigation against
program administrators.349 Although the decision to eliminate the entitlement may signal a decreased interest in accommodating claimants’ desires,
the programs’ continued funding makes clear that aiding the needy remains
346. See supra note 289.
347. One member of the Senate Finance Committee proposed doing just this. See supra note 294
and accompanying text.
348. At this writing, the original statutory authorization for TANF has been expired for more than
two years. The House has twice passed reauthorizations, and the Senate Finance Committee has reported out reauthorization legislation once and appears ready to do so again. Final enactment of
reauthorization legislation, and resolution of the various interest groups’ dissatisfaction with the current
system, however, appears months or years away.
349. Stripped of its emotive baggage, litigation is a complaint that junior officials are disobeying
the commands of senior ones: frontline staff’s failing to follow their regulations, state regulationwriters’ or legislators’ failing to follow federal regulations, federal regulations’ failing to follow
Congress’s commands, or Congress’s disregarding the Constitution. Thus, the essential cause of action
is one for insubordination, although it is rarely styled as such.
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a concern.350 Policymakers may well trust the good will of frontline staff.
Obtaining information about exactly how that staff is treating claimants is
difficult, however, without self-interested reporting from those most
knowledgeable.
Predictably, senior policymakers have had serious difficulty determining just how TANF is treating claimants since the elimination of the entitlement. In the first years after PRWORA, HHS and others funded a host of
studies of families leaving the cash-assistance rolls. Many of these studies
were plagued with low response rates and other methodological problems.
Even well-conducted studies faced serious structural problems gathering
representative information. Telephone studies tended to be biased toward
“leavers” who had prospered since those that had become destitute were
more likely to have been evicted or to have lost telephone service.
Moreover, respondents generally had little to gain and potentially much to
lose—a child-protective services investigation and possible loss of their
children—if they reported serious hardship. Even if the data was reliable,
the lack of comparable studies of “leavers” from the pre-PRWORA period
makes it difficult to determine if hardship was greater under the new system. Also problematic was the lack of a specific nexus to particular actions
of agency staff, making it almost impossible to determine if a family’s
good, or bad, fortune was the result of luck or the program’s administration.351 Finally, these studies provided only a snapshot of programs’ impact
at a given moment. They offered no insight into the programs’ change over
time. Thus, when cash assistance caseloads kept falling after unemployment and poverty rose in the recession of 2001—raising serious new questions about TANF’s effectiveness as a safety net for the destitute—funding
for leaver studies had largely dried up.
C.

Non-Entitlement Programs’ Unequal Treatment Among Groups of
Low-Income Families

Disparities in administration unfortunately are no rarity in entitlement
programs. Nonetheless, with an explicit standard for program administration, claimants can assess how they are being treated. Although individual
claimants may not know whether their treatment is better or worse than
350. See also 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(1), (2) (2000) (establishing two of TANF’s four goals as
assisting needy families).
351. One significant exception is the customer-service reviews the Tennessee Department of
Human Services conducts before terminating assistance. See Super, Offering an Invisible Hand, supra
note 82, at 882-83. These reviews focused on the specific decision to terminate benefits for nonfinancial reasons. Since responding could preserve a recipient’s benefits, the recipient had an incentive
to respond truthfully. (By contrast, claimants have little incentive to respond to research surveys and
may fear that admitting to hardship will not help their position but could jeopardize their custody of
their children.) The fact that these reviews reversed half of all proposed terminations raises disquieting
questions about the quality of decision making in other states.
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those in other groups, disparate treatment is likely to produce a disproportionate number of complaints from members of whichever group is being
ill treated. Possible discrimination can be identified relatively rapidly and
without arduous studies.
In a non-entitlement program, however, they are both more likely to
occur and more difficult to detect and excise. A non-entitlement program
that relies on the local exercise of subjective discretion lacks both a coherent set of principles of decision that apply across all claimants and a systematic method for claimants to enforce those principals. Where the
disparities in treatment implicate a group protected under civil-rights laws,
adversely affected claimants retain legal rights.352 In practice, however,
members of protected classes may not realize that they are being disadvantaged because they lack a basis for comparing their treatment.353 Rigorous
research into the extent of racial discrimination in non-entitlement cashassistance and child-care programs is difficult without access to the case
files of a random sample of claimants. Privacy rules354 empower state and
local agencies to deny researchers access to that data, and not surprisingly,
few have been eager to expose themselves to civil-rights complaints in this
manner. What research is available, however, paints a disturbing picture.355
Yet even where the disadvantaged group is not specially protected by
civil-rights laws, important public policies—or simple fairness—may be
offended by disparate treatment. For example, persons that recently have
undergone severe trauma may not have protected status under civil-rights
laws, but they certainly merit sympathy. In a system that provides generalized pressure on local offices to move families off of the rolls, however, a
parent who collects several months of aid while regaining her composure
may already be regarded as a “problem client” before she has had a meaningful chance to comply with any work activities. The degree to which
such a claimant meets with sympathy or irritation may well depend more
on the culture of the local office, and perhaps whether its manager is seeking to improve her chance of a promotion by producing good statistical
results, rather than on any balancing of policies ordained by central managers.356
352. In a sense, then, when an agency bestows non-entitlement benefits on some individuals, it
creates an entitlement in members of protected classes that are similarly situated to those recipients.
Proving that unsuccessful claimants truly are similarly situated, however, is extremely difficult in a
non-entitlement program where eligibility workers need not specify the basis for their decisions.
353. By contrast, members of protected groups need not know how others are being treated to
make a claim for a violation of the program’s rules. Proving a violation of a program’s rules is likely to
be far easier than proving a civil-rights violation.
354. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(8) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(iv), 1396a(a)(7) (2000).
355. Gooden, supra note 305.
356. This should not be regarded as a generic argument against local flexibility. If the local offices
were granted complete freedom to set their own policies, no doubt outcomes would vary as well. In that
case, however, it would be clear that local officials are accountable for the choices they make. By
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Even low-wage working people, the presumed role models of the current system, may receive sharply unequal treatment across local offices. As
noted above,357 their fluctuating incomes may make them a liability to an
office aiming for temporal precision in the application of a means test.358 In
addition, since child-care subsidies often are more costly than assistance,
some local offices may believe that the goal of cost-avoidance supersedes
that of work support and may seek to discourage their application. Also,
some low-skilled individuals, anxious to work, may have difficulty holding
any one job for very long; local offices that seek to conserve administrative
resources may resent having to process frequent changes in their benefits
as these claimants find and lose employment.
Without the objective standards of an entitlement, policymakers may
have difficulty preventing such disparities even when they fervently wish
to do so. In each case, a strong argument can be made that it is counterproductive to disadvantage these particular groups. Although some analogous
barriers appear in entitlement programs such as food stamps and
Medicaid,359 they may be particularly intractable in non-entitlement cashassistance and child-care programs.360 Many of these barriers are likely to
reflect deliberate choices of state policymakers. Nonetheless, these barriers’ impact may be compounded by additional barriers that local offices or
eligibility workers impose with the discretion a non-entitlement program
provides. As a result, more members of vulnerable groups may be unable
to continue to participate.
V
Entitlement and Non-Entitlement Systems in Other Areas of
Law
The lessons this Article has developed have applications in numerous
areas of law far removed from cash-assistance programs. Indeed, the
Article’s argument applies whenever all parties nominally espouse the
contrast, where central authorities attempt to manipulate local offices’ choices without clear rules,
claimants, members of the public, and even the two strata of officials may be unclear about who really
is responsible for a particular outcome. Thus, disentitlement in a system where central authorities still
purport to be setting priorities is very different from true devolution of authority.
357. See supra notes 142-45, and accompanying text.
358. Temporal precision is particularly vexing for program managers because events of which
they have no timely knowledge can cause a case to be branded an error. Thus, a flawless determination
of eligibility and benefit levels based on the claimant’s application can be ruined by a subsequent raise
or increase in hours worked. See Super, Quiet Revolution, supra note 104, at 1327-30.
359. See, e.g., Gabor & Botsko, supra note 312, at 13-27 (documenting access restrictions in
states’ TANF policies that local offices apply to food stamps).
360. An illustration of these differences is Reynolds v. Guiliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y.
1999). New York City’s welfare department was imposing similar access barriers in TANF-funded
programs, food stamps, and Medicaid. Reynolds enjoined many of these procedures as applied to food
stamps and Medicaid, but plaintiffs lacked the basis for claims against most of the same practices in the
disentitled programs. Id.
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same substantive norm for the administration of a program but some argue
that that norm need not be made legally enforceable. The ensuing debate
commonly becomes disjointed, as those favoring the norm’s enforceability
argue about its importance while their opponents insist that they share a
commitment to the norm but differ only as to process. A more meaningful
discussion would focus on the three key functions of enforceable norms
described above and on the government’s ability to replicate those functions without enforceability.
For example, in May 2004, President Bush argued that because
“[w]e’re a nation of law[s]” the public should be “comfort[ed]” that the
government would not practice torture.361 At the same time, it was arguing
before the Supreme Court that many of those held by the government had
no recourse to the courts to enforce those laws.362 In essence, the
Administration argued that while the humane treatment of prisoners is one
of the goals of the program that incarcerates them, that goal should not be
enforced with a legal entitlement to such treatment through administrative
hearings to challenge their detention, access to courts through writs of habeas corpus, or the ability to bring claims before international human-rights
tribunals. Thus, just as PRWORA did not dispute the validity of the objective that the entitlement had supported—aiding the needy —but nonetheless declined to support it with an entitlement for fear of undermining the
program’s other objectives, the Bush Administration asserted that legal
entitlement would undermine the other goal of incarceration—combating
terrorism.
The Administration’s critics respond by emphasizing the moral and
practical importance of national and international proscriptions on torture
(including the risk to future American POWs) and the government’s
proven inability to prevent abuses at Abu Ghraib prison and elsewhere.363
Occasionally someone also will note that U.S. Army doctrine holds that
torture is counter-productive because it yields unreliable information.
These arguments, however, are not directly responsive to the Administration’s public position, which rejects not the norm of humane treatment but
its enforceability.
That the Administration’s position in spring 2004 sounded odd to
many reflects American law’s traditional skepticism about the value of
361. 40 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Docs. 1049, 1055 (2004).
362. See, e.g., Editorial, Bush’s Legalistic Evasions about Torture Set a Dangerous Example for
U.S. Forces and the World, Atlanta J.-Const., June 16, 2004, at 16A; Editorial, Not Just a Few Bad
Apples, Baltimore Sun, June 13, 2004, at 4C; David Ignatius, Small Comfort, Wash. Post, June 15,
2004, at A23; Molly Ivins, The Many Errors of Bush’s Ways, Chi. Trib., June 17, 2004, at C27.
363. E.g., Robert Kuttner, Thank God for the Supreme Court, or at Least for the Six Members Who
Rules Clearly that the President’s Claims of Wartime Powers Do Not Trump the Rule of Law, Boston
Globe, June 30, 2004, at A17; Bob Dart, U.S. POWs from Other Wars Tell What It’s Like: ‘When You
Become a Prisoner of War, You’re Completely at the Mercy of the Captors’, Atlanta JournalConstitution, May 29, 2004, P. 1A.
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rules that individuals lack the capacity to enforce for themselves. Yet were
it not for the managerial deficiencies of non-entitlement programs, the
Administration’s position in this regard might not seem particularly
irrational.364 In the abstract, the questions of what standards constrain the
operation of government and what procedures enforce those standards are
entirely separate.
Ultimately, however, the release of photographs of brutality in Abu
Ghraib and of memos justifying brutal treatment of prisoners at
Guantanamo showed that, absent legal enforceability, the norm of humane
treatment was likely to be overcome in practice. The causes of this failure
are similar to those described above. First, frontline personnel yielded to
the influence of a strong counter-entitlement: pressure from superior officers to help extract actionable intelligence. With no countervailing pressure
to treat prisoners humanely, guards and intelligence officers’ incentives
became skewed.
Second, even to the extent that most senior policymakers had set out
humane norms of prisoner treatment in the Uniform Code of Military
Justice or otherwise, the lack of any mechanism for prisoners to seek enforcement of those rights may have deprived top managers of timely information about how frontline soldiers were resolving the tension between
those norms and the counter-entitlement to extract intelligence.365 Indeed,
the abuses at Abu Ghraib occurred despite the presence of many more
safeguards than are commonly present. The norms violated were relatively
clear, providing few serious interpretive problems: since the photographs
have come to light, few have questioned that the conduct they depict
should be proscribed. The U.S. Army also had the services of an expert and
highly independent auditor of its behavior, the International Committee of
the Red Cross.366 Yet the soldiers involved hid some abuses from the Red
Cross, a frequent problem when those with the best information about a
program’s adherence to its norms—here, the prisoners—lack the ability to
initiate an inquiry by requesting a hearing or contacting the outside observers. And even where the Red Cross knew of problems, it lacked the power
to compel a decision on them or even to share the information to more senior policymakers. By contrast, it is far more difficult to hide abuses from

364. The President’s credibility obviously was undermined severely by numerous pictures
showing that the U.S. had, in fact, engaged in torture, see Lt. Gen. Anthony R. Jones, AR 15-6
Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade (2004) (describing
abuses), and by extensive Justice and Defense Department memos offering legal justification for a
broad range of abuses that many would consider torture, e.g., Jay S. Bybee, Office of Legal Counsel,
Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (2002).
365. Subsequent investigations suggest that knowledge of prisoner abuse may in fact have gone a
long way up the chain of command. At a minimum, however, the ultimate policymakers—the Congress
and the electorate—were not aware until abuses had been occurring for many months.
366. Jones, supra note 25, at 64-67.
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those subject to them, and enforceable rights give individuals what auditors
generally lack: the power to force a decision.
Finally, prisoners’ lack of ability to force inquiries helped deny senior
military policymakers the ability to identify disparate treatment of
prisoners. If, as the Administration has alleged, abuses were confined to a
few particular military units, complaints likely would have come disproportionately from prisoners within the control of those units. Denying prisoners the right to make inquiry-forcing complaints prevented any such
pattern from becoming apparent. In addition, the apparent targeting of observant Muslims for particular abuse might have become apparent from
inquiries triggered by prisoners’ complaints.
To similar effect, when Congress and states sought to temper
Medicaid’s goal of improving beneficiaries’ health with the often contradictory goal of cost-containment, they forced millions of beneficiaries into
managed care.367 This stripped beneficiaries of many of their legal rights to
seek care and to choose among providers, much as PRWORA had stripped
cash-assistance claimants of their legal rights. And just as PRWORA had
given states virtually unchecked control over cash-assistance programs,
managed-care companies’ fiat now controlled the operation of Medicaid.368
Since then, federal and state administrators have pursued a daunting, and
so far largely unsuccessful, search for viable means of measuring the quality of care these companies offer and counterbalancing the companies’ incentives for cost containment with pressure for quality care.
As rising health-care costs have caused more employers to force their
workers into managed-care plans, this problem has emerged on the broader
political stage. Patients’-rights advocates have sought to give managedcare companies’ patients a broader range of enforceable rights to balance
the counter-entitlements that managed-care plans devise to encourage their
physicians to contain costs. Just as the shift of decision making in publicassistance programs away from true professionals has discredited
“professional judgment” as an alternative to enforceable rights,369 so too
they have suggested that the shift in power from professional doctors to
cost-focused managed-care companies has made traditional reliance on
doctors’ medical judgments an increasingly inadequate substitute for enforceable rights. On the other side, medical associations seeking relief from
367. Similarly, in 1997, when President Clinton and Congress sought to expand health insurance
for children while containing costs, they enacted the capped State Children’s Health Insurance Program
(SCHIP), a block grant to states. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa-1397jj (2000). Not only did this legislation
provide no individual entitlement to coverage, it also offered those claimants that states did choose to
cover few enforceable rights to services. The fiat of states, or of managed-care companies, determined
what the program would provide and under what conditions; whatever promises policymakers might
make about the services they would provide to claimants could be ignored without giving claimants
legal recourse.
368. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(b)(4) (2000).
369. See supra Part IV.C.3.
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malpractice awards have argued that the entitlement to high-quality care is
swamping the counter-entitlement for cost-containment, leading to wasteful “defensive medicine.” In neither case, however, are advocates of
structural change prepared to admit that they wish to change the substantive norms being enforced.
Each year since 2003, with Medicaid costs continuing to press states’
budgets despite the growth of managed care, President Bush proposed to
give states the option to convert Medicaid into a block grant shorn of legal
entitlements.370 Although states may exercise this flexibility to create less
generous entitlements, they also may be tempted to remove the entitlement
to care altogether, subsidizing particular individuals and services without
offering any legal assurances of coverage. The problems with disentitlement of Medicaid mirror those in cash-assistance programs. Without clear
rules, state policymakers and CMS will have difficulty communicating
their expectations to local offices or managed-care plans about what coverage they do and do not want to provide. They may have little reliable basis
for assessing how those offices are operating the program since claimants
will lack both a regularized channel for elevating complaints and clear criteria for framing their objections. And disentitlement raises the potential
for unnoticed but pervasive unequal application of discretion on matters
that may literally involve life or death.371 More generally, disentitlement is
likely to leave the tax-paying public with less reliable information about
the program it is funding, including both the program’s accomplishments
and the extent of unmet need.
President Bush also proposes to convert Section 8 housing vouchers372
and several other programs373 into block grants, and the House has passed
legislation that would do the same to the food stamp program.374 In each of
these cases, rather than modifying the substantive norms of the programs to
reflect new priorities, the proposals would extinguish claimants’ legal

370. Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2005 154-55 (2004) [hereinafter “FY
2005 Budget”]; Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2004 125-27 (2003).
On a smaller scale, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has begun promoting
waivers that allow states to limit or deny services in ways that otherwise would violate the Medicaid
statute to save money for coverage expansions, employer subsidies, and closing state budgetary gaps.
See Kaiser Family Foundation, Section 1115 Medicaid and SCHIP Waivers: Policy
Implications of Recent Activity (2003).
371. An expanding literature documents serious disparities in the quality of medical care received
by racial minorities and immigrants. E.g., Leighton Ku & Timothy Waidmann, Kaiser Commission
on Medicaid & the Uninsured, How Race/Ethnicity, Immigration Status and Language
Affect Health Insurance Coverage, Access to Care and Quality of Care among the Lowincome Population 17-18 (2003). If health-care professionals succumb in this manner, it seems
unlikely that non-professional eligibility workers will not. See Gooden, supra note 305.
372. FY 2005 Budget, supra note 370, at 165-66.
373. Id. at 130-31.
374. H.R. 4, 108th Cong. § 703 (2003).
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rights: instead of rights based on less generous substantive norms,375 claimants would have none at all. Yet the maintenance of these programs’
funding demonstrates that the President and the House are not prepared to
renounce the norms of aiding the homeless, the poorly housed, and the
hungry. Rendering these norms unenforceable, rather than making specific
reductions in society’s commitment to aid this population, risks setting local administration of these programs’ funding adrift in ways that senior
policymakers would never countenance.
Most recently, the legislation adding a prescription-drug benefit to
Medicare also modifies the underlying program to begin to erode beneficiaries’ legal rights. In lieu of entitlements to particular services, this legislation begins the process of converting Medicare into a promise of only a
cash subsidy (“premium support”) in an arbitrary amount. Here again,
rather than facing the political costs of narrowing or eliminating specific
rights that clashed with the new programmatic goal of cost containment
(e.g., by reducing the number of days of hospitalization or skilled nursinghome care to which beneficiaries are entitled), the legislation would eliminate the structure of legal entitlement to any particular benefits.
Legislation stripping prison inmates of much of their ability to challenge abusive conditions sailed through Congress on the strength of some
anecdotes about trivial complaints prisoners have lodged. In all likelihood,
many of those that supported this legislation, or that declined to expend
political capital to block it despite misgivings, may have been amenable to
somewhat harsher substantive norms for the treatment of prisoners.
Enacting those norms directly would have been a far superior path. The
Prison Litigation Reform Act does little to distinguish between frivolous
complaints, technically meritorious complaints filed under norms that have
lost political support, and complaints of far more serious abuses that violate widely shared norms.376
Given the emotive nature of human rights, it would be politically difficult to narrow the substantive standards for asylum or other humanitarian
relief.377 It may be precisely for that reason, then, that persons believing
that these norms should be curtailed have contented themselves with stripping immigrants of the right to enforce those norms under many circum-

375. For example, the rent subsidies for Section 8 housing might be trimmed or the quality
standards for that housing reduced.
376. See, e.g., Davis v. Agosto, 89 Fed. Appx. 523 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing for inadequate
pleading a mentally ill inmate’s civil-rights complaint alleging punitive beatings and abuse with cattle
prod); Roland v. Galloway, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7542 (D. Kan. 1998) (dismissing for failure to state
a claim a civil-rights action by a prisoner alleging he was given electric shocks for profane and
insubordinate speech).
377. See, e.g., Ndom v. Ashcroft, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 19072 (9th Cir. 2004) (requiring
applicant for asylum to show not just danger upon returning home but that he would be singled out for
imputed political beliefs).
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stances.378 The lack of enforcement thus allows agencies’ actual practice to
deviate from their stated norms in ways that some policymakers prefer. The
consequences of this deviation present a different type of inefficiency, well
illustrated in the immigration field. The substantive norms of U.S. immigration policy have symbolic value as an extension of U.S. foreign policy
as well as practical import for thousands of immigrants and their families.
Voters and the bulk of Members of Congress likely assume that the stated
norms are in fact those that are in force; oppressive regimes overseas, on
the other hand, experience the actual policy as persons they have persecuted overtly are returned to their control. This deviation between nominal
and actual policies will make it difficult for Members of Congress and the
electorate to properly calibrate the other elements of foreign policies that
affect these countries. The inefficiency of disentitlement, and the efficiency
of enforceable rights that help hold agencies to stated norms, thus extend
well beyond the programs immediately at issue.
Conclusion
Relatively few have compared the capacities of various administrative
structures to implement particular substantive policies. One person who
has is Jerry Mashaw. Writing long before PRWORA,379 he identified three
models of administrative adjudication in public-benefits cases.380 One
model assumes that programs’ goals are primarily paternalistic and therapeutic; it criticizes agencies for failing to carry out programs’ substantive
goals fully.381 This model, albeit seeking to implement very different substantive objectives from the Social Security cases he studied, certainly has
driven welfare policy discussions over the past decade. Professor Mashaw
posits a second, more legalistic model that seeks to borrow processes from
civil litigation to improve the accuracy of decision making.382 This model
is the one most closely associated with legal entitlements. Finally, he describes a “bureaucratic rationality” model seeking predictable, consistent
outcomes that treat similarly situated people similarly.383 Professor
Mashaw argues that, although not obviously inconsistent, these models
tend to clash in practice,384 forcing policymakers to favor one over the others. His conclusion about the inconsistency of these models has become
378. Lenni B. Benson, The New World of Judicial Review of Removal Orders, 12 Geo. Immigr.
L.J. 233 (1998) (describing the numerous circumstances under which prospective asylees may be
ejected from the United States without having an opportunity for judicial review of their claims of
foreign persecution).
379. Mashaw, supra note 76, at 21-23.
380. Although writing specifically about Social Security disability cases, Professor Mashaw
suggests that these models may be applied to administrative adjudications generally. Id. at 23.
381. Id. at 21, 26-29.
382. Id. at 21-22, 29-31.
383. Id. at 22, 25-26.
384. Id. at 23, 34-40.
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widely accepted, as reflected in the recent movement to reject legal entitlements.
This Article has revisited this problem two decades later and has
reached a very different conclusion from that of Professor Mashaw. It finds
that legal entitlements, far from being inconsistent with the implementation
of complex, competing substantive policies, are essential to their success. It
further concludes that assuring consistent application of those policies
across the target population is essential to achieving the goals of paternalistic policies such as those upon which Professor Mashaw’s first model depends. This result has important implications far beyond PRWORA and
cash-assistance programs. The assumption that entitlements must be eliminated to accommodate major changes in programs’ substantive priorities
has come to have a pervasive influence on policy development in many
other programs.385
None of this means, of course, that entitlements are appropriate vehicles for all public programs or activities. It is clear, however, that the force
and rigidity of entitlements has been greatly exaggerated. At the same time,
the force and effectiveness of counter-entitlements have gone unnoticed or
underappreciated in debates about proposals to eliminate enforceable
rights. Decisions about programmatic structure should not be made without
careful consideration of the alternatives, including a clear-eyed assessment
of how each structural option might affect the program’s substantive objectives. In some cases, a clearer understanding of the likely consequences of
eliminating the enforceability of substantive norms may help expose covert
attempts to subvert norms that still retain wide public support. Unfortunately, in the current atmosphere of reflexive hostility to entitlements,386
that kind of reflection is proving all too rare.

385. Moreover, the question of whether cash-assistance programs coupled with work requirements
should operate as entitlements remains very much alive at the state level even after Congress decided in
1996 that it would not provide any federal source of entitlement. See, e.g., Weston v. Cassata, 37 P.3d
469 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that Colorado’s cash assistance program was an entitlement for dueprocess purposes notwithstanding state legislation to the contrary).
386. The term “entitlement” once “signified the solidarity of an expansive welfare state that
extended the rights and meaning of citizenship” but since the 1990s has “bec[o]me a term almost as
negative as ‘welfare.’” Katz, supra note 117, at 324-25.

